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ABSTRACT 
 
          This paper examines the cyclical and structural stance of fiscal policy. Firstly, to measure 
the stance of tax policy more accurately, this paper constructs a new tax-indicator – “discretionary 
tax policy index”. Secondly, incorporating this new dataset, the short-run cyclical stance of tax 
policy by institutions and public debt is investigated empirically. Finally, in the long-run (structural) 
perspective, I examine empirically the fiscal impact of demographic shift, and project its future 
impact on public finance in an internationally-comparable way. 
          In Chapter 1, I establish a novel measure – “discretionary tax policy index” – that can 
isolate discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect, as well as representing the entire 
tax policy, which overcomes the limitations of other indicators. Especially, this paper newly 
estimates a vast amount of “time-varying” tax-elasticities, which enables us to better-gauge 
discretionary tax policy. Based on sizable panel-data for 151 countries over the periods of 1970-
2015, this newly developed indicator could expand analytical tool in the context of tax policy.  
          In Chapter 2, I investigate empirically the cyclical stance of tax policy in both advanced and 
developing countries, as well as the two underlying reasons – institutions and public debt – for 
their different cyclical stances. Using the new dataset of “discretionary tax policy index” derived 
from Chapter 1, both IV fixed-effects and system GMM are employed to deal with endogeneity 
problem. This paper finds that tax policies tend to be mildly countercyclical or acyclical in 
advanced countries, while being procyclical in developing countries. Moreover, the tendency for 
procyclicality of tax policy becomes stronger when institutions are weak and public debt is high. 
          In Chapter 3, I examine empirically the fiscal impact of demographic shift, and project its 
future impact on public spending. For empirical analysis, this paper employs Arellano-Bond’s 
system GMM, using 161 countries’ panel-data from 1970 to 2016. For simulation, it uses “granular” 
approach to project future fiscal-burdens, based on the micro-level (age-specific) data from the 
National Transfer Accounts (NTAs). This paper finds that demographic shift negatively affects 
fiscal balance, and its impacts on three age-related spending – pension, health and education – are 
the most important channels. Also, from the simulations for 117 countries, it compares 
internationally the future fiscal-burdens – augmented by three key spending – that countries would 
likely face only by demographic shift, which requires structural reforms be done for some countries.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A New Measure of Discretionary Tax Policy:  
“Discretionary Tax Policy Index” Adjusted by “Time-Varying” Tax Elasticity 
 
1.1. Introduction 
          In the wake of global financial crisis, it takes center stage again to assess the cyclical stance 
of fiscal policy. However, unlike government spending, there has been relatively little research 
about the stance of tax policy, the other side of fiscal policy. Why? The main reason is that an 
adequate tax-indicator – which can represent the authentic stance of tax policy – does not exist. 
More specifically, while government spending represents the entire policy on the spending side, 
the major tax-indicators – tax-rate or tax-revenue – have limitations as proxies of policy stance. 
An adjustment in a specific tax-rate cannot represent the entire tax policy, because tax structure 
does not consist of a single tax-rate1, and the effect of change in a specific tax-rate depends on the 
income-distribution of each tax-bracket. Also, aside from tax-rate adjustment, there are many other 
tax policies such as tax-credits, tax-deductions, tax-bracket adjustments and the administrative 
measure like tax-audit. To make matters worse, there is also the lack of available international tax-
rate data. For this reason, most papers have focused on the limited study of an individual country, 
instead of international cross-country study. 
 
          As an alternative for tax-rate, some researchers have utilized tax-revenue as a share of GDP. 
However, this approach also has a problem, because discretionary tax policy cannot be separated 
from automatic stabilizer effect2. That is, since tax-revenue endogenously responds to business-
cycle, it is imperative to isolate the policy-driven part from the automatic response to business-
                                                          
1 Tax structure consists of various tax-categories – personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), goods and services tax 
(GS) including value-added tax (VAT), property tax, trade tax, inheritance tax, financial transaction tax and etc. – with their 
respective marginal tax-rates for various tax-brackets.  
2 Even though “automatic stabilizer effect” has been an established concept in the literature, there has been no consensus about its 
coverage. Also, its size varies among countries, depending on its tax-code and social security system (i.e. unemployment 
insurance). To estimate it, the literature defines automatic stabilizer as a cyclical component of fiscal balance (Mohanty and 
Scatigna, 2003; Cottarelli and Fedelino, 2010). This paper basically follows their definition, but it focuses only on the revenue 
side (tax-code), not on the spending side (unemployment insurance). Thus, this paper defines automatic stabilizer as the cyclical 
component of tax-revenue/GDP.  
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cycle. As shown in Figure 1.1, if tax scheme is progressive, tax-revenue also increases 
progressively for output above potential level, which may cause tax-revenue as a share of GDP to 
rise (i.e. automatic stabilizer effect). If this effect is not excluded, we might mistakenly conclude 
that tax policy always exhibits countercyclical stance.  
 
          To overcome these limitations of major tax-indicators, the OECD has invented and 
updated the cyclically-adjusted budget balances (CAB), which measures discretionary fiscal 
policy net of cyclical effect. The underlying logic is that budget balance needs to be adjusted for 
output gap (i.e. cyclical effect) by fiscal-elasticity. However, this CAB also has the following 
weaknesses as an indicator representing the stance of tax policy. Firstly, it is adjusted only by 
cross-section (fixed) elasticity of tax-revenue to output gap3. It is more desirable to use “time-
varying” tax-elasticities, instead of a fixed elasticity, because it enables us to better-gauge the 
current year’s change in tax policy, by taking tax-code fixed in the previous year4. Also, the 
CAB covers only the data from advanced economies – mostly OECD –, not being available for 
developing countries. Moreover, it does not issue cyclically-adjusted tax-revenue, isolated from 
budget balance including government spending and social contribution.  
   
          Thus, the purpose of this paper is to establish a novel measure of discretionary tax policy – 
“discretionary tax policy index” or “progressivity-adjusted potential effective tax-rate” – that can 
isolate discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect, as well as representing the entire 
tax policy, which overcomes the weaknesses of other indicators. Especially, this paper newly 
estimates a large amount of “time-varying” tax-elasticities, which enables us to measure auto-
stabilizer more precisely, constructing sizable panel-data of “discretionary tax policy index” for 
151 countries from 1970 to 2015. This new tax-indicator could expand analytical tools in the 
context of tax policy, especially for the issue about the cyclical stance of tax policy, which will 
be investigated in Chapter 2.  
                                                          
3 For example, Giorno, et. al. (1995, OECD) estimated cross-section tax-elasticities, based on 1992 tax-code for 19 OECD 
countries. After that, Girouard and André (2005, OECD) also estimated them, based on 2003 tax-code for 28 OECD countries. 
Recently, Price, et. al. (2015, OECD) updated the estimates of Girouard and André (2005), based on 2013 tax-code for 35 OECD 
countries. All these studies have estimated only cross-section (fixed) tax-elasticity, based on the tax-code of a specific year. 
4 If “time-series” data for tax-elasticity (progressivity) were constructed, the progressivity of the previous year’s tax-code could 
be eliminated (adjusted) in a new tax-index, while the progressivity-change by the current year’s tax-code could be included in 
the index as a discretionary policy. This will be discussed in detail in the section 1.4.1. 
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          The new indicator, “discretionary tax policy index” has the following advantages over the 
other indicators used in the literature: (ⅰ) It can represent the entire tax policy, since it includes tax-
credits, tax-deductions, tax-bracket adjustments and more, as well as tax-rate. (ⅱ) It can separate 
discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer, which enables us to measure the authentic 
stance of tax policy. (ⅲ) Since it can be derived from easily-available tax-revenue data, it 
compensates for the lack of international tax-rate data. (ⅳ) For more precise estimation of 
automatic stabilizer, it newly constructs “time-varying” elasticities, distinguished from the 
literature that has estimated only cross-section elasticity. (ⅴ) It establishes more extended panel-
data – 151 countries over the periods of 1970-2015 –, which is the first panel study of this size.  
 
1.2. Literature Review 
          A body of literature has investigated the response of fiscal policy – especially government 
expenditure – over the business-cycle fluctuations. Thornton (2008), Carmignani (2010), Lledó, 
et. al. (2011), Frankel, et. al. (2013), and Calderon and Ngugen (2016) have examined this cyclical 
stance of government expenditure. On the contrary, there has been little research about the stance 
of tax policy, due to the insufficiency of international tax-rate data. As a result, most studies have 
focused on an individual country, instead of international cross-country. For example, Barro and 
Redlick (2011) investigate tax-multiplier effect – the effect of tax-rate adjustment on GDP –, by 
using marginal income tax-rates of the United States. Strawczynski (2014) also studies the cyclical 
behavior of tax policy, using statutory tax-rates of Israel. In addition, Strazcich (1997) examines 
tax-smoothing hypothesis, utilizing marginal tax-rates of both Canada and the United States. 
Moreover, as criticized by Attinasi and Klemm (2016), the adjustments in tax-rates reflect only a 
small portion of the changes in the entire tax policy. Thus, it cannot be a perfect measure of the 
government’s choices about overall tax. 
 
          Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Sturzenegger and Wernek (2006) use tax-revenue or tax-
revenue as a share of GDP, as an alternative for tax-rate. However, as mentioned by Kaminsky, et. 
al. (2004), their weaknesses lie in that they cannot distinguish the policy-driven part from 
automatic stabilizer effect. Recently, these problems were addressed by Végh and Vuletin (2015) 
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who directly use statutory marginal tax-rates for 64 countries. It was the first paper using 
international statutory tax-rate data that are collected from various country-specific sources. 
However, as the authors stated, it also has limitation in the sense that they only used top marginal 
tax-rates – even though average marginal tax-rates (i.e. effective tax-rates) are more appropriate 
as representatives of the entire tax policy – due to the lack of data. These top marginal tax-rates 
still cannot represent the entire tax policy.  
 
          In an effort to surmount these limitations, a strand of literature has tried to measure the 
discretionary fiscal policy such as the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB). The process 
adjusted cyclically by tax-elasticity with respect to output gap implies the process of eliminating 
automatic stabilizer effect. Girouard and André (2005) estimate the tax-elasticity, based on 2003 
tax-code for 28 OECD countries, following the study of Giorno, et. al. (1995) based on 1992 tax-
code for 19 OECD countries. Recently, Price, et. al. (2015) update the earlier study of Girouard 
and André (2005) by using 2013 tax-code for 35 OECD countries, with some methodological 
refinements. All these studies have addressed only “cross-section” tax-elasticity mostly for OECD 
countries. However, regarding developing countries, the literature-coverage becomes much 
narrower, especially being limited to the studies for an individual country. For example, Osoro 
(1993, 1995) estimates the tax-elasticity of Tanzania. Bilquees (2004) also studies the tax-elasticity 
for Pakistan. Cotton (2012) estimates the tax-elasticity for Trinidad and Tobago, followed by 
Upender (2008) who examined India’s tax-elasticity. Consequently, the literature has a common 
limitation in the sense that they have estimated only “cross-section” tax-elasticity – despite the 
advantages of using “time-varying” tax-elasticities for more accurate estimation – for the limited 
sample of advanced economies (mostly OECD) or an individual country.  
 
          All the literature considered, there is no perfect tax-indicator, which can evaluate precisely 
the stance of tax policy. The existing tax-indicators have intrinsically their own limitations: They 
cannot represent the entire tax policy, or cannot separate discretionary policy from automatic 
stabilizer, or estimate only “fixed” tax-elasticity for the limited sample (OECD or individual 
country). Thus, these limitations have motivated me to launch a further research to establish a new 
measure of discretionary tax policy – what I call – “discretionary tax policy index”. 
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1.3. Methodology (Step 1): A New Measure of “Discretionary Tax Policy Index”  
          This section provides us with a new methodology to better-measure discretionary tax 
policy. Firstly, as the basic conceptual idea, the underlying logic for “discretionary tax policy 
index” is explained. Then, the overall methodology for deriving this new measure is provided, 
except the estimates for tax-elasticity which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.3.1. Conceptual Idea for “Discretionary Tax Policy Index”  
          There exist several effects of the increase in output – above potential level – on both tax-
revenue and effective tax-rate, as shown in Figure 1.1-(A): (ⅰ) “Proportional increase in tax-
revenue by the increase in taxable income”: the augmented taxable income increases tax-revenue 
proportionally as shown in the area A of Figure 1.1-(A), and so the effective tax-rate remains 
unchanged (i.e. ?̅? = 𝑇 ↑ 𝑌 ↑⁄  ). (ⅱ) “Additional increase by tax-progressivity (i.e. automatic 
stabilizer effect)”: if tax scheme is progressive, the tax-revenue increases higher than 
proportionally by the additional area B (= C), resulting in raising the average effective tax-rate (i.e. 
𝜏 ↑= 𝑇 ⇈ 𝑌 ↑⁄ ). If the overall tax-progressivity (elasticity) is greater than one, tax-revenue cycles 
may exhibit greater fluctuations than business-cycles in the same logic, as in Figure 1.1-(B). (ⅲ) 
“Discretionary tax policy by policy maker”: it is a pure discretionary policy reaction by policy-
maker (i.e. the government’s choices) such as either raising or lowering tax-rate, which leads to 
the changes in the effective tax-rate (𝜏) at potential output – without the changes in output –, in 
Figure 1.1-(A). 
 
          To measure the genuine stance of tax policy more accurately, it is necessary to separate the 
discretionary tax policy – which is chosen by the government – from the automatic stabilizer effect 
– which is attributed to the automatic response of effective tax-rate on business-cycle fluctuations 
–, as well as excluding the proportional change in tax-revenue by the change in taxable income. 
Thus, the stance of tax policy should be measured only by (ⅲ) discretionary tax policy, excluding 
both (ⅱ) automatic stabilizer effect by tax-progressivity and (ⅰ) the proportional increase in tax-
revenue by the increase in taxable income. This is the basic idea underlying the new tax-indicator 
– “discretionary tax policy index” –, which will be derived in the next section. 
 
6 
 
1.3.2. A New Measure of Discretionary Tax Policy: “Discretionary Tax Policy Index”    
 
          Let’s start from potential tax-revenue 𝑇𝑡
∗. Let 𝑌𝑡
∗ be potential GDP5. Also, let 𝜃𝑡 be total tax-
progressivity, which is the same as the elasticity of tax-revenue to output6. Potential tax-revenue 
can be derived by adjusting actual tax-revenue for the weighted deviation of potential output from 
actual output by tax-progressivity7. That is, 𝑇𝑡
∗ is “progressivity-adjusted potential tax-revenue”, 
which is adjusted to potential value that under a tax-progressivity (elasticity) 𝜃𝑡 , tax-revenue 
would have if the output were at its potential level 𝑌𝑡
∗, instead of its actual level 𝑌𝑡. This step 
implies excluding both the area A and C in Figure 1.1-(A).   
 
 𝑇𝑡
∗ = 𝑇𝑡 ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡
∗
𝑌𝑡
 )
𝜃𝑡
                                                                          (1) 
     
                                                 𝑇𝑡
∗ = progressivity-adjusted potential tax-revenue  
                                                 𝑇𝑡 = actual tax-revenue  
                                                 𝑌𝑡
∗ = potential GDP  
                                                 𝑌𝑡  = actual GDP  
                                                 𝜃𝑡 = total tax-progressivity (elasticity of tax-revenue to output) 
 
          The second step is to derive “progressivity-adjusted potential effective tax-rate”. This can 
be easily obtained by dividing the progressivity-adjusted potential tax-revenue 𝑇𝑡
∗ by the potential 
output 𝑌𝑡
∗. The underlying logic is as follows: Potential tax-revenue 𝑇𝑡
∗ is acyclical, which is no 
longer influenced by automatic stabilizer. Since automatic stabilizer effect is already excluded in 
the above equation (1), the discretionary tax policy (discretionary effective tax-rate) can be solely 
                                                          
5 This paper uses a Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothed) GDP as a proxy of potential output, as in most literature. 
6 According to Benabou (2002) and Holter et. al. (2014), tax-progressivity is generally defined as follows: A tax scheme is 
progressive if and only if the marginal tax-rate (MTR) is higher than the average tax-rate (ATR) for all level of income: 
 
     𝜃 =
𝑀𝑇𝑅
𝐴𝑇𝑅
= ( 
𝜕𝑇/𝜕𝑌
𝑇/𝑌
 )   > 1                                         ∀𝑌 > 0.                                    (1-1) 
 
The equation (1-1) can also be regarded as the elasticity of tax-revenue to output. Moreover, tax-progressivity varies among tax-
categories – for example, personal income tax (PIT) usually has higher progressivity than the value-added tax (VAT), whose 
progressivity is around one, since it is a flat tax. Thus, in this paper, “total tax-progressivity (elasticity)” is defined as a weighted-
average elasticity of personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), goods and services tax (GS) and the other tax.   
 
7 This potential tax-revenue (𝑇𝑡
∗) is basically similar to the revenue part of cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) by 
Bornhorst, et. al. (2011; OECD). However, unlike their approach, it covers only tax-revenue, excluding social security 
contributions and government expenditure. More importantly, it is different from CAB, in the sense that it uses “time-varying” 
progressivity (elasticity) 𝜃𝑡, instead of fixed 𝜃. The details for this will be discussed in section 1.4. 
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measured just by dividing 𝑇𝑡
∗ by potential output 𝑌𝑡
∗. This step implies eliminating the proportional 
increase in potential tax-revenue by the increase in potential output. Also, it is more desirable to 
replace outputs with lagged values, since tax is levied based on the taxable income of the previous 
year, and tax policy usually entails time-lag for legislation and implementation. This replacement 
also helps us to address a potential endogeneity problem – reverse causality between tax-revenue 
and output. Thus, “progressivity-adjusted potential effective tax-rate” 𝜏𝑡 can be derived as follows: 
 
𝜏𝑡 =
𝑇𝑡
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ =
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
                                                              (2) 
 
          The last step is to decompose tax-revenue into various tax-categories with their respective 
progressivity (elasticity), and to establish the synthetic index by the weighted average of them. 
Firstly, let’s decompose tax-revenue into four categories: personal income tax (PIT), corporate 
income tax (CIT), goods and services tax (GS) – including value-added tax (VAT) – and other 
taxes such as trade tax, property tax, financial transaction tax, inheritance tax, and so on. Next, the 
tax-progressivity (elasticity) of each tax-category is estimated, which will be discussed in the next 
section 1.4. Then, I can establish the synthetic index of discretionary tax policy as follows. In this 
paper, I will call this index “discretionary tax policy index”: 
 
𝜏𝑡  =  𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+ 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
  
                           +(1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )                                                          (3) 
     
                                     𝜏𝑡 = discretionary tax policy index 
                                     𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇, 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 = respective share of PIT, CIT and GS to tax-revenue 
                                     𝑇𝑡 = actual tax-revenue  
                                     𝑌𝑡−1
∗ = lagged potential GDP  
                                     𝑌𝑡−1 = lagged actual GDP  
                                     𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 = respective elasticity of PIT, CIT and GS to output gap 
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1.4. Methodology (Step 2): Estimates for “Time-Varying” Tax Elasticity  
          In this process, the estimates for tax-elasticity 𝜃  is crucial. To estimate 𝜃 , this paper 
basically uses the method suggested by Girouard and André (2005). However, this paper extends 
the data-coverage much broader from their cross-section estimates (2003) for 28 OECD countries 
into “time-varying” estimates (1970~2015) for 151 advanced and developing countries. This is a 
distinguished feature of this paper, compared to the previous literature. Following the approach of 
Girouard and André (2005), tax-elasticity 𝜃 is identified separately in this paper, as shown in the 
equation (4): (ⅰ) “elasticity of tax-revenue to tax base (𝜃𝑇,𝑇𝐵)”, which is determined by tax-code 
and income-distribution, (ⅱ) “elasticity of tax base to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌)”, which is estimated 
empirically. Especially, unlike their method, this paper uses “time-varying” tax-elasticity 𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵) 
to capture the time-varying feature of tax-code and income-distribution.  
 
𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑌)  =   𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)  ×  𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌8                                                                    (4) 
 
                                                   𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑌) = “time-varying” elasticity of tax-revenue to output gap 
                                                   𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵) = “time-varying” elasticity of tax-revenue to tax base    
                                                   𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌  =  elasticity of tax base to output gap  
 
1.4.1. “Time-Varying” Elasticity of Tax-Revenue to Tax Base (𝜽𝒕,(𝑻,𝑻𝑩)) 
          As the first step, it is necessary to derive “time-varying” elasticity of tax-revenue to tax base, 
𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵). For this, earnings (wage), profits and private consumption are used as proxies of tax base 
for personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and goods and services tax (GS), 
respectively. First of all, the elasticity of PIT to earnings is calculated by income distribution-
weighted ratio of marginal- to average tax-rate. However, unlike the method used by Girouard and 
André (2005), this paper replaces both marginal- and average tax-rate with lagged values, by using 
a bunch of time-series (“time-varying”) data for actual marginal- and average tax-rates that are 
                                                          
8 The elasticity of tax-revenue with respect to output gap (𝜃𝑇,𝑌) can be decomposed into the product of the following two 
components: the elasticity of tax-revenue to tax base (𝜃𝑇,𝑇𝐵) and the elasticity of tax base to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌).   
                                 
∆𝑇
∆𝑌
∙
𝑌
𝑇⏟
=𝜃𝑇,𝑌
  ≡   ( 
∆𝑇
∆𝑇𝐵
∙
𝑇𝐵
𝑇
 )⏟      
=𝜃𝑇,𝑇𝐵
 ×  ( 
∆𝑇𝐵
∆𝑌
∙
𝑌
𝑇𝐵
 )⏟      
=𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
                                                                     (4-1) 
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newly calculated in this paper. This replacement enables us to better-gauge the current year’s 
change in tax policy, by taking the tax-code fixed in the previous year. That is, the progressivity 
of the previous year’s tax-code is eliminated (adjusted) in the index, but the progressivity-change 
by the current year’s tax-code is included as a discretionary policy. Thus, the “time-varying” 
elasticity of PIT to earnings can be derived by the following equation: 
 
𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇   =   
∑  (𝛿𝑡,𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇 )𝑖
∑  (𝛿𝑡,𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇 )𝑖
                                                              (5) 
     
                                                 𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = elasticity of PIT to earnings  
                                                 𝛿𝑡,𝑖 = weight of percentile-income 𝑖 in total income  
                                                 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = lagged marginal tax-rate of PIT at percentile-income 𝑖 
                                                 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇  = lagged average tax-rate of PIT at percentile-income 𝑖 
 
          Figure 1.2-(A) and Table 1.1 show how to derive the elasticity of PIT to earnings (𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ) 
from income-distribution, marginal- and average tax-rates, in case of Australia tax-code in 2015. 
As shown in Table 1.1, based on the data of personal income tax-revenue (𝑇𝑖) and personal income 
(𝑌𝑖) at each income-level, “actual” marginal- and average tax-rates are derived at each income-
level. The income-distribution plays an “income-weighting” role in the ratio of marginal- to 
average tax-rate, as in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2-(A). For this, a log-normal distribution is fitted 
along the income-distribution from 0- to 5-times average earnings. This paper extends the fitted 
distribution from 3-times average earnings in Girouard and André (2005) model into 5-times 
average earnings, to better-capture the long tail of income-distribution. Also, to fit a log-normal 
income distribution, this paper derives standard deviation from Gini-index9, instead of the decile-
data used in the 2005 model. Since the Gini index is more easily available for many countries than 
decile-data, I can attain internationally-comparable fits of log-normal distribution, which enables 
                                                          
9 The international cross-country data for both Gini index (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖) and the average income (𝑚) – normalized to 1 (i.e. 1% of the 
average income) – are available for each country. The mean of log-normal distribution is as follows: 𝑚 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜇 + 𝜎2/2), where 
𝜇 and 𝜎 are the mean and standard deviation of normal distribution, respectively. Also, the Gini index of log-normal distribution 
is as follows: 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝜎2/2), where 𝑒𝑟𝑓 is error function. Thus, standard deviation can be calculated from the Gini index by 
the following formula: 𝜎 = 2 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓 is inverse error function. Moreover, the mean of normal distribution 
(𝜇) can be derived as follows: 𝜇 = ln(𝑚) − 𝜎2/2.  
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us to construct the new tax-indicator more extensively – including developing countries as well as 
advanced countries. As a result, income-distributions, marginal- and average tax-rates for 119 
advanced and developing countries are derived as in Figure 1.3, by which I can obtain the 
elasticities of PIT to earnings for all the sample countries in a specific year. Iterating this procedure 
for every year (1970-2015), I can also establish a vast amount of “time-varying” elasticities of PIT 
to earnings for 119 countries over the periods of 1970-2015. The third column of Table 1.2 
illustrates “time-varying” elasticities of PIT to earnings in case of Australia.  
 
          Corporate income tax (CIT) and goods and services tax (GS) are assumed to be proportional 
to each tax base – profits and private consumption –, as in the 2005 model. That is, the elasticities 
of both CIT and GS with respect to their respective tax base are assumed to be a unity. Table 1.5 
shows in detail how to estimate these “time-varying” elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS to their 
respective tax base, using their data-sources. 
 
1.4.2. Estimates for the Elasticity of Tax Base to Output Gap (𝜽𝑻𝑩,𝒀) 
          As the second step, the elasticity of tax base to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌) is estimated empirically. 
First of all, the elasticity of PIT base (earnings) to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ) is estimated empirically. 
For this, the panel FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Square) estimator with correction for AR 
(1) autocorrelation in the residuals is employed, using the panel-data covering 151 countries 
from 1970 to 2015. Especially, the sample countries are classified into 6 groups by geographic or 
economic criterion, and then the elasticities are identified separately for each group, as shown in 
Table 1.5. The estimation equation is as follows: 
 
∆ log (
𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗ ) =  𝛼 + 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ∙  ∆ log (
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗)                                                       (6)                                             
     
                                                   𝐸𝐶𝑡 = compensation for employees  
                                                   𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = elasticity of earnings to output gap  
                                                   𝑌𝑡
∗ = potential GDP  
                                                   𝑌𝑡  = actual GDP  
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In this regression, the first differences of log-data are used, since the first differences of these 
variables are stationary, being statistically more robust than the level-data10. Table 1.5 shows the 
detailed method for estimating the elasticity of earnings to output gap, with its data-sources. The 
estimation results for each group are also provided in Table 1.5. 
 
          Secondly, the elasticity of CIT base (profits) to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ) is calculated by utilizing 
the reciprocal feature between profits and wages (or earnings). It is assumed that the response of 
profits can be represented by the reciprocal of wage. Thus, the formula for deriving the elasticity 
of profits to output gap can be expressed as follows: 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ]/𝑝𝑠, where 𝑝𝑠 
is the profit share, which implies the ratio of profits (gross operating surplus) to the sum of 
profits and wages (employee-compensation) 11. Lastly, the elasticity of indirect tax (goods and 
services tax, GS) base to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐺𝑆 ) is assumed to be a unity. This assumption is 
reasonable, since the indirect tax – including value-added tax – is usually a flat tax. The details 
for both estimation methodology and their data-sources are provided in Table 1.5. By this 
method, the “time-varying” elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS to output gap are derived, as shown 
in Australia case of both Figure 1.2-(B) and Table 1.2. 
 
          By this procedure, a heap of “time-series” data (1970-2015) for tax-elasticity (progressivity) 
are constructed for 151 countries including both advanced and developing economies. This is a 
crucial innovation of this paper, compared to the literature that provided us with only cross-section 
(2003) elasticity for limited samples – mostly OECD countries. Table 1.6 shows these tax-
elasticities for 151 countries. By following all the procedures in both section 1.3 and 1.4, this paper 
establishes sizable panel dataset for discretionary tax policy – 151 countries for periods of 1970-
2015–, which is the first panel study of this size. Table 1.7 provides us with tax-revenue structure 
and discretionary tax policy index for 151 countries, which shows at a glance the whole procedure 
of deriving “discretionary tax policy index”. Also, Figure 1.2-(C) and Figure 1.4 show graphically 
                                                          
10 When either the level-data or the first-differenced data for employee-compensation are used in this regression, the estimated 
coefficients (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ) seem to be similar between the two. However, regarding the stationarity of time-series data, Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests show that the first-differenced data are stationary for most of the countries, but not in level-data. 
11 The change in GDP can be decomposed into the change in profits (𝑃) and the change in employee-compensation (𝐸𝐶) as 
follows: ∆𝑌 = ∆𝑃 + ∆𝐸𝐶. From this identity, the elasticity of profits to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ) can be derived as follows:   
    
∆𝑃
∆𝑌
+
∆𝐸𝐶
∆𝑌
= 1  ⇔   
𝑃
𝑌
∙ (
∆𝑃
∆𝑌
∙
𝑌
𝑃
 ) +
𝐸𝐶
𝑌
∙ (
∆𝐸𝐶
∆𝑌
∙
𝑌
𝐸𝐶
) = 1  ⇔  𝑝𝑠 ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 + (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = 1 ⇔  ∴  𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ]/𝑝𝑠   
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the difference between “discretionary tax policy index” and tax-revenue/lagged GDP for Australia 
and 151 countries, respectively. The gap between the two lines can be interpreted as automatic 
stabilizer effect. 
 
1.5. Data Descriptions and Variable Sources 
          As the sub-data for deriving this new indicator, 151 countries’ panel-data from 1970 to 
2015 are used in this paper. Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 summarize the detailed methods and data 
sources, necessary to implement both Step 1 and Step 2 for deriving the new indicator, 
respectively. Firstly, Table 1.4 shows the data-sources for deriving “discretionary tax policy 
index” (Step 1). Regarding tax-revenue structure, the shares of PIT, CIT, GS, VAT revenue to 
total tax-revenue – 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇(= 𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡⁄ ), 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇(= 𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡⁄ ), 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆(= 𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡⁄ ) and 𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇(= 𝑇𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑇𝑡⁄ ) – are 
calculated from the following data-sources: the data for 𝑇𝑡, 𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇, 𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇, 𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆 and 𝑇𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇 are obtained 
from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database. Based on this tax-revenue 
structure, “discretionary tax policy index” is calculated by the equation (3) of the previous 
section 1.3, using the following additional data-sources: (ⅰ) For output gap (𝑌𝑡−1
∗ /𝑌𝑡−1), the lagged 
GDP data (𝑌𝑡−1) is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI). Also, 
the lagged potential GDP (𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ) is derived from Hodrick-Prescott filtering. Since I use the annual 
data, the smoothing parameter of HP filter is set at 6.5, following Ravn and Uhlig (2002). (ⅱ) 
Tax-revenue as a share of lagged potential GDP (𝑇𝑡/𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ) is calculated from the data of the World 
Bank’s WDI. (ⅲ) The data-sources for deriving tax-elasticities – 𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇, 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 – are provided 
in Table 1.5. 
 
          Table 1.5 shows the detailed estimation method and data-sources for estimating the 
elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS to output gap (Step 2). Firstly, as I mentioned earlier, the 
elasticity of PIT to earnings (𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ) is derived from income distribution-weighted ratio of 
marginal- to average tax-rate. For the OECD countries, the actual average (marginal) tax-rates 
are calculated by dividing (the first difference of) personal income tax-revenue by (the first 
difference of) gross personal income in each income-level. The data for each 0%~200% level of 
the average income is obtained from the OECD benefits, taxes and wages database, based on the 
family-type of married couple – second earner is not working – with no children. To capture the 
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long tail of income-distribution better, marginal (average) tax-rates and the fitted distribution are 
extended to 500% of average income, considering each country’s tax-schedule such as statutory 
top (or second-top) marginal tax-rates. For developing countries, per-capita GDP is used as an 
alternative of the average income. Marginal- and average tax-rates are extrapolated based on the 
estimates of tax-rates in each income-level of 0~4 times per-capita GDP, which are obtained 
from the Andrew Young School World Tax Indicators database12. Also, a log-normal distribution 
is fitted along income-distribution from 0- to 5-times average income. For this, standard 
deviation is calculated from Gini index by the following formula: 𝜎 = 2 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖), 
where 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓 is inverse error function. Gini index is acquired from the World Bank’s WDI or 
the UN University’s World Income Inequality database (WIID) version 3.4.  
 
          Secondly, the elasticity of earnings to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ) is estimated empirically. For 
regressing the estimation model (6), the data for employee-compensation (𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) are obtained 
from the World Bank’s WDI database. The data-sources for both lagged GDP and lagged 
potential GDP – both 𝑌𝑡−1 and 𝑌𝑡−1
∗  – are the same as before. Lastly, to derive the elasticity of 
profits to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ), based on the following formula: 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ]/𝑝𝑠, 
the data for profit share (𝑝𝑠) is calculated by dividing gross operating surplus by the sum of both 
gross operating surplus and employee-compensation. Both data – gross operating surplus and 
employee-compensation – are obtained from the United Nation’s National Accounts database. 
For the time-periods without tax-elasticity estimates, I use the average of the estimated values as 
an alternative.  
 
1.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
          In this section, I briefly check the sensitivity of “discretionary tax policy index” to 
business-cycle. For this, sensitivity analysis is conducted separately as follows: (ⅰ) the sensitivity 
(elasticity) of overall tax-revenue to business-cycle (i.e. the sensitivity in Step 2) and (ⅱ) the 
sensitivity of automatic stabilizer effect to overall tax-elasticity (i.e. the sensitivity in Step 1). 
Especially, the latter –  the sensitivity of auto-stabilizer to overall tax-elasticity – is used as a 
                                                          
12 Andrew Young School World Tax Indicators database (http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/wti.html) provides us with the actual marginal- 
and average income tax-rates for each income-level (0y~4y) equivalent to 0~4 times per-capita GDP.  
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proxy of the sensitivity of “discretionary tax policy index” to overall tax-elasticity. It is more 
desirable to measure the sensitivity of automatic stabilizer effect to tax-elasticity – rather than the 
sensitivity of the entire index to tax-elasticity –, because the entire index includes “discretionary” 
policy decisions by governments, depending on the country-specific (politico-economic) 
environment. It is thought be reasonable to assess only the sensitivity of automatic stabilizer 
effect to business-cycle, excluding the policy-driven part in the index.  
 
          The first part analyzes how much the overall tax-revenue responds to business-cycle 
fluctuations. Since I already derived the elasticity of each tax-category – PIT, CIT and GS – with 
respect to output gap in the previous section 1.4, the sensitivity of overall tax-revenue to 
business-cycle can be calculated by the weighted average of them as follows: 
 
𝜃𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ∙ 𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ∙ 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 ∙ 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 + (1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆)                 (7) 
 
where 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 are the respective shares of PIT, CIT and GS tax-revenue to total tax-
revenue, 𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 are the respective elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS tax-revenue to 
output gap. Figure 1.5-(A) shows the sensitivity of overall tax-revenue to business-cycle, using 
the Box-and-Whisker plots for 151 countries’ panel-data from 1970 to 2015. The Box-and-
Whisker plot shows at a glance the statistical information from a five-number summary: the 
minimum, the first quartile (25%), median, the third quartile (75%), maximum value in the 
sample (elasticity) data. Figure 1.5-(A) reports that the ranges for the sensitivities of overall tax-
revenue with respect to output gap in 151 countries are mainly between 1.0 and 1.5. Also, Figure 
1.5-(B) and (C) show the respective sensitivities of PIT and CIT to business-cycle, which reports 
that the ranges for the sensitivities of each tax-revenue to output gap are mainly between 1.0 and 
2.5 for PIT and between 1.0 and 1.5 for CIT, respectively. 
 
          The second part is the analysis for how much automatic stabilizer effect changes by a 
change in overall tax-elasticity (progressivity). As mentioned earlier, this paper defines 
automatic stabilizer effect as the cyclical component of tax-revenue/GDP – instead of fiscal 
balance/GDP – narrowing down its coverage to revenue side. Accordingly, it can be calculated 
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by the absolute value of the gap between the tax-revenue/lagged GDP and the “discretionary tax 
policy index” as follows:  
 
Automatic Stabilizer Effect (ASE)  = | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− 𝜏𝑡 |                                             (8) 
 
where 𝜏𝑡 is the discretionary tax policy index
13. Figure 1.6-(A) represents the sensitivity of 
automatic stabilizer effect with respect to overall tax-elasticity (progressivity). The fitted line 
exhibits an upward-sloping form with the slope of 0.251, which implies that the higher overall 
tax-elasticity (progressivity), the greater automatic stabilizer effect. This is consistent with our 
intuition that as tax scheme becomes more progressive, the automatic stabilizer effect may 
increase. Figure 1.6-(B) also shows cross-country comparisons for the sensitivities of automatic 
stabilizer effect with respect to overall tax-elasticity, which implies that the countries with 
relatively higher tax-progressivity – for example, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, 
Iceland, Portugal and etc. – tend to have greater automatic stabilizer effect. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
          This paper establishes a novel measure of discretionary tax policy – “discretionary tax 
policy index” (or “progressivity-adjusted potential effective tax-rate”) – that can separate 
discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect, as well as representing the entire tax 
policy, which overcomes the limitations of other indicators. Especially, this paper newly 
constructs a vast amount of “time-varying” tax-elasticities, which enables us to better-gauge 
discretionary tax policy by estimating automatic stabilizer effect more accurately. Consequently, 
this paper builds sizable – and the most improved – tax-indicator for 151 countries from 1970 to 
2015, which provide us with an expanded analytical tool with regards to tax policy, especially 
for the issue of cyclical stance of tax policy.  
 
 
                                                          
13  More specifically, in this paper, automatic stabilizer effect (ASE) – which is defined as the cyclical component of tax-
revenue/GDP – is calculated by the following formula for 151 countries:  
   ASE = | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− 𝜏𝑡 |  =  | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− (𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+ 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
+ (1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 −𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆)
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )) | 
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1.8. Figures and Tables 
 Figure 1.1. The Conceptual Idea for “Discretionary Tax Policy Index”  
    (A) The Effects of Output-Increase on both Tax-Revenue and Effective Tax-Rate  
                       
                                        Source. Author’s own work. 
 
 
    (B) Business-Cycle, Tax-Revenue Cycle and Automatic Stabilizer Effect 
    
             Note. Output gap implies the difference between actual output and potential output (i.e. 𝑂𝐺 = 𝑌 − 𝑌∗). 
             Source. Author’s own work. 
17 
 
Figure 1.2. “Time-Varying” Tax Elasticity and “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” 
   (A) Income Distribution-Weighted PIT Elasticity: Australia Tax-Code (2015)     
 
       Notes.   1. This is based on a family-type of married couple – second earner not working – with no children. 
                    2. A log-normal distribution is fitted along income-distribution from 0- to 5-times average income.  
                        Standard deviation for log-normal fitting is derived from Gini index. 
                    3. Marginal- and average tax-rates are actual tax-rates – not statutory tax-rates – which are calculated  
                        from the data of personal income tax-revenue (𝑇𝑖) and personal income (𝑌𝑖) at each income-level.  
                    4. The details for how to derive this elasticity from data sources are provided in Table 1.5. 
       Source. Author’s own work, based on the income tax at each income-level from OECD Benefits, Taxes and  
                    Wages / Tax database, and the Gini index from World bank WDI. 
 
   (B) “Time-Varying” Tax Elasticity: Australia (1982-2015) 
 
           Source. Author’s own work, based on the estimation methodology and the data-sources that are  
                        described in Table 1.5. 
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Figure 1.2. (cont.) 
   (C) “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” and Tax-Revenue/GDP in Australia: Auto-Stabilizer 
 
              Notes. The gap between the two lines can be interpreted as automatic stabilizer effect, which is derived 
                          by the absolute value of the gap between tax-revenue/lagged GDP and discretionary tax policy  
                          index as follows: Auto-stabilizer effect  = | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− 𝜏𝑡 | .              
             Source. Author’s own work, based on the “discretionary tax policy index”, which is newly established  
                          in this paper, and tax-revenue and GDP from World Bank WDI. 
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Figure 1.3. Income-Distribution and Marginal /Average Tax-rates: 119 countries  
 
 (A) Advanced Countries: 35 countries  
                   
   (1) Australia                      (2) Austria                          (3) Belgium                       (4) Bulgaria                               
 
   (5) Canada                         (6) Croatia                         (7) Cyprus                         (8) Czech Republic                               
 
   (9) Denmark                      (10) Estonia                       (11) Finland                     (12) France                               
 
   (13) Germany                   (14) Greece                         (15) Hungary                    (16) Iceland                               
 
   (17) Ireland                       (18) Italy                            (19) Japan                        (20) Latvia                               
 
   (21) Lithuania                   (22) Luxembourg              (23) Malta                         (24) Netherlands                               
 
   (25) New Zealand              (26) Norway                      (27) Portugal                    (28) Romania                               
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Figure 1.3. (cont.) 
 
   (29) Slovak Republic         (30) Slovenia                     (31) Spain                         (32) Sweden                               
 
   (33) Switzerland                (34) United Kingdom        (35) United States                                                        
    
 
 (B) Developing Countries: 84 countries  
                  
   (36) Albania                      (37) Algeria                       (38) Angola                       (39) Argentina                               
 
   (40) Armenia                     (41) Bangladesh               (42) Barbados                   (43) Belarus                               
 
   (44) Belize                         (45) Benin                          (46) Bolivia                      (47) Botswana                               
 
   (48) Brazil                         (49) Burundi                      (50) Central Africa          (51) Chile                               
 
   (52) China                         (53) China, Macao           (54) Congo, Republic      (55) Congo, Democratic                               
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Figure 1.3. (cont.) 
 
   (56) Costa Rica                 (57) Cote d’lvoire               (58) Dominica              (59) Dominican Republic                               
 
   (60) Egypt                          (61) El Salvador                (62) Ethiopia                    (63) Fiji                               
 
   (64) Gambia                      (65) Georgia                      (66) Ghana                        (67) Guatemala                               
 
   (68) Honduras                   (69) India                          (70) Indonesia                   (71) Iran                               
 
   (72) Israel                          (73) Jamaica                     (74) Kazakhstan                (75) Kenya                               
 
   (76) Korea                         (77) Kyrgyz Republic         (78) Lebanon                     (79) Liberia                               
 
   (80) Macedonia                 (81) Madagascar               (82) Malawi                      (83) Malaysia                               
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Figure 1.3. (cont.) 
 
   (84) Mali                            (85) Mauritius                   (86) Mexico                       (87) Moldova                               
 
   (88) Mongolia                    (89) Morocco                    (90) Mozambique               (91) Namibia                               
 
   (92) Nigeria                       (93) Pakistan                   (94) Papua New Guinea      (95) Peru                               
 
   (96) Philippines                 (97) Russia                        (98) Rwanda                      (99) Samoa                               
 
   (100) Senegal                    (101) Serbia                      (102) Sierra Leone            (103) Singapore                               
 
   (104) Solomon Islands      (105) South Africa            (106) Sri Lanka                (107) St. Lucia                               
 
   (108) Syria                        (109) Tanzania                  (110) Thailand                 (111) Togo                               
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Figure 1.3. (cont.) 
 
 (112) Trinidad and Tobago       (113) Tunisia              (114) Turkey                     (115) Uganda                               
 
  (116) Ukraine                     (117) Uzbekistan              (118) Zambia                    (119) Zimbabwe                               
 
 
Notes. 1. A log-normal distribution is fitted along income-distribution from 0- to 5-times average income. Standard     
               deviation for log-normal fitting is calculated from Gini index.         
           2. For developing countries, per-capita GDP is used as an alternative of the average income.  
           3. Marginal- and average tax-rates are actual tax-rates – not statutory tax-rates – which are calculated  
               from the data of personal income tax-revenue (𝑇𝑖) and personal income (𝑌𝑖) at each income-level.             
           4. For advanced countries, 2015 tax-code is basically used, while for developing countries, 2005 tax-code  
               is used, except some countries without the data.   
           5. The details for how to derive this elasticity from the data-sources are provided in Table 1.5. 
Source. Author’s own work, based on the income tax at each income-level from both “OECD Benefits, Taxes and    
             Wages” and “World Tax Indicator”. The Gini index and per-capita GDP are obtained from World bank WDI. 
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Figure 1.4. “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” and Tax-Revenue/lagged GDP: 151 countries  
 
 (A) Advanced Countries: 35 countries  
                   
   (1) Australia                      (2) Austria                          (3) Belgium                       (4) Bulgaria                               
 
   (5) Canada                         (6) Croatia                         (7) Cyprus                         (8) Czech Republic                               
 
   (9) Denmark                      (10) Estonia                       (11) Finland                     (12) France                               
 
   (13) Germany                   (14) Greece                         (15) Hungary                    (16) Iceland                               
 
   (17) Ireland                       (18) Italy                            (19) Japan                        (20) Latvia                               
 
   (21) Lithuania                   (22) Luxembourg              (23) Malta                         (24) Netherlands                               
 
   (25) New Zealand              (26) Norway                      (27) Portugal                    (28) Romania                               
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Figure 1.4. (cont.) 
 
   (29) Slovak Republic         (30) Slovenia                     (31) Spain                         (32) Sweden                               
 
   (33) Switzerland                (34) United Kingdom        (35) United States                                                        
 
 
 (B) Developing Countries: 116 countries  
                  
   (36) Afghanistan               (37) Albania                      (38) Algeria                       (39) Angola 
 
  (40) Antigua & Barbuda     (41) Argentina                 (42) Armenia                   (43) Bahamas                               
 
   (44) Bahrain                     (45) Bangladesh               (46) Barbados                   (47) Belarus                               
 
   (48) Belize                         (49) Benin                          (50) Bhutan                      (51) Bolivia                              
 
   (52) Bosnia                        (53) Botswana                   (54) Brazil                         (55) Burkina Faso                               
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Figure 1.4. (cont.) 
 
   (56) Burundi                   (57) Cabo Verde                 (58) Cambodia                 (59) Central Africa 
 
   (60) Chile                         (61) China                         (62) China, Macao           (63) Colombia                               
 
  (64) Congo, Democratic   (65) Congo, Republic        (66) Costa Rica                (67) Cote d’lvoire 
 
   (68) Dominica                (69) Dominican Republic    (70) Egypt                       (71) El Salvador                               
 
   (72) Ethiopia                    (73) Fiji                             (74) Gambia                     (75) Georgia                              
 
   (76) Ghana                        (77) Grenada                    (78) Guatemala                 (79) Honduras                               
 
   (80) India                          (81) Indonesia                   (82) Iran                           (83) Israel     
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Figure 1.4. (cont.) 
 
   (84) Jamaica                     (85) Jordan                       (86) Kazakhstan               (87) Kenya                               
 
   (88) Korea                         (89) Kuwait                      (90) Kyrgyz Republic        (91) Lao PDR                               
 
   (92) Lebanon                    (93) Lesotho                      (94) Liberia                      (95) Macedonia                               
 
    (96) Madagascar              (97) Malawi                      (98) Malaysia                  (99) Maldives             
 
    (100) Mali                        (101) Marshall Islands      (102) Mauritius               (103) Mexico                                                     
 
    (104) Micronesia             (105) Moldova                  (106) Mongolia                 (107) Morocco                                              
 
    (108) Mozambique          (109) Namibia                  (110) Nepal                       (111) Nicaragua                              
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Figure 1.4. (cont.) 
 
   (112) Nigeria                    (113) Oman                      (114) Pakistan                  (115) Palau                               
 
  (116) Papua New Guinea   (117) Paraguay               (118) Peru                        (119) Philippines                               
 
   (120) Qatar                       (121) Russia                     (122) Rwanda                   (123) Samoa                               
 
   (124) San Marino             (125) Senegal                   (126) Serbia                     (127) Seychelles             
 
   (128) Sierra Leone           (129) Singapore              (130) Solomon Islands     (131) South Africa                                                     
 
   (132) Sri Lanka               (133) St. Kitts & Nevis      (134) St. Lucia                 (135) Syria                                              
 
   (136) Tanzania                (137) Thailand                  (138) Togo                    (139) Trinidad & Tobago                               
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Figure 1.4. (cont.) 
 
   (140) Tunisia                    (141) Turkey                    (142) UAE                         (143) Uganda                               
 
   (144) Ukraine                   (145) Uruguay                 (146) Uzbekistan               (147) Vanuatu                               
 
   (148) Vietnam                  (149) Yemen                     (150) Zambia                    (151) Zimbabwe                               
 
 
   Notes. The gap between the two lines can be interpreted as automatic stabilizer effect. 
   Source. Author’s own work, based on the “discretionary tax policy index”, which is newly established in this paper, 
                and tax-revenue and GDP from World Bank WDI. 
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Figure 1.5. Sensitivity Analysis Ⅰ: Box-and-Whisker Plots for Tax-Elasticity in 151 countries 
         (A) Sensitivity of Overall Tax-Revenue to Business-Cycle  
 
       Notes. 1. The sensitivity of overall tax-revenue to business-cycle is calculated by the following weighted  
                      average of each tax-elasticity: 𝜃𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 + (1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆)𝜃𝑡
𝑂 
                  2. The Box-and-Whisker plot shows at a glance the statistical information from a five-number summary:   
                      the minimum, first quartile (25%), median, third quartile (75%) and maximum value in sample data.  
                  3. This shows the range for the sensitivities of tax-revenue to output gap is mainly between 1.0 and 1.5.  
       Source. Author’s own work, based on the samples. 
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Figure 1.5. (cont.) 
 
   (B) Sensitivity of PIT to Business-Cycle               (C) Sensitivity of CIT to Business-Cycle     
 
    Notes. 1. The Box-and-Whisker plot shows at a glance the statistical information from a five-number summary:   
                    the minimum, first quartile (25%), median, third quartile (75%) and maximum value in sample data.  
               2. These graphs show the ranges for the sensitivities of each tax – PIT and CIT – to output gap are mainly  
                   between 1.0 and 2.5 for PIT and between 1.0 and 1.5 for CIT. 
    Source. Author’s own work, based on the samples. 
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Figure 1.6. Sensitivity Analysis Ⅱ: Auto-Stabilizer Effect and Tax-Elasticity (Progressivity)  
        (A) Sensitivity of Auto-Stabilizer Effect to Tax-Elasticity (151 countries, 1970-2015) 
 
               Notes. Automatic stabilizer effect is calculated by the absolute value of the gap between tax-revenue/   
                          lagged GDP and “discretionary tax policy index” as follows: Auto-stabilizer effect  = | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− 𝜏𝑡 | .              
               Source. Author’s own work, based on the “discretionary tax policy index”, newly established in this paper, 
                            and tax-revenue and GDP from IMF GFS and World Bank WDI, respectively. 
      
       (B) Cross-Country Comparisons for Sensitivity of Auto-Stabilizer (151 countries, 2015)  
 
               Notes. 1. Auto-stabilizer effect  = | 
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
− 𝜏𝑡 | .              
                          2. For cross-country comparison, the cross-section data of 2015 are used. In case of some countries 
                              without the data of 2015, the recent year’s data are used instead.  
               Source. Author’s own work, based on the “discretionary tax policy index”, newly established in this paper, 
                            and tax-revenue and GDP from IMF GFS and World Bank WDI, respectively. 
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Table 1.1. Income Distribution-Weighted Elasticity of PIT to Earnings: Australia (2015)     
Income 
level 
(ratio of 
average 
income) 
(i) 
Personal 
income 
tax 
revenue1 
(𝑇𝑖, AU$) 
 
Gross 
personal 
income1 
 
(𝑌𝑖, AU $) 
 
Tax-rate 
 
 
Log-normal 
income 
distribution 
 (PDF) 3 
(𝛿𝑖, %) 
Income-Weighted 
tax-rate 
Marginal 
tax-rate2 
(𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 =
 d𝑇𝑖/d𝑌𝑖,%) 
Average 
tax-rate2 
(𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖 =
 𝑇𝑖/𝑌𝑖,%) 
Weighted-
Marginal  
tax-rate 
(𝛿𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,%) 
Weighted-
Average 
tax-rate 
(𝛿𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖, %) 
0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1 0 8,077 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.2 11 16,155 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 
0.3 701 24,232 8.5 2.9 4.4 0.4 0.1 
0.4 2,639 32,310 24.0 8.2 7.3 1.8 0.6 
0.5 5,806 40,387 30.3 12.6 8.9 2.7 1.1 
0.6 7,994 48,464 36.0 16.5 9.4 3.4 1.5 
0.7 10,902 56,542 36.0 19.3 9.0 3.3 1.7 
0.8 13,810 64,619 36.0 21.4 8.3 3.0 1.8 
0.9 16,627 72,697 34.9 22.9 7.4 2.6 1.7 
1.0 19,449 80,774 34.9 24.1 6.4 2.2 1.5 
1.1 22,599 88,851 39.0 25.4 5.5 2.2 1.4 
1.2 25,749 96,929 39.0 26.6 4.7 1.8 1.3 
1.3 28,899 105,006 39.0 27.5 4.0 1.6 1.1 
1.4 32,050 113,084 39.0 28.3 3.4 1.3 1.0 
1.5 35,220 121,161 39.0 29.1 2.9 1.1 0.8 
1.6 38,350 129,238 39.0 29.7 2.4 1.0 0.7 
1.7 41,500 137,316 39.0 30.2 2.1 0.8 0.6 
1.8 44,650 145,393 39.0 30.7 1.8 0.7 0.5 
1.9 47,801 153,471 39.0 31.1 1.5 0.6 0.5 
2.0 50,951 161,548 39.0 31.5 1.3 0.5 0.4 
2.1 54,101 169,625 39.0 31.9 1.1 0.4 0.3 
2.2 57,251 177,703 39.0 32.2 0.9 0.4 0.3 
2.3 60,886 185,780 45.0 32.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 
2.4 90,692 252,014 45.0 36.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 
2.5 95,417 262,515 45.0 36.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 
2.6 119,043 315,091 45.0 37.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 
2.7 124,496 327,135 45.0 38.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 
2.8 129,948 339,251 45.0 38.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 
2.9 167,023 421,640 45.0 39.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 
3.0 173,566 436,179 45.0 39.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 
3.1 202,645 500,799 45.0 40.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 
3.2 209,914 516,954 45.0 40.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 
3.3 217,184 533,108 45.0 40.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 
3.4 261,529 631,653 45.0 41.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
3.5 269,889 650,231 45.0 41.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
… … … … … … … … 
5.0 2,221,788 4,987,785 45.0 44.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Income-Weighted Total Tax-rate:  ∑  (𝛿𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖)𝑖  and  ∑  (𝛿𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖)𝑖  34.2 20.8 
Income-Weighted Total Elasticity of PIT to Earnings:   𝜃(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇 =
∑  (𝛿𝑖∙𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖)𝑖
∑  (𝛿𝑖∙𝐴𝑇𝑅 𝑖)𝑖
 1.643 
     Notes. 1. This is based on a family-type of married couple – second earner not working – with no children. 
                2. Marginal- and average tax-rates are actual tax-rates – not statutory tax-rates – which are calculated  
                    from the data of personal income tax-revenue (𝑇𝑖) and personal income (𝑌𝑖) at each income-level.  
                3. A log-normal distribution is fitted along income-distribution from 0- to 5-times average income.  
                    Standard deviation for log-normal fitting is derived from Gini index. 
                4. The details for how to derive this elasticity from data sources are provided in Table 1.5.  
   Source. Author’s own work, based on the income tax at each income-level from OECD Benefits, Taxes and Wages/  
                 Tax database, and the Gini index from World bank WDI. 
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Table 1.2. “Time-Varying” Elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS Tax-Revenue to Output Gap: Australia Example (1982-2015) 
Year 
 
PIT Elasticity 
to Output gap 
(A=B×C) 
 
 
 
CIT Elasticity 
to Output gap  
(D=1×G)4 
  
 
GS Elasticity 
to Output gap4 
(H) 
Previous Estimates 
(Literature) 
 
PIT Elasticity 
to earnings1 (B) 
 
Earnings Elasticity 
to Output gap2 (C) 
 
Profit 
Share3 (F) 
 
Profit Elasticity to OG 
(G = [1-(1-F)∙C] /F) 
1982 1.091 1.335 0.817 1.291 0.386 1.291 1.000  
1983 1.056 1.293 0.817 1.249 0.424 1.249 1.000 ■ Girouard & 
1984 1.079 1.321 0.817 1.249 0.424 1.249 1.000 André (2005): 
1985 1.315 1.610 0.817 1.246 0.426 1.246 1.000  
1986 1.195 1.462 0.817 1.239 0.434 1.239 1.000 Cross-section estimates 
1987 1.162 1.422 0.817 1.225 0.448 1.225 1.000 based on 2003 tax-code 
1988 1.159 1.419 0.817 1.217 0.457 1.217 1.000  
1989 1.239 1.517 0.817 1.227 0.446 1.227 1.000 𝜃𝑡=2003
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = 1.04 
1990 1.294 1.584 0.817 1.236 0.436 1.236 1.000 𝜃𝑡=2003
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = 1.45 
1991 1.314 1.609 0.817 1.234 0.439 1.234 1.000 𝜃𝑡=2003
𝐺𝑆 = 1.00 
1992 1.313 1.607 0.817 1.225 0.449 1.225 1.000  
1993 1.229 1.504 0.817 1.222 0.452 1.222 1.000   
1994 1.178 1.442 0.817 1.226 0.448 1.226 1.000  ■ Giorno, et. al.  
1995 1.243 1.522 0.817 1.231 0.442 1.231 1.000 (1995): 
1996 1.202 1.471 0.817 1.240 0.432 1.240 1.000  
1997 1.223 1.497 0.817 1.234 0.439 1.234 1.000 Cross-section estimates 
1998 1.107 1.355 0.817 1.239 0.433 1.239 1.000 based on 1992 tax-code 
1999 1.075 1.315 0.817 1.234 0.439 1.234 1.000  
2000 1.133 1.387 0.817 1.235 0.438 1.235 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = 0.8 
2001 1.299 1.589 0.817 1.223 0.450 1.223 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = 2.5 
2002 1.295 1.585 0.817 1.224 0.449 1.224 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝐺𝑆 = 1.0 
2003 1.312 1.606 0.817 1.220 0.454 1.220 1.000  
2004 1.283 1.570 0.817 1.221 0.453 1.221 1.000  
2005 1.274 1.559 0.817 1.219 0.455 1.219 1.000  ■ Price, et. al.  
2006 1.283 1.570 0.817 1.220 0.454 1.220 1.000 (2015): 
2007 1.281 1.568 0.817 1.218 0.457 1.218 1.000  
2008 1.346 1.648 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000 Cross-section estimates 
2009 1.426 1.746 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000 based on 2013 tax-code 
2010 1.443 1.766 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000  
2011 1.451 1.777 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝑃𝐼𝑇 = 1.67 
2012 1.340 1.640 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = 1.85 
2013 1.367 1.674 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000 𝜃𝑡=1992
𝐺𝑆 = 0.97 
2014 1.352 1.655 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000  
2015 1.342 1.643 0.817 1.215 0.460 1.215 1.000  
  Notes. 1. PIT elasticity to earnings is derived by income distribution-weighted ratio of marginal- to average tax-rate at each year, as in Table 1.1. 
             2. Earnings elasticity to output gap is estimated empirically, using panel FGLS. / 3. Profit share is the ratio of profit to the sum of profit and wage. 
             4. CIT elasticity to profits and GS elasticity to output gap are assumed to be a unity. / 5. The details for how to derive elasticity are provided in Table 1.5. 
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the data from OECD Benefits, Taxes and Wages, World Tax Indicator, UN National Accounts and World Bank WDI.  
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Table 1.3. Establishing a New Tax-Indicator, “Discretionary Tax Policy Index”: Australia Example (1982-2015)  
Year 
Tax-Revenue Structure                                   Discretionary Tax Policy Index:  𝜏𝑡 = 
𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
 +
𝑤𝑡
𝑂 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) (%) 
Personal 
Income Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
 (𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue)  
(𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇)  
Goods & 
Services Tax 
Revenue  
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) 
  
Other Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑂) 
Progressivity (elasticity) Tax 
Revenue/ 
potential 
GDP (%)  
(
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ )  
Output 
Gap 
 ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) 
VAT 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇) 
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆) 
1982 55.86 12.97 24.30 - 6.87 1.09 1.29 1.00 24.89 1.00 24.93 
1983 55.78 11.47 26.37 - 6.37 1.06 1.25 1.00 24.03 0.97 23.35 
1984 54.99 10.00 28.38 - 6.62 1.08 1.25 1.00 23.47 1.01 23.73 
1985 55.29 10.41 27.37 - 6.93 1.32 1.25 1.00 24.80 0.99 24.79 
1986 55.60 10.24 27.03 - 7.13 1.20 1.24 1.00 24.70 1.01 25.07 
1987 57.26 9.91 25.62 - 7.21 1.16 1.23 1.00 25.03 1.02 25.57 
1989 57.02 12.13 23.79 - 7.07 1.24 1.23 1.00 25.49 1.01 25.72 
1990 55.16 14.50 23.33 - 7.01 1.29 1.24 1.00 25.34 0.97 24.53 
1991 54.20 16.51 23.02 - 6.27 1.31 1.23 1.00 24.03 0.95 22.70 
1992 53.60 17.54 22.31 - 6.55 1.31 1.23 1.00 21.35 0.99 20.96 
1993 53.55 17.90 22.19 - 6.36 1.23 1.22 1.00 20.65 1.02 21.02 
1994 54.17 16.12 23.75 - 5.96 1.18 1.23 1.00 20.72 1.01 21.04 
1995 52.07 17.62 23.50 - 6.82 1.24 1.23 1.00 22.18 1.01 22.49 
1996 52.38 17.99 23.23 - 6.39 1.20 1.24 1.00 23.23 1.00 23.33 
1997 53.21 18.64 22.17 - 5.98 1.22 1.23 1.00 23.70 0.99 23.49 
1998 54.04 17.99 21.95 - 6.01 1.11 1.24 1.00 23.58 1.00 23.49 
1999 54.21 18.42 21.62 - 5.75 1.08 1.23 1.00 23.72 1.00 23.64 
2000 54.92 19.35 20.15 - 5.59 1.13 1.24 1.00 24.50 1.00 24.57 
2001 44.24 24.12 26.27 13.63 5.37 1.30 1.22 1.00 26.46 1.00 26.46 
2002 48.52 17.91 27.84 15.43 5.73 1.30 1.22 1.00 25.19 1.00 25.12 
2003 48.57 19.86 28.01 16.04 3.55 1.31 1.22 1.00 25.89 1.00 25.82 
2004 48.97 20.04 27.61 16.28 3.39 1.28 1.22 1.00 26.00 1.01 26.17 
2005 48.98 21.67 26.32 15.56 3.03 1.27 1.22 1.00 26.45 1.01 26.60 
2006 48.29 22.99 25.96 15.95 2.76 1.28 1.22 1.00 26.27 1.01 26.63 
2007 45.70 25.84 25.42 15.73 3.03 1.28 1.22 1.00 26.00 1.01 26.28 
2008 44.75 27.50 24.73 15.54 3.02 1.35 1.22 1.00 26.28 1.00 26.27 
2009 45.87 25.89 25.17 15.33 3.07 1.43 1.22 1.00 23.80 0.99 23.54 
2010 46.71 22.70 27.66 17.43 2.94 1.44 1.22 1.00 21.41 0.99 21.16 
2011 48.05 22.49 26.66 16.70 2.79 1.45 1.22 1.00 21.74 1.02 22.32 
2012 48.37 23.86 24.97 15.37 2.80 1.34 1.22 1.00 22.71 0.99 22.49 
2013 48.17 22.96 25.95 14.87 2.91 1.37 1.22 1.00 23.06 0.98 22.60 
2014 48.45 21.81 26.44 15.79 3.30 1.35 1.22 1.00 23.03 1.00 23.01 
2015 51.31 20.58 24.39 15.80 3.72 1.34 1.22 1.00 22.64 0.99 22.44 
    Source. Author’s own work, based on data from IMF Government Finance Statistics, OECD Taxes and Wages, World Tax Indicator and World Bank WDI
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Table 1.4. Data-Sources for Establishing “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” (Step1)  
Variable Variable Description Data Source 
 (Step 1-1) Tax-Revenue Structure   
① PIT revenue share;  𝑤𝑡𝑃𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
)   The ratio of personal income tax (PIT) revenue to total tax-revenue (%) 
  * IMF GFS: Taxes on income, profits & capital gains: individuals  
 
Author’s own calculation 
using the 𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇,  𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇, 𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆, 
and 𝑇𝑡 data from the IMF’s 
Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS). 
 
② CIT revenue share;  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
)   The ratio of corporate income tax (CIT) revenue to total tax-revenue (%) 
  * IMF GFS: Taxes on income, profits & capital gains: corporations 
③ GS revenue share;  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆
𝑇𝑡
)   The ratio of goods & services tax (GS) revenue to total tax-revenue (%) 
  * IMF GFS: Taxes on goods and services 
 ④ VAT revenue share;  𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇
𝑇𝑡
) The ratio of value-added tax (VAT) revenue to total tax-revenue (%) 
  * IMF GFS: Value-added taxes 
⑤ Other revenue share;  𝑤𝑡
𝑂 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑂
𝑇𝑡
)   The ratio of the other tax-revenue to total tax-revenue (%)  
  * The share of the other tax: 1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 
 (Step 1-2) Discretionary Tax Policy Index  
  The “discretionary tax policy index” is defined as the “progressivity-adjusted potential effective tax-rate”, which is adjusted  
  to a potential value that under a tax-progressivity (elasticity) 𝜃, the effective tax-rate would have if the output were at 
  its potential level 𝑌𝑡
∗, instead of its actual level 𝑌𝑡. It is calculated as the weighted average of several tax-categories:   
 
     𝜏𝑡  =  𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+ 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+ 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
+ (1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 −𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆)
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )   
     
Author’s own calculation 
using the following data 
(①~⑧). 
⑥ Tax-elasticity (Progressivity) The elasticity of tax-revenue to output gap, which is calculated by the 
product of the elasticity of tax-revenue to tax base and the elasticity of tax 
base to output gap. The details are provided in Table 1.5. 
Author’s own calculation 
based on the method and 
data-sources which are 
provided in Table 1.5.   (ⅰ) PIT elasticity (𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) The elasticity of personal income tax-revenue to output gap. (☞ Table 1.5) 
      (ⅱ) CIT elasticity (𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇) The elasticity of corporate income tax-revenue to output gap. (☞ Table 1.5) 
      (ⅲ) GS elasticity (𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆) The elasticity of goods & services tax-revenue to output gap. (☞ Table 1.5) 
⑦  Tax-revenue / potential GDP ( 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ) 
The lagged potential GDP (𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ) is the lagged Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend 
GDP (smoothing parameter 6.5). 
Author’s own calculation 
using World Bank WDI 
⑧  Output gap ( 𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) The deviation of the lagged potential output from the lagged actual output. Author’s own calculation 
using World Bank WDI 
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Table 1.5. Data Sources for Estimating “Time-Varying” Tax-Elasticity: 𝜽𝒕,(𝑻,𝒀) = 𝜽𝒕,(𝑻,𝑻𝑩) ∙ 𝜽𝑻𝑩,𝒀 (Step 2) 
Estimation & Variable Variable Description Data Source 
 (Step 2-1) Elasticity of Tax-Revenue to Tax Base: 𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)         
 The elasticity of PIT to earnings is derived by income distribution-weighted ratio of marginal- to average tax-rate:  
𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇 =
∑  (𝛿𝑡,𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇 )𝑖
∑  (𝛿𝑡,𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇 )𝑖
 
Author’s own calculation 
using the following data  
 
① Marginal- and Average  
     tax-rate (𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇/𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Average [marginal] tax-rate is calculated by dividing (ⅱ) [first difference] by (ⅰ) [first 
difference] in each income-level (0~200% of average income) for OECD countries†.  
For developing countries or OECD countries before 2000, per-capita GDP is used as 
an alternative of average income. Both marginal- and average tax-rates are 
extrapolated based on the estimates of tax-rates in 0~4 times per-capita GDP. 
Author’s own calculation 
using the following data 
𝜃𝑡,(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝑃𝐼𝑇   (ⅰ) Gross personal income Gross personal income level (LCU) by 0~200% of average income, based on family-
type of married couple with no children (second earner is not working) 
OECD Benefits,  
Taxes and Wages 
       (ⅱ) Personal income tax Personal income tax-revenue (LCU) paid by 0~200% of average income, based on 
the same family-type as (ⅰ) 
OECD Benefits,  
Taxes and Wages  
       (ⅲ) Per-capita GDP GDP divided by midyear population (current LCU) World Bank’s WDI  
        (ⅳ) Marginal [Average] 
       tax-rates for 0y~4y 
Marginal [average] income tax-rates for income-level (0y~4y) equivalent to 0~4 
times per-capita GDP 
Andrew Young School 
World Tax Indicators 
(http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/wti.html)  
 ②  Income distribution (𝛿𝑡,𝑖) Log-normal distribution is fitted along income-distribution from 0- to 5-times 
average income. Standard deviation for log-normal fitting is calculated from Gini 
index as follows: 𝜎 = 2 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓 is inverse error function†. 
Author’s own calculation 
using the following data 
       (ⅰ) Gini index It measures the extent to which income-distribution deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. 
World Bank’s WDI / World 
Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) v.3.4 
𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝐶𝐼𝑇  
 𝜃𝑡(𝑇,𝑇𝐵)
𝐺𝑆  
The elasticities of both CIT and indirect tax (GS) to the respective tax base are assumed to be a unity. - 
 
† To capture the long tail of income-distribution better, marginal (average) tax-rates and the fitted distribution are extended by 500% of average income, considering each 
country’s tax-schedule such as statutory top (or second-top) marginal tax-rate and its bracket.  
 
† We know Gini index (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖) and the average income (𝑚) normalized to 1 (1% of average income) for each country. The mean of log-normal distribution is 𝑚 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜇 +
𝜎2/2), where 𝜇 and 𝜎 are the mean and standard deviation of normal distribution, respectively. Also, the Gini index of log-normal distribution is 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝜎2/2), where 
𝑒𝑟𝑓 is error function. Thus, standard deviation can be calculated from the Gini index by 𝜎 = 2 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓 is inverse error function. Moreover, the mean of 
normal distribution (𝜇) can be derived by 𝜇 = ln(𝑚) − 𝜎2/2.  
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Table 1.5. (cont.)  
Estimation & Variable Variable Description Data Source 
  (Step 2-2) Elasticity of Tax Base to Output Gap: 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌   
𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇  The elasticity of PIT base (earnings) to output gap is estimated empirically, using panel FGLS (Feasible Generalized 
Least Square) estimator with correction for AR (1) autocorrelation in the residuals. Especially, country samples are 
classified into 6 groups by geographic or economic criterion†, and it is estimated separately for each group.   
                                                         ∆ log (
𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗ ) = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ∙ ∆ log (
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗)  
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6‡ 
𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇  0.7415458*** 0.8454381*** 0.9047379*** 0.7701137*** 0.6684505** 0.7259605*** 
                   
Author’s own estimation 
using the following data  
 ① Employee-compensation (𝐸𝐶𝑡) Total compensation of employees (current LCU) World Bank’s WDI database  
 ② GDP (𝑌𝑡) / Potential GDP (𝑌𝑡
∗) 𝑌𝑡 is real GDP, and 𝑌𝑡
∗ is the Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend real 
GDP with smoothing parameter 6.5 
World Bank’s WDI database 
 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇  The elasticity of CIT base (profits) to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ) is calculated by reciprocal feature between profit and wage:   
   
𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = [1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ]/𝑝𝑠 
Author’s own calculation 
using the following data 
 ① Profit share (𝑝𝑠) The share of profit (gross operating surplus) to the sum of both profit 
and wage (employee-compensation) 
United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
 𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐺𝑆  The elasticity of GS base (private consumption) to output gap (𝜃𝑇𝐵,𝑌
𝐺𝑆 ) is assumed to be a unity. - 
† Countries are classified into 6 groups: (ⅰ) Group 1 [Southern Europe] (4): Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (ⅱ) Group 2 [Europe + North America] (36): Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands, Finland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Estonia, France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada; (ⅲ) Group 3 [Latin America] (8): Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay; (ⅳ) Group 4 [Central 
America + Caribbean] (16): Bahamas, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Barbados, Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia; (ⅴ) Group 5 [Asia + Oceania] (49): Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Cambodia, Korea, Kuwait, Japan, Lao 
PDR, China, China Macao, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nepal, Jordan, Oman, Palau, Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Australia, Armenia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Georgia, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, UAE, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen; (ⅵ) Group 6 [Africa and Other countries] (37): Burundi, Burkina Faso, 
Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Central African 
Republic, Liberia, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Cote d’lvoire, Sierra Leon, Togo   
‡    For Group 6 [Africa and Other countries], the FGLS estimate of the whole groups (151 countries’ panel data) is applied as an alternative.                
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Table 1.6. Elasticities of PIT, CIT and GS Tax with respect to Output Gap (151 countries6, 2015 / 2005) 
Country 
 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to  
output gap 
 
 (A=B×C) 
 
 
CIT 
Elasticity  
to  
output gap4 
(D=1×G) 
  
 
GS 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap4 
 
(H) 
 
 
Year 
Previous Estimates: 
Girouard and André 
(2005) 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to 
Earnings1 
(B) 
Earnings 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap2 
(C) 
 
Profit 
Share3 
 
(F) 
Profit 
Elasticity 
to output gap 
(G = [1-  
(1-F)∙C] /F) 
𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝑃𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐶𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐺𝑆  
 Australia 1.34 1.64 0.82 1.22 0.46 1.22 1.00 2015 1.04 1.45 1.00 
 Austria 1.63 1.92 0.85 1.23 0.41 1.23 1.00 2015 1.31 1.69 1.00 
 Belgium 1.74 2.06 0.85 1.21 0.42 1.21 1.00 2015 1.09 1.57 1.00 
 Bulgaria 0.87 1.03 0.85 1.11 0.58 1.11 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Canada 2.86 3.39 0.85 1.24 0.39 1.24 1.00 2015 1.10 1.55 1.00 
 Croatia 2.12 2.51 0.85 1.24 0.39 1.24 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Cyprus 1.89 2.83 0.67 1.75 0.31 1.75 1.00 2007 - - - 
 Czech Republic 2.46 2.91 0.85 1.14 0.53 1.14 1.00 2015 1.19 1.39 1.00 
 Denmark 1.08 1.28 0.85 1.25 0.38 1.25 1.00 2015 0.96 1.65 1.00 
Advanced Estonia 1.34 1.58 0.85 1.20 0.43 1.20 1.00 2015 - - - 
countries Finland 1.15 1.36 0.85 1.22 0.42 1.22 1.00 2015 0.91 1.64 1.00 
 France 1.21 1.43 0.85 1.24 0.40 1.24 1.00 2015 1.18 1.59 1.00 
 Germany 1.88 2.22 0.85 1.22 0.41 1.22 1.00 2015 1.61 1.53 1.00 
 Greece 1.64 2.21 0.74 1.16 0.62 1.16 1.00 2015 1.80 1.08 1.00 
 Hungary 0.85 1.01 0.85 1.16 0.48 1.16 1.00 2015 1.70 1.44 1.00 
 Iceland 1.73 2.05 0.85 1.26 0.38 1.26 1.00 2015 0.86 2.08 1.00 
 Ireland 1.94 2.29 0.85 1.18 0.47 1.18 1.00 2015 1.44 1.30 1.00 
 Italy 1.51 2.03 0.74 1.25 0.51 1.25 1.00 2015 1.75 1.12 1.00 
 Japan 1.31 1.96 0.67 1.39 0.46 1.39 1.00 2015 1.17 1.65 1.00 
 Latvia 1.43 1.69 0.85 1.20 0.44 1.20 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Lithuania 1.26 1.50 0.85 1.17 0.48 1.17 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Luxembourg 1.96 2.32 0.85 1.18 0.46 1.18 1.00 2015 1.50 1.75 1.00 
 Malta 1.72 2.04 0.85 1.17 0.48 1.17 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Netherlands 1.84 2.18 0.85 1.22 0.41 1.22 1.00 2015 1.69 1.52 1.00 
 New Zealand 0.95 1.42 0.67 1.35 0.49 1.35 1.00 2015 0.92 1.37 1.00 
 Norway 1.40 1.65 0.85 1.18 0.46 1.18 1.00 2015 1.02 1.42 1.00 
 Portugal 1.46 1.97 0.74 1.36 0.42 1.36 1.00 2015 1.53 1.17 1.00 
 Romania 1.09 1.30 0.85 1.12 0.56 1.12 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Slovak Republic 2.57 3.04 0.85 1.13 0.55 1.13 1.00 2015 0.70 1.32 1.00 
 Slovenia 1.98 2.34 0.85 1.33 0.32 1.33 1.00 2015 - - - 
 Spain 1.56 2.11 0.74 1.30 0.46 1.30 1.00 2015 1.92 1.15 1.00 
 Sweden 1.18 1.39 0.85 1.31 0.33 1.31 1.00 2015 0.92 1.78 1.00 
 Switzerland 1.68 1.98 0.85 1.20 0.44 1.20 1.00 2015 1.10 1.78 1.00 
 United Kingdom 1.56 1.85 0.85 1.27 0.36 1.27 1.00 2015 1.18 1.66 1.00 
 United States 1.34 1.59 0.85 1.23 0.41 1.23 1.00 2015 1.30 1.53 1.00 
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Table 1.6. (cont.) 
Country 
 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to  
output gap 
 
 (A=B×C) 
 
 
CIT 
Elasticity  
to  
output gap4 
(D=1×G) 
  
 
GS 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap4 
 
(H) 
 
 
Year 
Previous Estimates: 
Girouard and André 
(2005) 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to 
Earnings1 
(B) 
Earnings 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap2 
(C) 
 
Profit 
Share3 
 
(F) 
Profit 
Elasticity 
to output gap 
(G = [1-  
(1-F)∙C] /F) 
𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝑃𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐶𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐺𝑆  
 Albania 2.98 3.53 0.85 1.20 0.44 1.20 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Algeria 1.27 1.75 0.73 1.07 0.79 1.07 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Angola 1.13 1.56 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2003 - - - 
 Argentina 2.10 2.32 0.90 1.05 0.66 1.05 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Armenia 0.85 1.04 0.82 1.14 0.56 1.14 1.00 2002 - - - 
 Bangladesh 1.94 2.37 0.82 1.15 0.55 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Barbados 1.42 1.85 0.77 1.45 0.34 1.45 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Belarus 1.18 1.39 0.85 1.23 0.40 1.23 1.00 1998 - - - 
 Belize 1.59 2.06 0.77 1.22 0.51 1.22 1.00 1985 - - - 
 Benin 1.28 1.76 0.73 1.58 0.32 1.58 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Bolivia 2.17 2.40 0.90 1.06 0.63 1.06 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Botswana 1.70 2.35 0.73 1.11 0.71 1.11 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Brazil 2.12 2.35 0.90 1.11 0.47 1.11 1.00 2005 - - - 
Developing Burundi 1.53 2.10 0.73 1.08 0.77 1.08 1.00 2002 - - - 
countries Central Africa 2.24 3.09 0.73 1.07 0.80 1.07 1.00 2002 - - - 
 Chile 2.96 3.27 0.90 1.08 0.53 1.08 1.00 2003 - - - 
 China 1.77 2.65 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
 China, Macao 1.39 2.07 0.67 1.19 0.64 1.19 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Congo, Democratic 0.73 1.00 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Congo, Republic 1.09 1.50 0.73 1.14 0.65 1.14 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Costa Rica 2.18 2.83 0.77 1.26 0.47 1.26 1.00 1984 - - - 
 Cote d’lvore 1.03 1.41 0.73 1.29 0.49 1.29 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Dominica 2.16 2.80 0.77 1.22 0.51 1.22 1.00 1998 - - - 
 Dominican RP 1.43 1.85 0.77 1.13 0.64 1.13 1.00 1989 - - - 
 Egypt 1.68 2.32 0.73 1.15 0.64 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 El Salvador 1.82 2.36 0.77 1.22 0.51 1.22 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Ethiopia 1.35 1.86 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Fiji 1.23 1.84 0.67 1.29 0.53 1.29 1.00 1990 - - - 
 Gambia 1.35 1.85 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Georgia 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.12 0.73 1.12 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Ghana 1.21 1.67 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Guatemala 1.45 1.88 0.77 1.18 0.56 1.18 1.00 1987 - - - 
 Honduras 0.78 1.01 0.77 1.31 0.43 1.31 1.00 1990 - - - 
 India 2.92 4.36 0.67 1.15 0.69 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Indonesia 1.88 1.31 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
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Table 1.6. (cont.) 
Country 
 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to  
output gap 
 
 (A=B×C) 
 
 
CIT 
Elasticity  
to  
output gap4 
(D=1×G) 
  
 
GS 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap4 
 
(H) 
 
 
Year 
Previous Estimates: 
Girouard and André 
(2005) 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to 
Earnings1 
(B) 
Earnings 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap2 
(C) 
 
Profit 
Share3 
 
(F) 
Profit 
Elasticity 
to output gap 
(G = [1-  
(1-F)∙C] /F) 
𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝑃𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐶𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐺𝑆  
 Iran 1.23 1.84 0.67 1.14 0.70 1.14 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Israel 1.38 2.06 0.67 1.47 0.41 1.47 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Jamaica 1.30 1.68 0.77 1.26 0.47 1.26 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Kazakhstan 0.83 1.24 0.67 1.26 0.56 1.26 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Kenya 0.93 1.29 0.73 1.19 0.59 1.19 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Korea 1.58 2.36 0.67 1.28 0.54 1.28 1.00 2005 1.40 1.52 1.00 
 Kyrgyz Republic 0.75 1.12 0.67 1.70 0.32 1.70 1.00 2002 - - - 
 Lebanon 1.26 1.89 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Liberia 0.73 1.00 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Macedonia 1.11 1.31 0.85 1.20 0.44 1.20 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Madagascar 2.04 2.81 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Malawi 1.90 2.61 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Malaysia 1.77 2.65 0.67 1.20 0.62 1.20 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Mali 1.99 2.74 0.73 1.04 0.86 1.04 1.00 2005 - - - 
Developing Mauritius 1.69 2.33 0.73 1.18 0.61 1.18 1.00 2005 - - - 
countries Mexico 1.44 1.86 0.77 1.11 0.68 1.11 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Moldova 1.64 1.94 0.85 1.27 0.37 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Mongolia 1.24 1.86 0.67 1.21 0.61 1.21 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Morocco 2.81 3.87 0.73 1.17 0.62 1.17 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Mozambique 0.73 1.00 0.73 1.17 0.62 1.17 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Namibia 2.31 3.19 0.73 1.24 0.53 1.24 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Nigeria 1.03 1.41 0.73 1.02 0.95 1.02 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Pakistan 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2001 - - - 
 Papua New Guinea 1.83 2.73 0.67 1.08 0.80 1.08 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Peru 1.71 1.89 0.90 1.04 0.70 1.04 1.00 1993 - - - 
 Philippines 1.10 1.64 0.67 1.14 0.70 1.14 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Russia 0.87 1.03 0.85 1.19 0.46 1.19 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Rwanda 1.41 1.94 0.73 1.08 0.78 1.08 1.00 2001 - - - 
 Samoa 1.73 2.59 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Senegal 0.96 1.32 0.73 1.08 0.77 1.08 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Serbia 2.18 2.58 0.85 1.31 0.33 1.31 1.00 2001 - - - 
 Sierra Leone 2.82 3.88 0.73 1.16 0.64 1.16 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Singapore 1.25 1.87 0.67 1.24 0.58 1.24 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Solomon Island 1.35 2.03 0.67 1.32 0.51 1.32 1.00 1990 - - - 
 South Africa 1.77 2.44 0.73 1.27 0.51 1.27 1.00 2005 - - - 
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Table 1.6. (cont.) 
Country 
 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to  
output gap 
 
 (A=B×C) 
 
 
CIT 
Elasticity  
to  
output gap4 
(D=1×G) 
  
 
GS 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap4 
 
(H) 
 
 
Year 
Previous Estimates: 
Girouard and André 
(2005) 
PIT 
Elasticity 
to 
Earnings1 
(B) 
Earnings 
Elasticity 
 to  
output gap2 
(C) 
 
Profit 
Share3 
 
(F) 
Profit 
Elasticity 
to output gap 
(G = [1-  
(1-F)∙C] /F) 
𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝑃𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐶𝐼𝑇  𝜃(𝑇,𝑌)
𝐺𝑆  
 Sri Lanka 1.83 2.74 0.67 1.36 0.48 1.36 1.00 1994 - - - 
 St. Lucia 1.54 2.00 0.77 1.22 0.51 1.22 1.00 1988 - - - 
 Syria 0.94 1.40 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Tanzania 1.26 1.74 0.73 1.03 0.91 1.03 1.00 1995 - - - 
Developing Thailand 2.30 3.45 0.67 1.17 0.66 1.17 1.00 2005 - - - 
countries Togo 1.77 2.44 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Trinidad & Tobago 1.17 1.52 0.77 1.12 0.67 1.12 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Tunisia 1.32 1.82 0.73 1.18 0.60 1.18 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Turkey 1.17 1.74 0.67 1.14 0.70 1.14 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Uganda 1.44 1.98 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 1987 - - - 
 Ukraine 0.97 1.14 0.85 1.16 0.48 1.16 1.00 2003 - - - 
 Uzbekistan 0.85 1.27 0.67 1.27 0.55 1.27 1.00 2004 - - - 
 Zambia 1.63 2.25 0.73 1.15 0.65 1.15 1.00 2005 - - - 
 Zimbabwe 1.81 2.49 0.73 1.31 0.47 1.31 1.00 2001 - - - 
  Notes. 1. PIT elasticity to earnings is derived by income distribution-weighted ratio of marginal to average tax-rate at each year, as shown in Table 1.1. 
             2. Earnings elasticity to output gap is estimated empirically for each group, using panel FGLS estimator with correction for AR (1) autocorrelation.  
             3. Profit share is the ratio of profit (gross operating surplus) to the sum of both profit and wage (employee-compensation). 
             4. CIT elasticity to profits and indirect (GS) elasticity to output gap are assumed to be a unity.  
             5. The details for how to derive these elasticities from data-sources are provided in Table 1.5. 
             6. Elasticities for 119 countries are provided in this table. For the remaining 32 countries without data, the average of the existing estimates is used. 
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the data from OECD Benefits, Taxes and Wages, World Tax Indicator, UN National Accounts and World Bank WDI.  
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Table 1.7. Tax-Revenue Structure and “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” for 151 countries in 2015  
Country 
Tax-Revenue Structure Discretionary Tax Policy Index  𝜏𝑡 = 
 
 
 
 
Year  
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇)  
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) 
 Other 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑂) 
Progressivity (elasticity)  
Tax 
Revenue/ 
potential 
GDP (%) 
(
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ )  
 
 
Output 
Gap 
 
( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) 
𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
 +
𝑤𝑡
𝑂 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) (%) 
VAT 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐶𝐼𝑇) 
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐺𝑆) 
Afghanistan 12.33 20.12 23.99 0.00 43.56 1.52 1.21 1.00 8.21 0.93 7.56 2013 
Albania 7.98 9.40 75.31 47.36 7.31 2.39 1.20 1.00 18.91 1.01 19.06 2015 
Algeria 7.06 57.48 28.53 9.28 6.93 1.23 1.11 1.00 42.60 1.06 45.46 2011 
Angola 13.28 55.41 11.50 0.00 19.81 1.44 1.15 1.00 12.16 1.01 12.34 2015 
Antigua & Barbuda 6.47 6.23 46.92 0.00 40.38 1.52 1.21 1.00 17.08 1.01 17.74 2014 
Argentina 8.19 19.03 50.29 28.67 22.49 1.86 1.07 1.00 15.38 1.04 16.10 2015 
Armenia 29.52 9.82 44.80 40.16 15.86 1.81 1.15 1.00 22.29 0.99 21.76 2015 
Australia 51.31 20.58 24.39 15.80 3.72 1.35 1.22 1.00 22.64 0.99 22.44 2015 
Austria 39.20 8.45 44.54 28.44 7.81 1.64 1.22 1.00 27.83 1.00 27.95 2015 
Bahamas 0.00 0.00 31.88 14.57 68.12 1.52 1.21 1.00 17.37 1.00 17.41 2015 
Bahrain 0.00 9.51 17.61 0.00 72.88 1.52 1.21 1.00 1.34 0.90 1.21 2009 
Bangladesh 10.11 21.50 36.83 35.03 31.56 1.93 1.15 1.00 9.49 1.01 9.60 2015 
Barbados 17.58 8.23 53.39 41.99 20.80 1.51 1.45 1.00 24.45 1.02 24.26 2013 
Belarus 0.00 6.43 61.72 39.35 31.85 1.03 1.22 1.00 16.79 0.94 15.80 2015 
Belgium 43.38 13.67 41.08 27.26 1.86 1.61 1.21 1.00 25.12 1.00 25.24 2015 
Belize 9.88 5.63 41.63 0.00 42.86 1.62 1.22 1.00 20.58 0.98 20.18 1996 
Benin 8.66 9.12 50.27 43.09 31.95 1.53 1.58 1.00 16.89 0.99 16.71 2013 
Bhutan 9.02 49.62 39.42 0.00 1.94 1.52 1.21 1.00 14.86 1.02 15.17 2014 
Bolivia 0.00 14.78 75.61 33.98 9.01 1.72 1.05 1.00 19.44 0.98 19.04 2007 
Bosnia 7.14 6.08 86.18 82.25 0.60 1.52 1.21 1.00 20.58 1.01 20.89 2015 
Botswana 10.08 34.65 11.50 0.00 43.77 1.53 1.13 1.00 17.70 1.04 18.42 1996 
Brazil 13.41 21.34 45.85 0.00 19.40 2.11 1.11 1.00 13.62 0.98 13.25 2015 
Bulgaria 15.18 10.58 73.94 44.46 0.30 1.23 1.11 1.00 20.77 1.03 21.38 2015 
Burkina Faso 12.96 5.89 36.76 0.00 44.39 1.52 1.21 1.00 8.77 1.01 8.84 1987 
Burundi 9.71 18.63 61.71 39.15 9.95 1.62 1.08 1.00 14.41 1.00 14.42 2013 
Cabo Verde 18.53 13.47 47.49 36.19 20.51 1.52 1.21 1.00 18.38 0.99 18.15 2012 
Cambodia 4.91 15.01 55.01 34.11 25.07 1.52 1.21 1.00 15.80 1.00 15.86 2014 
Canada 55.00 16.93 23.40 0.00 4.67 2.86 1.24 1.00 12.27 0.98 11.78 2015 
Central Africa 0.31 12.97 28.13 14.28 58.59 2.03 1.07 1.00 10.77 0.93 10.02 2012 
Chile 5.68 10.65 60.87 0.00 22.79 2.71 1.08 1.00 23.93 0.96 21.92 1986 
China 7.11 25.39 62.80 37.46 4.70 1.80 1.27 1.00 10.57 0.99 10.45 2014 
China, Macao 1.96 5.62 91.14 0.00 1.27 1.33 1.22 1.00 27.05 0.88 23.66 2015 
Colombia 33.21 0.06 53.48 45.47 13.25 1.52 1.21 1.00 12.02 1.02 12.27 2010 
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Table 1.7. (cont.) 
Country 
Tax-Revenue Structure Discretionary Tax Policy Index  𝜏𝑡 = 
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Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇)  
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Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) 
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Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑂) 
Progressivity (elasticity)  
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(
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𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
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𝑌𝑡−1
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𝑌𝑡−1
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𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
 +
𝑤𝑡
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𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
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VAT 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐶𝐼𝑇) 
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐺𝑆) 
Congo, Democratic 14.22 15.16 34.28 0.00 36.34 0.73 1.15 1.00 11.02 1.00 11.03 2010 
Congo, Republic 15.39 22.51 44.64 27.90 17.46 1.19 1.15 1.00 10.25 0.94 9.64 2012 
Costa Rica 9.66 18.75 56.17 0.00 15.42 1.94 1.26 1.00 14.69 1.00 14.66 2015 
Cote d’lvoire 13.95 9.29 28.82 10.55 47.94 1.15 1.26 1.00 15.61 1.01 15.81 2014 
Croatia 2.21 8.93 87.73 64.60 1.13 2.00 1.24 1.00 19.05 1.01 19.23 2014 
Cyprus 11.45 24.70 55.51 35.83 8.34 1.45 1.75 1.00 23.25 1.04 24.30 2015 
Czech Republic 16.96 16.39 67.31 38.95 0.00 2.51 1.14 1.00 13.98 0.99 14.11 2015 
Denmark 44.80 7.67 42.09 26.82 5.44 1.09 1.25 1.00 35.00 1.00 34.98 2015 
Dominica 10.50 7.77 59.73 41.32 2.20 1.99 1.22 1.00 22.65 1.00 22.77 2014 
Dominican RP 8.66 15.02 58.84 35.80 17.48 1.64 1.13 1.00 14.49 1.00 14.45 2015 
Egypt 12.49 29.94 45.94 0.00 11.63 1.59 1.17 1.00 14.27 1.01 14.38 2015 
El Salvador 5.07 17.94 59.25 49.22 17.74 1.89 1.22 1.00 0.02 0.77 0.02 2015 
Estonia 26.48 9.50 64.02 41.93 0.00 1.34 1.20 1.00 22.94 0.99 22.56 2015 
Ethiopia 3.59 16.89 25.40 20.55 54.12 1.67 1.15 1.00 11.14 1.08 12.35 2011 
Fiji 7.41 11.15 53.41 38.39 28.03 1.19 1.29 1.00 25.40 1.01 25.67 2013 
Finland 21.34 6.64 70.40 43.77 1.62 1.15 1.22 1.00 21.01 1.00 21.10 2015 
France 37.68 11.32 42.06 29.70 8.94 1.21 1.24 1.00 23.66 1.00 23.74 2015 
Gambia 11.66 12.62 42.52 0.00 33.21 1.87 1.15 1.00 16.61 1.02 16.98 2009 
Georgia 27.19 13.58 57.97 46.43 1.26 0.76 1.25 1.00 25.59 1.01 25.89 2015 
Germany 35.77 4.89 57.98 31.79 1.36 1.89 1.22 1.00 11.87 1.00 11.90 2015 
Ghana 16.79 19.11 39.91 31.02 24.19 1.30 1.15 1.00 18.57 1.04 19.37 2011 
Greece 22.13 8.75 58.27 29.67 10.85 1.63 1.16 1.00 23.96 1.02 24.47 2015 
Grenada 9.60 9.21 45.51 36.95 35.68 1.52 1.21 1.00 20.56 1.02 21.05 2014 
Guatemala 2.70 32.01 59.58 46.82 5.71 1.93 1.18 1.00 11.70 1.00 11.71 2013 
Honduras 11.01 20.28 63.85 40.41 4.86 0.78 1.36 1.00 19.06 1.01 19.27 2015 
Hungary 21.19 7.66 67.83 41.27 3.32 0.86 1.16 1.00 25.02 0.99 24.74 2015 
Iceland 24.32 10.02 48.64 35.03 17.02 1.82 1.26 1.00 25.51 1.02 26.28 2015 
India 19.49 33.94 31.32 0.00 15.25 2.84 1.15 1.00 12.49 1.00 12.41 2013 
Indonesia 9.90 38.69 45.90 34.18 5.51 1.47 1.27 1.00 11.76 1.00 11.72 2015 
Iran 11.27 55.43 12.12 5.37 21.18 1.29 1.16 1.00 8.54 0.95 8.01 2009 
Ireland 39.79 14.04 43.10 24.20 3.07 1.87 1.17 1.00 23.41 1.09 26.45 2015 
Israel 26.01 12.76 50.62 33.42 10.61 1.38 1.47 1.00 24.54 1.00 24.61 2015 
Italy 44.64 8.24 39.46 24.36 7.66 1.48 1.25 1.00 23.83 1.01 24.03 2015 
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Table 1.7. (cont.) 
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Tax-Revenue Structure Discretionary Tax Policy Index  𝜏𝑡 = 
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Jamaica 25.09 9.23 45.18 0.00 20.50 1.56 1.26 1.00 28.51 1.02 29.08 2013 
Japan 25.24 27.50 42.29 28.71 4.97 1.31 1.39 1.00 11.81 1.00 11.82 2015 
Jordan 5.05 15.91 67.87 0.00 11.17 1.52 1.21 1.00 16.27 0.99 16.09 2015 
Kazakhstan 0.45 30.77 53.07 38.89 15.71 0.75 1.37 1.00 12.80 1.03 13.22 2000 
Kenya 27.39 22.39 39.15 25.42 11.07 1.00 1.19 1.00 18.51 1.02 18.93 2015 
Korea 28.83 21.11 40.50 26.69 9.56 1.59 1.28 1.00 14.54 1.01 14.71 2015 
Kuwait 0.00 0.00 33.19 0.00 66.81 1.52 1.21 1.00 1.10 0.94 1.03 2015 
Kyrgyz Republic 7.76 13.80 65.04 45.93 13.40 0.89 1.62 1.00 18.49 0.98 18.02 2015 
Lao PDR 0.00 0.00 68.75 28.29 31.25 1.52 1.21 1.00 15.10 0.98 14.83 2015 
Latvia 7.89 10.62 81.27 51.29 0.22 1.48 1.20 1.00 15.65 0.99 15.47 2015 
Lebanon 0.00 0.00 48.07 28.16 51.93 1.16 1.27 1.00 14.67 1.00 14.70 2015 
Lesotho 16.14 6.05 18.23 16.19 59.58 1.52 1.21 1.00 53.34 1.01 53.97 2013 
Liberia 35.83 4.66 16.14 5.57 43.37 0.87 1.15 1.00 23.32 0.98 22.83 2013 
Lithuania 23.04 9.19 67.10 46.23 0.67 1.30 1.17 1.00 17.32 0.99 17.05 2015 
Luxembourg 36.02 12.90 47.58 26.65 3.51 1.97 1.18 1.00 26.48 0.99 26.11 2015 
Macedonia 12.47 4.77 71.87 50.21 10.89 1.06 1.20 1.00 16.72 0.99 16.50 2012 
Madagascar 0.00 0.00 26.05 16.50 73.95 2.04 1.15 1.00 10.68 1.02 10.91 2014 
Malawi 28.66 20.00 41.71 28.34 9.64 1.76 1.15 1.00 18.74 1.01 18.92 2015 
Malaysia 15.91 45.48 30.16 16.33 8.45 1.54 1.20 1.00 15.10 0.99 14.93 2015 
Maldives 0.00 5.41 33.91 0.00 60.68 1.52 1.21 1.00 15.59 1.06 16.46 2011 
Mali 7.87 16.57 51.80 30.32 23.76 1.63 1.04 1.00 15.41 1.02 15.79 2015 
Malta 24.40 24.02 50.77 28.02 0.81 1.79 1.17 1.00 28.88 1.00 28.96 2015 
Marshall Islands 37.86 0.00 35.26 0.00 26.87 1.52 1.21 1.00 17.08 1.01 17.19 2015 
Mauritius 9.83 12.51 71.52 36.33 6.14 1.37 1.24 1.00 19.30 1.00 19.26 2014 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 78.60 0.00 21.40 1.35 1.12 1.00 11.98 0.97 11.57 2000 
Micronesia 24.47 24.13 25.20 0.00 26.20 1.52 1.21 1.00 5.37 1.00 5.40 2015 
Moldova 5.07 11.60 77.78 57.19 5.55 1.52 1.22 1.00 21.47 0.99 21.33 2015 
Mongolia 0.00 21.89 64.94 47.58 13.17 1.39 1.24 1.00 18.92 0.96 18.03 2013 
Morocco 17.76 19.92 55.98 35.92 6.34 2.44 1.16 1.00 22.50 1.01 22.74 2015 
Mozambique 13.30 30.92 45.51 34.18 10.27 0.83 1.17 1.00 25.78 1.00 25.75 2013 
Namibia 21.54 16.41 25.39 23.71 36.66 1.72 1.25 1.00 36.83 0.95 34.80 2015 
Nepal 2.40 17.82 53.22 31.61 26.57 1.52 1.21 1.00 18.62 0.97 18.09 2015 
Netherlands 35.75 12.57 47.11 30.61 4.57 1.91 1.22 1.00 21.99 1.01 22.16 2015 
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Table 1.7. (cont.) 
Country 
Tax-Revenue Structure Discretionary Tax Policy Index  𝜏𝑡 = 
 
 
 
 
Year  
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇)  
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) 
 Other 
Tax 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑂) 
Progressivity (elasticity)  
Tax 
Revenue/ 
potential 
GDP (%) 
(
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ )  
 
 
Output 
Gap 
 
( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) 
𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
+
  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
 +
𝑤𝑡
𝑂 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 ) (%) 
VAT 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐶𝐼𝑇) 
Goods & 
Services 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐺𝑆) 
New Zealand 44.10 18.30 34.06 0.00 3.54 0.95 1.35 1.00 28.65 0.99 28.63 2015 
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 56.24 38.21 43.76 1.52 1.21 1.00 17.54 1.00 17.58 2015 
Nigeria 0.00 0.00 9.54 9.54 90.46 1.26 1.11 1.00 1.71 0.97 1.65 2013 
Norway 24.83 21.61 52.21 36.47 1.35 1.39 1.18 1.00 22.69 0.98 22.23 2015 
Oman 0.00 51.46 0.00 0.00 48.54 1.52 1.21 1.00 2.75 0.95 2.58 2013 
Pakistan 34.88 0.56 45.47 0.00 19.09 0.67 1.27 1.00 11.18 1.00 11.22 2014 
Palau 16.15 0.00 39.67 0.00 44.18 1.52 1.21 1.00 22.41 1.01 22.57 2015 
Papua New Guinea 34.01 29.35 27.47 15.01 9.17 1.20 1.11 1.00 22.32 0.96 21.35 2015 
Paraguay 0.69 20.82 67.88 53.79 10.61 1.52 1.21 1.00 13.57 0.97 13.20 2015 
Peru 12.35 26.18 50.62 44.35 10.85 1.86 1.04 1.00 15.71 1.01 15.81 2015 
Philippines 17.03 26.98 29.05 16.28 26.94 1.32 1.13 1.00 14.54 0.99 14.35 2015 
Portugal 29.94 12.66 53.28 35.89 4.12 1.58 1.36 1.00 23.38 1.01 23.80 2015 
Qatar 0.00 93.98 0.00 0.00 6.02 1.52 1.21 1.00 15.46 1.21 19.47 2010 
Romania 20.30 12.34 66.31 42.68 1.05 1.14 1.12 1.00 19.97 1.01 20.18 2015 
Russia 0.02 5.63 56.21 49.62 38.14 0.95 1.18 1.00 11.44 1.00 11.16 2015 
Rwanda 32.61 7.97 51.13 34.37 8.29 1.97 1.08 1.00 14.95 1.00 14.96 2015 
Samoa 13.45 10.85 63.83 40.08 11.87 1.58 1.27 1.00 23.20 1.02 23.74 2015 
San Marino 37.82 0.00 57.85 28.94 4.32 1.52 1.21 1.00 23.43 1.00 23.41 2008 
Senegal 13.64 9.45 55.42 38.63 21.49 1.32 1.09 1.00 20.60 1.03 21.16 2015 
Serbia 6.57 6.90 81.44 51.99 5.09 2.18 1.34 1.00 20.96 0.99 20.72 2012 
Seychelles 0.45 17.15 56.09 35.22 26.31 1.52 1.21 1.00 31.03 0.98 30.24 2014 
Sierra Lone 31.71 13.83 39.46 0.00 15.00 2.82 1.16 1.00 10.28 0.89 8.57 2014 
Singapore 16.60 28.12 31.73 0.00 23.55 1.14 1.29 1.00 14.23 1.00 14.25 2015 
Slovak Republic 17.71 21.17 59.95 38.96 1.16 2.61 1.13 1.00 18.19 1.01 18.36 2015 
Slovenia 13.42 7.90 78.25 44.73 0.44 1.98 1.33 1.00 19.13 1.01 19.29 2015 
Solomon Islands 16.26 19.60 21.97 0.00 42.17 1.39 1.32 1.00 31.53 0.99 31.20 2015 
South Africa 35.25 19.70 38.17 25.45 6.88 1.43 1.32 1.00 29.11 1.00 28.98 2015 
Spain 25.65 15.88 57.72 0.00 0.75 1.56 1.30 1.00 14.71 1.02 15.08 2015 
Sri Lanka 2.81 11.95 53.43 16.21 31.81 1.82 1.39 1.00 13.21 0.99 13.08 2015 
St. Kitts & Nevis 15.31 8.60 51.47 29.53 24.62 1.52 1.21 1.00 21.65 1.01 21.99 2014 
St. Lucia 11.75 7.35 44.79 37.64 36.11 1.52 1.22 1.00 23.65 1.02 24.07 2014 
Sweden 8.22 10.95 45.92 33.46 34.91 1.19 1.31 1.00 28.41 1.01 28.78 2015 
Switzerland 16.53 15.22 57.14 34.57 11.11 1.67 1.20 1.00 9.97 0.99 9.92 2015 
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Table 1.7. (cont.) 
Country 
Tax-Revenue Structure Discretionary Tax Policy Index  𝜏𝑡 = 
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∗
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VAT 
Revenue 
(% of tax 
revenue) 
(𝑤𝑡
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Tax 
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(𝜃𝑃𝐼𝑇) 
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Income 
Tax 
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Services 
Tax 
elasticity 
(𝜃𝐺𝑆) 
Syria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.87 1.27 1.00 18.02 0.96 17.29 2008 
Tanzania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 1.53 1.04 1.00 12.26 1.01 12.42 2015 
Thailand 12.05 28.16 54.49 21.59 5.30 1.46 1.19 1.00 16.78 1.01 16.87 2015 
Togo 4.65 13.95 56.88 42.83 24.52 1.60 1.15 1.00 23.58 1.01 23.78 2015 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.49 63.02 18.56 14.55 17.93 1.32 1.19 1.00 27.47 0.97 26.64 2012 
Tunisia 21.45 19.33 46.61 31.42 12.61 1.48 1.19 1.00 22.43 1.03 23.14 2012 
Turkey 20.44 7.83 66.56 28.54 5.17 1.17 1.14 1.00 20.75 1.01 20.86 2015 
Uganda 17.40 14.47 55.98 32.00 12.15 1.86 1.15 1.00 11.18 1.01 11.36 2015 
Ukraine 11.08 8.55 70.44 43.88 9.93 1.10 1.19 1.00 23.30 1.10 25.69 2015 
UAE 0.00 0.00 85.77 0.00 14.23 1.52 1.21 1.00 0.65 0.94 0.06 2015 
United Kingdom 36.11 9.76 46.59 27.21 7.54 1.48 1.27 1.00 26.27 0.99 26.01 2015 
United States 75.51 16.74 4.92 0.00 2.83 1.35 1.23 1.00 11.88 1.00 11.83 2015 
Uruguay 18.67 12.13 54.46 42.60 14.74 1.52 1.21 1.00 20.51 0.99 20.22 2015 
Uzbekistan 5.46 21.53 50.90 27.30 22.10 0.95 1.27 1.00 20.61 1.00 20.57 2015 
Vanuatu 0.00 0.00 56.87 0.00 43.13 1.52 1.21 1.00 18.34 0.97 17.71 1999 
Vietnam 6.58 31.57 39.49 25.46 22.36 1.52 1.21 1.00 25.25 0.97 24.52 2012 
Yemen 14.55 31.32 23.99 0.00 30.14 1.52 1.21 1.00 11.12 1.15 13.00 1999 
Zambia 34.09 17.79 38.06 24.42 10.06 1.44 1.15 1.00 15.81 1.05 16.80 2010 
Zimbabwe 21.64 14.56 40.95 0.00 22.85 1.62 1.35 1.00 26.25 0.96 25.11 2012 
  Source. Author’s own calculation using the following sample sources. 
      1. In 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
), 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
), 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆
𝑇𝑡
) and 𝑤𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇
𝑇𝑡
), the data of 𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇,  𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇, 𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆 and 𝑇𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑇are from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). 
      2. The data sources for estimating 𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 are provided in Table 1.5. 
      3. 𝑌𝑡−1 data is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 𝑌𝑡−1
∗  is Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend GDP (smoothing parameter 6.5). 
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Table 1.8. List of Countries in the Sample (151 countries) 
Category Countries in the subsample 
Number of 
Countries 
  Subsample 1 
    : Advanced      
      economies 
 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
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  Subsample 2  
    : Developing     
      economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
China Macao, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’lvoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, 
Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe     
 
 
116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source. The United Nation, World Economic Situation and Prospect 2017 p151. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutions and Public Debt: 
New Evidences from “Discretionary Tax Policy Index” 
 
2.1. Introduction 
          There exist two strands of theories regarding how fiscal policy should respond to business-
cycle. Standard Keynesian view suggests that fiscal policy should be geared towards alleviating 
the economic volatility – should be set counter-cyclically –, while the tax-smoothing theory 
proposed by Barro (1979) claims that it should be cyclically neutral. The empirical evidences have 
shown that fiscal policy – especially government spending – tends to be countercyclical or 
acyclical in advanced countries. In the process of tackling global financial crisis in 2008-09, this 
countercyclical feature has been more striking in advanced countries through policy measures such 
as fiscal stimulus-packages or bailouts. These evidences seem to be consistent with the theoretical 
views of both Keynesian and Barro. On the contrary, the cyclical stance of fiscal policy in 
developing countries is more disputable. The empirical literature has shown that government 
spending tends to be procyclical in developing countries, which does not conform with either of 
two theories. Why do developing countries exhibit this puzzling behavior? To explain this, several 
explanations have been proposed in the literature, which can be summed up as two main culprits: 
political distortions and limited fiscal-capacity. At least, on government spending side, the 
discrepancy in opinions among the literature seems to have been narrowed down. 
 
          However, unfortunately on revenue side, there has been little research about the cyclical 
stance of tax policy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main reasons are as follows. Foremost, there 
is the lack of available international tax-rate data. For this reason, most papers have focused on 
individual-country study, instead of international cross-country study. Also, the complexity of tax 
structure has made it difficult for researchers to measure the entire tax policy. Unlike government 
spending, adjustments in tax-rate cannot represent the entire tax policy. Lastly, tax-revenue/GDP 
data also has problem, since it cannot separate discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer 
effect. To surmount these obstacles, this paper analyzes the cyclical stance of tax policy, using 
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“discretionary tax policy index” newly established in Chapter 1, which can separate discretionary 
tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect, as well as representing the entire tax policy and using 
available tax-revenue data.  
 
          Using this new tax-indicator, this paper investigates empirically whether developing 
countries exhibit procyclical behavior in the context of tax policy. To examine it, this paper 
hypothesizes two possible reasons for procyclical tax policy: (ⅰ) political distortions (by weak 
institutions) and (ⅱ) limited fiscal-capacity (by public-debt burden). The intuitive motivations for 
these hypotheses are as follows: Firstly, I guess intuitively that it is difficult for the government 
with weak institutions to overcome political pressure for tax-cut, due to a loose fiscal-rule or 
political populism, while the government with strong institutions can maintain tax policy 
acyclically based on a stringent fiscal-rule – little influenced by political pressure. Also, the highly-
indebted countries have only limited fiscal-capacity, and so they cannot help raising tax-rate – to 
collect tax-revenue – rather than lowering it even in recession. These two distortion-factors may 
cause developing countries to have procyclical bias in tax policy. 
 
          Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the cyclical stance of tax policy 
in both developing and advanced countries and their underlying reasons – institutions and public 
debt – for different cyclical stances. That is, this paper answers the following two research 
questions: (ⅰ) “Is the cyclical stance of tax policy in developing countries different from the 
stance in advanced countries?” (ⅱ) “How does the cyclical stance of tax policy change by the two 
factors – institutional quality and public debt?” or “Is there a threshold level of institutions and 
public debt, above which the stance of tax policy is switched?” To answer these two questions, I 
use new tax-indicator – “discretionary tax policy index” – derived in Chapter 1. Also, to deal 
with endogeneity problem, this paper employs fixed-effect regression with instrumental variables 
as a main identification method, utilizing 151 countries’ panel-data for periods of 1970-2015.  
 
          Using these novel dataset, this paper finds the following significant evidences about the 
cyclical stance of tax policy. Firstly, tax policy tends to be mildly countercyclical or acyclical in 
advanced countries, while being procyclical in developing countries. This implies that tax policy 
has a similar cyclical pattern to government spending in both advanced and developing 
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economies. Secondly, as underlying reasons for procyclical tax policy in developing countries, 
this paper finds that both institutions and public debt play a crucial role. More specifically, the 
tendency of procyclicality of tax policy becomes stronger, when institutions are weak (i.e. loose 
rule of law, more corruption) and the level of public debt is high. Thus, there exist threshold 
levels of both institutions and public debt, above which the stance of tax policy is changed.  
 
          This paper contributes to the existing literature as follows: Most of all, this paper analyzes 
empirically the cyclical stance of tax policy and its underlying reasons, by using a new tax-
indicator – “discretionary tax policy index”.  This index is the most improved indicator in the 
context of evaluating the authentic stance of tax policy, which may provide us with the most 
reliable results. Also, this paper firstly derives the threshold levels of institutional quality, public 
debt and both, above which the stance of tax policy is changed. Lastly, it uses more extended 
panel-data of 151 countries for periods of 1970-2015, which is the first panel study of this size. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
          There has been an ample literature supporting that fiscal policy – especially government 
spending – tends to be countercyclical or acyclical in advanced countries, while being 
procyclical in developing countries. The empirical evidences including Mélitz (2000), Fatás and 
Mihov (2002), and Galí and Perotti (2003) have shown that advanced countries are inclined to 
implement countercyclical fiscal policies, especially in Europe or the OECD countries. In the 
midst of global financial crisis in 2008-09, their countercyclical behaviors have been more 
conspicuous due to fiscal stimulus packages. On the contrary, other empirical researches have 
documented that government spending tends to be procyclical in developing countries – 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin American countries. A bunch of researches including 
Kaminsky, et. al. (2004), Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), Thornton (2008), Carmignani (2010), Lledó, 
et. al. (2011) and Calderon and Ngugen (2016) have found the evidence to support this 
procyclical pattern in developing countries, following the first study by Gavin and Perotti (1997).  
 
          Regarding why developing countries exhibit this puzzling behavior – procyclical bias of 
government spending –, the two underlying reasons have been proposed in the literature. A 
strand of literature such as Garvin and Perotti (1997), Kaminsky, et. al. (2004), and Srebrnik and 
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Strawczynski (2016) claims that limited access to funding in developing countries prevents 
government from borrowing to conduct countercyclical policy during recession. This restricted 
fiscal-capacity may lead to procyclical bias of government spending in developing countries. In 
contrast, the other strand of literature including Acemoglu, et. al. (2003), Végh and Vuletin 
(2015) and Calderon and Ngugen (2016) explains that institutional quality plays an important 
role. That is, procyclical bias of government spending tends to appear mainly in the countries 
with weak institutions, due to the inability of government to rein in spending in good times.  
 
          However, on the revenue side, there has been little research about the cyclical stance of tax 
policy – the other pillar of fiscal policy –, due to the insufficiency of international tax-rate data. 
For this reason, most papers have focused on individual-country study. For example, Strazcich 
(1997) analyzes the cyclical stance of tax policy, using tax-rate data of Canada and United States. 
Barro and Redlick (2011) and Strawczynski (2014) also study it, using the data of United States 
and Israel, respectively. To overcome the lack of data, Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Sturzenegger 
and Wernek (2006) use tax-revenue as a share of GDP as an alternative, but it also has problem in 
the sense that it cannot isolate discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect. Recently, 
Végh and Vuletin (2015) deal with these problems by using directly statutory tax-rates of 64 
countries. This is the first paper using international cross-country data, but it has still limitations, 
because they use only top marginal tax-rates, which cannot represent the entire tax policy. 
Consequently, the above researches about the cyclical stance of tax policy have intrinsic 
limitations in the sense that there always exist some data-problems. 
 
          Thus, a further research needs to be done, using more improved tax-indicator – 
“discretionary tax policy index” – that can compensate for the above weaknesses. This novel 
dataset was already established in Chapter 1 of this paper. Since this index can separate 
discretionary tax policy from automatic stabilizer effect, as well as representing the entire tax 
policy and using available tax-revenue data, it enables us to measure more accurately the authentic 
stance of discretionary tax policy. It is the most developed tax-indicator for assessing tax policy’s 
stance, which may provide us with more reliable results, compared to those of the previous 
literature. 
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2.3. Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis  
2.3.1. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
          As the sample, 151 countries’ panel-data from 1970 to 2015 are used in this paper. Table 
2.4 shows data descriptions and variable sources. Firstly, the dependent variable – “discretionary 
tax policy index” – is newly established in both Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 of Chapter 1. As a main 
explanatory variable, the GDP growth rate is obtained from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio is the central governments’ gross debt as a share of GDP, which comes 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) database. The 
synthetic index of institutional quality is calculated, based on the weighted average of five 
principal components: 𝐼𝑄 = (𝑅𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐺𝐸 + 𝑅𝑄 + 𝑃𝑆)/5  where 𝑅𝐿 is rule of law, 𝐶𝐶 is control 
of corruption, 𝐺𝐸 is government effectiveness, 𝑅𝑄 is regulatory quality, and 𝑃𝑆 is political 
stability. All index-ranges are from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), which are normalized as 0~1. 
They are obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) database. Also, 
two demographic variables are included to be controlled. Population growth rate, associated with 
the number of tax-payers, needs to be controlled in the model. Dependency ratio is the ratio of 
the elderly (aged 65 and over) to working-age (15~64) population, which implies the burden of 
tax-payers to support dependents. Both are acquired from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
          Also, three external variables are included to control the effect of external shock. Trade 
openness is the sum of both exports and imports as a share of GDP, which controls the impact of 
international trade. Its source is also the World Bank’s WDI database. External shock is defined 
as the export-weighted real GDP shocks of its trading partners. Following Jaimovich and Panizza 
(2007), it is calculated as follows: 
 
          𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡  =  
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
∙ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∙𝑗 𝑔𝑗,𝑡                                                (1) 
 
where 
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
 is the country i’s average export-share of GDP, 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (=
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡
) is the share of export 
from country i to trading partner j – where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is total export-value of country i ; 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is export-
value from country i to j –, and 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is the real GDP growth rate in trading partner country j. 
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These variables’ sources are as follows: (ⅰ) 
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
 is from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database. (ⅱ) 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
is from the IMF’s IFS database. (ⅲ) 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is from the World Bank’s WDI database. External debt-
to-GDP ratio is total – public plus external – gross external debt as a share of GDP or GNI, 
which comes from the World Bank’s WDI and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) database. 
 
          Moreover, five price and liquidity variables are included. Inflation is the average growth 
rate of consumer price index (CPI), which is based on the World Bank’s WDI database. Also, oil 
price and commodity price need to be controlled, because in case of oil (or commodity) 
exporting countries, the revenue from oil (or commodity) exports consists of large proportion of 
total revenue. Oil price is calculated as the log of inflation-adjusted oil price. The non-fuel 
commodity price is calculated as the log of non-fuel commodity price index (2005=100), which 
includes food and beverages, and industrial input price indices. These data are only applied to 
oil-exporters and non-fuel commodity exporters14. Liquidity liability is broad money or M3 as a 
share of GDP, which is from the World Bank’s WDI database. To capture global liquidity, the 
real returns on U.S. Treasury bills are used as a proxy of global interest rate. It is calculated by 
subtracting inflation rate of the previous year from the yield-rate of U.S. Treasury bills. It is 
obtained from the IMF’s IFS database.  
 
          Lastly, Table 2.1 provides us with summary statistics. Total sample consists of 151 countries 
from 1970 to 2015. Table 2.2 shows the results of stationarity test for key variables. I use the 
Fisher-type panel unit-root test based on ADF (Choi, 2001), which has the null hypothesis that all 
the panels contain unit roots. In Table 2.2, green-colored cells represent the variables are stationary. 
From the results, I can see that discretionary tax policy index is stationary, as well as other key 
variables such as GDP growth rate, institutions, public debt, population growth rate, inflation and 
trade openness. Table 2.3 shows the sample list of 151 advanced and developing countries. 
 
                                                          
14 [Oil-exporters] (9): Angola, Algeria, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway, Russia (source: US Energy Information 
Administration); [Non-fuel commodity exporters] (19): Brazil, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, 
Ghana, Iceland, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia (source: Dauvin, 2014). 
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2.3.2. Descriptive Analysis 
          In this section, I briefly check cross-country correlation plots as descriptive analysis, 
before examining a causality by more accurate estimation method. Figure 2.1-(A) graphically 
shows the cyclical stance of tax policy in both advanced and developing countries. It shows 
correlations between tax policy index growth and lagged GDP growth. A positive (+) correlation 
might represent countercyclical tax policy, while a negative (-) correlation implies procyclical 
tax policy. Red (yellow) bars represent correlations in advanced (developing) countries. As in 
Figure 2.1-(A), tax policies tend to have mainly procyclical stances in developing countries, 
while approximately being acyclical in advanced countries, which implies tax policy might have 
a similar cyclical pattern to government spending in both advanced and developing economies.   
 
          Figure 2.1-(B) represents the cyclical stance of tax policy by institutional quality. The fit 
plot between tax-GDP correlation and institutional quality is drawn with 95% confidence 
interval, showing a slightly upward-sloping form. This relationship provides us with the 
possibility that as institutions improves, tax policy becomes less procyclical or acyclical.  
 
          Also, Figure 2.1-(C) graphically shows the cyclicality of tax policy by public debt. The fit 
plot shows a slightly downward-sloping form, which implies that the higher level of public debt, 
the more procyclical tax policy. However, this relationship seems to be not strong, since the 
effect of public debt on cyclical stance is weakened by the countervailing-effect of institutions on 
the cyclical stance. For example, some samples of advanced countries (i.e. Japan, U.S. and etc.) 
with both high institutions – countercyclical bias – and high public debt – procyclical bias – 
eventually show acyclical or mildly countercyclical stance. Therefore, I need to check the 
cyclicality more accurately by estimation method, considering both public debt and institutions.  
 
          These correlation plots do not guarantee any specific direction of causality. Rather, there is 
a strong possibility of reverse causality – tax-multiplier effect that when tax-rate rises, the output 
falls – which might lead to endogeneity problem. Thus, it needs to be examined more accurately, 
by considering many control variables and addressing a possible endogeneity problem by 
instrumental variable approach. I will discuss this in the next section. 
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2.4. Estimation Methodology 
          This paper uses the panel country fixed-effect regression with instrumental variables as a 
main identification methodology. Also, the dynamic panel Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system 
GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used as a supplementary 
methodology for robustness check. Both methodologies have the advantages in the sense that the 
potential endogeneity problem can be dealt with.  
 
2.4.1. Panel Country Fixed-Effect regression  
          To measure the cyclicality of tax policy, I use the following fiscal (tax) reaction function as 
a panel country fixed-effect regression model, as in the literature (Végh and Vuletin, 2015): 
 
                 ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑘 ∙ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (2) 
 
                          ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = growth rate of discretionary tax policy index (of country 𝑖 and year 𝑡)  
                          𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged discretionary tax policy index  
                          ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged growth rate of real GDP  
                          𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 = vector of K lagged control variables (external debt, population growth, 
                                           dependency ratio, inflation, liquidity liability, oil price,  
                                           non-fuel commodity price, global interest rate) 
                          𝜂𝑖 = country fixed-effect of country 𝑖 
                          𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = error-term. 
 
In the model (2), since ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is the growth rate of discretionary tax policy index and ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
growth rate of real GDP, the coefficient 𝛽 can be interpreted as the response of tax policy to 
business-cycle. Hence, the sign of 𝛽 – which determines whether tax policy is counter- or pro-
cyclical – is of our main interest. Controlling many other variables (𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1), I can conclude that 
if 𝛽 > 0, then tax policy is countercyclical, while if 𝛽 < 0, then it is prorcyclical. Also, to capture 
the tendency of tax policy’s persistence, the lagged variable of discretionary tax policy index 
(𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1) is included in the model. This lagged variable allows us to deal with a possible omitted 
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variable bias (Claeys, 2006). The vector 𝜓𝑘 explains the effects of K variables on the tax policy, 
which needs to be controlled. Lastly, 𝜂𝑖 accounts for country fixed-effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is error-term. 
 
          In addition, to analyze the respective impact of institutional quality (IQ), public debt (PD), 
and both (IQ×PD) on the cyclical stance of tax policy, I consider the following revised 
estimation models. These models include the interaction-terms of the respective lagged variables 
of IQ, PD, and IQ×PD, multiplied by the lagged GDP growth. Also, in equation (3), to analyze 
only the effect of institutions (IQ), I control the other factor – public debt (PD). Similarly, in 
equation (4), institutional quality (IQ) is included as a control variable.   
 
∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜑𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜑𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (5) 
 
                  𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged synthetic index of institutional quality (of country 𝑖 and year 𝑡)  
                  𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged level of public debt-to-GDP ratio   
                  𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged public debt multiplied by institutional quality  
 
These interaction-terms enable us to measure the respective impact of IQ, PD, and IQ×PD on the 
cyclicality of tax policy, and their respective thresholds. For example, I can show that the cyclical 
stance of tax policy depends on the level of institutional quality (IQ), by differentiating equation 
(3) with respect to GDP growth rate: 
   
The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy  =
𝜕(∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
 = 𝛽 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1                       (6) 
 
A threshold level, above which the cyclical stance of tax policy is changed, can be derived by 
equating the above equation (6) with zero as follow: 
 
                            Threshold level of Institutional Quality (IQ*)  = −
𝛽
𝛾
                                  (7) 
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This analyzing tool is also applied to the analysis for threshold of public debt (PD) and the public 
debt multiplied by institutional quality (IQ×PD).    
 
2.4.2. Tackling Endogeneity Problem: Fixed-Effect IV regression   
          However, this simple fixed-effect model cannot address a potential endogeneity problem. 
For example, the relationship between tax policy and GDP does not guarantee any direction of 
causation. Rather, there might be a strong possibility of reverse causality – tax-multiplier effect 
that when tax-rate rises, output falls –, which might lead to endogeneity problem. Thus, this 
endogeneity problem needs to be dealt with in the model by instrumental variable approach. For 
this, I use the following three instruments. First, two-period lagged external shock – as defined in 
the equation (1) – is used as an instrument, following Jaimovich and Panizza (2007):  
 
          𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡−2  =  
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
∙ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡−2 ∙𝑗 𝑔𝑗,𝑡−2                                        (1-1) 
 
where 
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
 is the country i’s average export-share of GDP, 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the share of export from 
country i to trading partner j, and 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is the real GDP shock (growth rate) in trading partner j. 
This index of export-weighted real GDP shock of trading partners can seize the external shock, 
the two-period lagged value of which can be represented as a valid instrument. Because two-
period lagged external shock is a good predictor of the lagged GDP growth rate ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 –  the 
lagged business-cycle –, as well as being uncorrelated with the error-term – excluded correctly 
from the equation model. In addition, two-period lagged variables of both real GDP growth rate 
and tax policy index are used as instruments as well.  
 
          Thus, to tackle endogeneity problem, I use panel country fixed-effect model with the 
above three instrumental variables as a final estimation methodology. Moreover, as a test for 
validity of instrumental variables, the Hansen’s over-identification test is conducted. The null 
hypothesis of Hansen’s test is that the instruments are exogenous – uncorrelated with the error 
term. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the IV’s requirements such as the relevance and 
the exclusion restriction can be considered as being satisfied.  
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2.4.3. Robustness Check: Dynamic Panel Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond System GMM 
          As a supplementary methodology for robustness check, the dynamic panel Arellano-Bover/ 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation method is also used. This dynamic model additionally 
includes the lagged growth rate of discretionary tax policy index (∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1). 
 
              ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝜃 ∙ ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑘 ∙ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (8) 
 
                          ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = growth rate of discretionary tax policy index (of country 𝑖 and year 𝑡)  
                          𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged discretionary tax policy index  
                          ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged growth rate of real GDP  
                          𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 = vector of K lagged control variables (external debt, population growth, 
                                           dependency ratio, inflation, liquidity liability, oil price,  
                                           non-fuel commodity price, global interest rate) 
                          𝜂𝑖 = country fixed-effect of country 𝑖 
                          𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = error-term. 
 
This system GMM method is also adequate as an identification strategy, in the sense that both the 
endogeneity and autocorrelation problem can be addressed.  
                        
2.5. Empirical Results 
          From the results of descriptive analysis, I establish the following hypotheses, which will be 
verified empirically by using the above estimation methods. Verifying hypothesis 1 is the answer 
to research question (ⅰ) “Is the cyclical stance of tax policy in developing countries different from 
that in advanced countries?” Also, proving hypothesis 2 is the answer to question (ⅱ) “How does 
the cyclical stance of tax policy change by institutional quality and public debt?”. That is, “Is there 
threshold levels of institutional quality, public debt and both, above which the cyclical stances of 
tax policy are switched?” Lastly, hypothesis 3 checks briefly the relationship between tax policy’s 
cyclicality and government spending’s cyclicality. 
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2.5.1. The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy in Advanced and Developing countries 
   
        Hypothesis 1 (The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy in Advanced and Developing countries) 
Tax policy tends to have countercyclical or acyclical stance in advanced countries, while having 
procyclical stance in developing countries.  
 
          Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2-(A) report the estimation results for both advanced and 
developing countries. In the left column of Table 2.5, IV fixed-effect regression shows a 
significant result for countercyclical stance of tax policy in advanced countries. The estimated 
coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate (0.0232789***) shows a positive sign, being statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level. This implies that tax policy is mildly countercyclical in 
advanced countries. In contrast, according to the right column of Table 2.5, the estimated 
coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate is -0.0175957***, showing its sign is negative and it is 
statistically significant at 1% level. This represents that tax policy is procyclical in developing 
countries. Thus, I conclude that tax policy tends to be mildly countercyclical in advanced 
countries, while having procyclical stance in developing countries.   
 
2.5.2. The Reasons for Different Cyclical Stances: Institutional Quality & Public Debt 
   
        Hypothesis 2-1 (The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutional Quality) As the 
institutions are weak (i.e. loose rule of law, more corruption), tax policy tends to be more 
procyclical. In contrast, as the institutions improve (i.e. strict rule of law, less corruption), tax 
policy becomes less procyclical or more countercyclical. Thus, there exists a threshold level of 
institutions, above which the stance of tax policy is changed from pro- into counter-cyclical. 
 
          Now, let’s focus on the influence of institutions on the cyclicality of tax policy. For this, I 
use the model (3). Table 2.6 shows the result of IV fixed-effect regression. The estimated 
coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) is -0.0923319**, and the estimated coefficient of 
lagged interaction-term between GDP growth and institutions (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1) is 0.1634522**, 
showing they are all statistically significant at 5% level. Hence, it can be shown that the cyclical 
stance of tax policy depends on the institutional quality (IQ) by the first derivative:  
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The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy  =
𝜕(∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
 = −0.0923319 + 0.1634522 ∙ 𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1     (9) 
 
From (9), I can conclude that as institutional quality improves, the stance of tax policy tends to 
become less procyclical (i.e. less negative sign) or more countercyclical (i.e. more positive sign). 
Moreover, there exists a threshold level of institutional quality (𝐼𝑄∗), above which the stance of 
tax policy is changed from pro- into counter-cyclical. As shown in (10), the threshold level of 
institutional quality is 0.565, which is similar to the current level of institutions of Italy (i.e. 
𝐼𝑄𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑦,2015 = 0.574). Figure 2.2-(B) also graphically shows this result.  
 
                 Threshold level of Institutional Quality (𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ )  = 
0.0923319
0.1634522
 =  0.565                 (10) 
 
          This empirical result is consistent with our intuition. In politico-economic perspective, the 
countries with weak institutions may not be able to overcome political pressure for tax-cut, due 
to a loose fiscal rule or political populism. On the contrary, the countries with strong institutions 
can maintain tax policy acyclically or less procyclically, based on a stringent fiscal rule. 
 
   
        Hypothesis 2-2 (The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Public Debt) If the level of public 
debt is sufficiently high, tax policy tends to have procyclical stance, while if the level of public 
debt is low, tax policy becomes countercyclical. Thus, there exists a threshold level of public 
debt, above which the stance of tax policy is changed from counter- into pro-cyclical. Also, the 
cyclical response of tax policy by public debt appears asymmetrically according to the business-
cycle. That is, procyclicality of tax policy in highly-indebted countries occur mainly in 
recessions rather than in booms.   
 
          Let’s explore the impact of public debt on the cyclical stance of tax policy, using the 
estimation model (4). Table 2.7 shows the result of IV fixed-effect regression. The estimated 
coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) is 0.0639006*, and the estimated coefficient of 
lagged interaction-term between GDP growth and public debt (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) is -0.0007119**, 
showing they are all statistically significant. By the first derivative, it can be shown that if public 
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debt is high, the cyclicality of tax policy tends to become more procyclical (i.e. more negative 
sign), while if public debt is low, it becomes more countercyclical (i.e. positive sign) as follows:  
   
The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy  =
𝜕(∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
 = 0.0639006 − 0.0007119 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1      (11) 
 
I can also derive a threshold level of public debt (𝑃𝐷∗), above which the stance of tax policy is 
changed from counter- into pro-cyclical. From (12), the threshold level of public debt-to-GDP 
ratio is 89.76, which is analogous to the level of public debt in Canada (i.e. 𝐼𝑄𝐶𝑎𝑛,2015 = 91.50). 
Figure 2.2-(C) also graphically shows this result. 
 
               Threshold level of Public Debt-to-GDP ratio (𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ )  = 
0.0639006
0.0007119
 =  89.76            (12) 
 
          Also, Table 2.7 shows that the procyclicality of tax policy in highly-indebted countries 
occurs mainly in recession rather than in boom. That is, the responses of tax policy by public 
debt appear asymmetrically according to business-cycle. From the second and third columns of 
Table 2.7, the estimated coefficient of lagged interaction-term (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) is -0.0006022*** 
in recessions, while it is 0.0004209 in booms, showing the signs are opposite and only the 
coefficient in recession is significant. Thus, I can interpret the procyclicality (i.e. negative sign) 
of tax policy in highly-indebted countries tends to occur mainly in recessions – not in booms.  
 
          This empirical result is also consistent with our intuition. The highly-indebted countries 
have only limited fiscal-capacity, and so they might have no choice but to raise tax-rate 
inevitably even in recessions – to collect tax-revenue – instead of a countercyclical tax-cut. Thus, 
this limited fiscal-capacity by public-debt burden may make tax policy become more procyclical, 
particularly in recessions.   
 
   
        Hypothesis 2-3 (The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutions and Public Debt) 
Considering public debt multiplied by institutions (IQ×PD), as institutions are weak, the 
threshold level of public debt multiplied by institutions – which changes tax policy from counter- 
into pro-cyclicality – become lower than before, which makes tax policy be more procyclical. 
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          By using the estimation model (5), Table 2.8 shows the result of IV fixed-effect 
regression. The estimated coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate (∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) is 0.0995523**, and the 
lagged interaction-term between GDP growth and public debt multiplied by institutional quality 
(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) is -0.00214***, which are all statistically significant at 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. It can be shown that if the level of public debt multiplied by institutional quality is 
sufficiently high, the stance of tax policy tends to become more procyclical (i.e. more negative 
sign), while if the level of public debt including institutions is low, it becomes more 
countercyclical (i.e. more positive sign):  
   
   The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy  =
𝜕(∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
 = 0.0995523 − 0.00214 ∙ 𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1    (13) 
 
A threshold level of public debt multiplied by institutions (𝐼𝑄∗ × 𝑃𝐷∗) – above which the stance 
of tax policy is changed from counter- into pro-cyclical – is 46.52, which is lower than 89.76 in 
the equation (12). Figure 2.2-(D) also graphically shows this result. 
 
     Threshold level of Public Debt with Institutions (𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ )  = 
0.0995523
0.00214
 =  46.52    (14) 
 
This lower threshold-level is thought to be reasonable, because institutional quality index is 
ranging from zero (the lowest value) to one (the highest value), as defined in the previous section 
2.3.1. Moreover, it can also be shown that for a given threshold level of public debt (𝑃𝐷∗), as the 
institutional quality falls (𝐼𝑄∗), the overall threshold level of public debt multiplied by 
institutions become lower than before, which makes tax policy have more procyclical bias. 
 
2.5.3. Relationship between Tax Policy and Government Spending Policy 
   
        Hypothesis 3 (The Relationship between the Cyclicality of Tax Policy and the Cyclicality 
of Government Spending Policy) The countries with more procyclical spending policy also 
tend to have more procyclical tax policy, and vice versa. Thus, the policy responses of both tax 
and government spending tend to be implemented basically in the same direction.  
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          Lastly, I need to check whether the cyclical stance of tax policy is the same as the cyclical 
stance of government spending policy. Because if the cyclical stances of the two are opposite, I 
cannot conclude the overall cyclical stance of fiscal policy. Figure 2.2-(E) graphically shows the 
relationship between the following two correlations: (ⅰ) correlation between growth rate of 
discretionary tax policy index and GDP growth rate (y-axis), (ⅱ) correlation between the cyclical 
component of government spending and the cyclical component of GDP15 (x-axis). In y-axis, a 
positive (+) correlation implies countercyclical stance of tax policy, while a negative (-) 
represents procyclical tax policy. In contrast, in x-axis, a positive (+) correlation means 
procyclical spending policy, while a negative (-) means countercyclical spending policy. As 
shown in Figure 2.2-(E), the fitted line has a downward sloping form, which implies that the 
countries with more procyclical spending policy (i.e. (+) correlations in x-axis) tend to have 
more procyclical tax policy (i.e. (–) correlations in y-axis), and vice versa. Thus, it is shown that 
policy responses of both tax and government spending tend to be conducted basically in the same 
direction. 
 
2.5.4. Robustness Check: Specifications with Different Identifications and Variables  
          Table 2.9 shows how the results of other identification strategies are different from the result 
of the baseline model (IV fixed-effects). Two different identification strategies are employed for 
robustness check: (ⅰ) simple fixed-effects regression and (ⅱ) dynamic panel Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation. Regarding advanced countries, the estimated 
coefficient of lagged GDP growth rate is 0.0011408 and 0.0018082, respectively for the two 
estimation methods, which is approximately around zero, even if it is insignificant. This implies 
that tax policy might be acyclical or mildly countercyclical in advanced countries. Also, when it 
comes to developing countries, the results of both estimations – simple fixed-effects and system 
GMM – show procyclical stance of tax policy, since the estimated coefficients of lagged GDP 
growth rate are -0.002521** and -0.0036555, respectively. These results are basically similar to the 
results of the baseline model. Thus, robustness to various specifications with different 
identification strategies is satisfied. 
 
                                                          
15 In this paper, the cyclical components of both government expenditure and real GDP are derived by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filtering method, which has the smoothing parameter of 6.5. 
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          Table 2.10. shows the results of various specifications with different set of control 
variables. Column (3) reports the result of the baseline full model. Column (1) is the result of the 
model which excludes the following control variables from the full model: liquidity liability, oil 
price, non-fuel commodity price and global interest. Column (2) is the result of the model in 
which dependency ratio and trade openness are excluded. The signs and significances of the 
column (1) and (2) are basically similar to those of the baseline model. Hence, robustness to 
specifications with different control variables is also satisfied. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
          This paper investigates empirically the cyclical stance of tax policy in both developing and 
advanced countries, and two underlying reasons – institutions and public debt – for their 
different cyclical stances. Unlike government spending, there has been little research about the 
cyclicality of tax policy, due to the lack of available tax-rate data. To overcome this limitation, 
this paper uses a novel dataset – “discretionary tax policy index” – that I already established in 
Chapter 1. This index is the most improved indicator in the context of assessing the stance of tax 
policy. Using these new dataset, this paper finds that tax policy tends to be mildly 
countercyclical or acyclical in advanced countries, while being procyclical in developing 
countries. Moreover, the tendency for procyclicality of tax policy becomes stronger when 
institutions are weak and public debt is high. That is, there exist threshold levels of both 
institutional quality (0.565) and public debt (89.76% of GDP), above which the stance of tax 
policy is switched.  
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2.7. Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1. Descriptive Analysis: Cross-Country Correlation Plots 
  
     (A) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy in both Advanced and Developing countries                 
 
                   
    Notes. 1. The red bars show correlations between tax policy index growth and lagged GDP growth for advanced 
                   countries, while the yellow bars show correlations for developing countries. (+) correlation represents  
                   the countercyclical stance of tax policy, while (-) correlation means the procyclical stance of tax policy.  
               2. The sample data of 131 countries from 1970 to 2015 are used. 
    Source. Author’s own work, based on “discretionary tax policy index”, which is newly established in Chapter 1,  
                 and the real GDP growth rate from World Bank WDI. 
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Figure 2.1. (cont.) 
        (B) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutional Quality 
 
                Notes. (-) correlation implies procyclical tax policy, while (+) correlation means countercyclicality.   
 
                Source. Author’s own work, based on “discretionary tax policy index”, newly established in Chapter 1, 
                             and institutional quality index (average) from World Bank WGI (World Governance Indicator). 
 
        (C) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Public Debt 
 
                Notes. (-) correlation implies procyclical tax policy, while (+) correlation means countercyclicality.   
 
                Source. Author’s own work based on “discretionary tax policy index”, newly established in Chapter 1, 
                             and general government gross debt/GDP in 2015 from IMF WEO. 
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Figure 2.2. Estimation Results: The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy  
        (A) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy in both Advanced and Developing countries 
 
                    Notes. 1. In the coefficient of lagged GDP growth, a negative (-) sign represents procyclical  
                                   tax policy, while a positive (+) sign means countercyclical tax policy.  
                               2. The coefficients are derived from the panel estimation results of IV fixed-effects. 
                               3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                    Source. Author’s own work.  
 
        (B) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutional Quality (Threshold of IQ) 
 
                    Notes. 1. In y-axis, a negative (-) sign represents procyclical tax policy, while a positive (+)    
                                   sign means countercyclical tax policy.  
                               2. The linear equation is derived from the panel estimation results of IV fixed-effects. 
                               3. Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                    Source. Author’s own work.  
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Figure 2.2. (cont.) 
       (C) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Public Debt (Threshold of PD) 
 
                    Notes. 1. In y-axis, a negative (-) sign represents procyclical tax policy, while a positive (+)    
                                   sign means countercyclical tax policy.  
                               2. The linear equation is derived from the panel estimation results of IV fixed-effects. 
                               3. Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                    Source. Author’s own work.  
 
       (D) The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institution & Public Debt (Threshold of IQ×PD) 
 
                    Notes. 1. In y-axis, a negative (-) sign represents procyclical tax policy, while a positive (+)    
                                   sign means countercyclical tax policy.  
                               2. The linear equation is derived from the panel estimation results of IV fixed-effects. 
                               3. Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                    Source. Author’s own work.  
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Figure 2.2. (cont.) 
      (E) Relationship between Tax Policy and Government Spending Policy 
 
              Notes. 1. In y-axis (tax policy), (+) correlation implies countercyclical tax policy, while (-) correlation  
                             represents procyclicality. In x-axis (government expenditure), (+) correlation is procyclical 
                             spending policy, while (-) correlation means countercyclical stance.  
                         2. The cyclical components of both government expenditure and real GDP are derived by the 
                             Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter method, which has the smoothing parameter of 6.5. 
 
 
              Source. Author’s own work. . 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of 151 Countries, 1970-2015 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Discretionary tax policy index 3,792 18.82 8.20 0.02 110.08 
Real GDP growth rate 5,930 3.76 5.66 -51.03 106.28 
Public debt / GDP 3,107 56.39 106.47 0.21 5,102 
Institutional quality 2,550 0.51 0.18 0.07 0.91 
Population growth rate 6,726 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.19 
Dependency ratio 6,647 10.95 6.55 0.87 42.65 
External shock 3,509 1.8e+8 3.0e+9 -1.5e+9 7.8e+10 
Trade openness 5,714 78.64 48.40 4.92 441.60 
Externa debt 4,534 65.59 89.41 0.14 2,688 
Inflation 5,437 41.50 558.92 -35.84 24,411 
Liquidity liability 5,005 48.74 47.10 0.27 977.01 
Oil price 6,946 0.16 0.78 0.00 4.67 
Non-fuel commodity price 6,946 0.37 1.24 0.00 5.25 
Global interest rate 6,795 0.66 2.37 -5.21 6.36 
 
Table 2.2. Stationarity Test for Key Variables: Panel Unit-Root Test 
Variables 
 
Stationarity Test: Panel Unit-Root Test  
(Fisher-Type based on ADF) 
Inverse  
Chi-squared 
Inverse 
Normal 
Inverse  
Logit 
Modified Inv. 
Chi-squared 
Dependent 
variable 
Discretionary tax policy index 561.27*** -5.80*** -7.13*** 10.55*** 
Explanatory 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP growth 1,957.34*** -33.00*** -43.43*** 67.35*** 
Institutional quality 410.01*** -0.82 -1.67** 4.49*** 
L. Public debt/GDP 264.35** 1.52 0.79 1.70** 
Population growth rate 2,160.19*** -28.90*** -46.37*** 75.94*** 
Inflation 1,362.13*** -22.73*** -29.85*** 45.00*** 
Trade openness 466.17*** -4.52*** -5.37*** 6.99*** 
     Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
† Fisher-type panel unit-root tests (with one lag) based on ADF (Choi, 2001) have the null hypothesis that all 
the panels contain unit roots.  
† Green-colored cells represent that the variables are stationary. 
     Source. Author’s own work, based on Fisher-type Panel Unit Root test suggested by Choi (2001). 
72 
 
Table 2.3. Classification of Countries in the Sample (151 countries) 
Category Countries in the subsample 
Number of 
Countries 
  Subsample 1 
    : Advanced      
      economies 
 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
  Subsample 2  
    : Developing     
      economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
China Macao, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’lvoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, 
Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe     
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    Source. The United Nation, World Economic Situation and Prospect 2017 p151. 
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Table 2.4. Data Descriptions and Variable Sources 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent variable    
 ① Discretionary tax policy index The “discretionary tax policy index” is defined as the “progressivity-adjusted 
potential effective tax-rate”, which is adjusted to a potential value that under a 
tax-progressivity (elasticity) 𝜃, effective tax-rate would have if the output were 
at its potential level 𝑌𝑡
∗ , instead of its actual level 𝑌𝑡 . It is calculated as the 
following weighted average of several tax-categories:   
 
     𝜏𝑡  =  𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
+  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
  
              +  𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )
𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆
 + (1 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 −𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆) ∙
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
∗ ∙ ( 
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
 )      
 
where 𝑇𝑡 is tax-revenue, 𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
),  𝑤𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑡
), 𝑤𝑡
𝐺𝑆 (=
𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆
𝑇𝑡
) is the share of 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, goods & services tax to total tax-
revenue, respectively. 𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 is the progressivity of the above taxes 
w.r.t output gap, respectively. 𝑌𝑡−1 is the lagged GDP (current LCU), and  𝑌𝑡−1
∗  
is the lagged Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend GDP (smoothing parameter 6.5) 
 
Author’s own calculation using the 
following sample sources. 
 
 (ⅰ) 𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇,  𝑇𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇, 𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝑆, and 𝑇𝑡 data are  
     from IMF’s Government Finance  
     Statistics (GFS) database. 
 
 (ⅱ) The data-sources for estimating  
      𝜃𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑇 , 𝜃𝑡
𝐶𝐼𝑇and 𝜃𝑡
𝐺𝑆 are provided in      
     Table 1.5 of Chapter 1. 
 
 (ⅲ) 𝑌𝑡−1 data is from World Bank’s   
     World Development Indicators  
     (WDI) database.  
 
Explanatory variables    
  ①  Real GDP growth rate The growth rate of real GDP based on constant local currency World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
  ②  Public debt / GDP The central government gross debt as a share of GDP IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) / Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) 
database  
  ③  Institutional quality The synthetic index of institutional quality is calculated, based on the weighted 
average of five principal components, which is normalized as range 0~1. 
 
𝐼𝑄 = (𝑅𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐺𝐸 + 𝑅𝑄 + 𝑃𝑆)/5 
 
where 𝑅𝐿 is rule of law, 𝐶𝐶 is control of corruption, 𝐺𝐸 is government 
effectiveness, 𝑅𝑄 is regulatory quality, 𝑃𝑆 is political stability (-2.5~2.5). 
 
Author’s own calculation based on 
World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) database 
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Table 2.4. (cont.)  
 
Variables Description Source 
Explanatory variables 
   
      
   ④  Population growth rate 
 
The growth rate of total population 
 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
    
   ⑤  Dependency ratio 
 
The ratio of the elderly (aged 65+) population to working-age (aged 15-64) 
population   
 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
      
      
   ⑥  External shock 
 
 
The “external shock” is defined as the export-weighted real GDP shocks of its 
trading partners. Following Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), it is calculated as 
follows: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡  =  
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
∙∑𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∙
𝑗
𝑔𝑗,𝑡 
 
where 
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
 is the country i’s average export-share of GDP, 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (=
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡
) is the 
share of export from country i to trading partner j – where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is total export-
value of country i; 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is export-value from country i to j –, and 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is the real 
GDP growth rate in trading partner country j. 
 
 
   
 
 
Author’s own calculation using the 
following sample sources, based on the 
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) method. 
 
 (ⅰ) 
𝑋𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
 is from IMF’s International  
      Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
 (ⅱ) 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is from IMF’s Direction of  
      Trade Statistics (DOTS) database;  
       𝑋𝑖𝑡 is from IMF’s International  
      Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
 (ⅲ) 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is from World Bank’s  
        WDI database. 
   ⑦  External debt Total – public plus external – gross external debt as a share of GDP or the 
external debt stock as a share of GNI 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) database / 
World Bank’s WDI database 
   ⑧  Inflation The average growth rate of consumer price index (CPI) World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
   ⑨  Liquidity liability The amount of liquid liabilities – broad money or M3 – as a share of GDP World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
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Table 2.4. (cont.)  
† Oil-exporters (9): Angola, Algeria, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway, Russia (source: US Energy Information Administration). 
‡ Non-fuel commodity exporters (19): Brazil, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Iceland, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia (source: Dauvin, 2014). 
 
 
 
Variables Description Source 
Explanatory variables 
   
      
   ⑩  Trade openness 
 
The sum of both exports and imports – of both goods and services – as a share 
of GDP 
 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
    
   ⑪  Oil price 
 
The oil price is calculated as the log of inflation-adjusted oil price. This data is 
only applied to oil-exporter countries†.    
 
Author’s own calculation, using 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) / inflationData.com database / 
Econstats database 
      
      
   ⑫  Non-fuel commodity price 
 
 
The non-fuel commodity price is calculated as the log of non-fuel commodity 
index (2005=100), which includes food and beverage and industrial input 
indices. This data is only applied to non-fuel commodity exporters‡.    
 
  * The data preceding 1992 are extrapolated, assuming that the growth rate of 
non-fuel commodity price is the same as that of industrial input price. 
 
   
 
 
Author’s own calculation, using 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) / inflationData.com database / 
Econstats database  
  
 
   ⑬  Global interest rate The global interest rate is calculated by subtracting the inflation (CPI) rate of the 
previous year from the yield-rate of U.S. Treasury bills.  
IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database 
 
   ⑭  Cyclical component of   
         Real GDP 
 
The cyclical component is derived as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered GDP 
(smoothing parameter 6.5). 
 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database 
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Table 2.5. Estimation Results Ⅰ: The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy in Both Advanced and Developing countries 
     Dependent Variable: 
     Growth rate of Discretionary Tax Policy Index 
  Advanced Countries  Developing Countries 
IV Fixed Effects  IV Fixed Effects 
     Lagged growth rate of real GDP 0.0232789***  -0.0175957*** 
 (0.008)  (0.005) 
     Lagged external debt 0.0005914***  -0.0001295 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     Lagged discretionary tax policy index -0.0178066***  -0.0111009*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
     Lagged population growth -4.099622**  0.5873213 
 (1.991)  (1.053) 
     Lagged dependency ratio 0.0008376  0.0001623 
 (0.003)  (0.008) 
     Lagged trade openness -0.000432  0.0006152 
 (0.001)  (0.000) 
     Lagged inflation  -0.0018699  -0.000467 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
     Lagged liquid liability   -0.0005728  0.0000849 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
     Lagged log of oil price -0.0348879  0.0358468 
 (0.045)  (0.028) 
     Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   20.0038962  -0.0272043*** 
 (0.017)  (0.008) 
     Lagged global interest -0.0062436*  -0.0004603 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
     Lagged growth rate of tax policy index -  - 
    
     Number of Observations 245  993 
     R-squared 0.0948  0.1007 
     Over-identification test: Hansen test 2.09  7.94 
    
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and discretionary tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. the 
instruments are exogenous).   
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Table 2.6. Estimation Results Ⅱ-1: The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutional Quality (Threshold level of IQ) 
      Dependent Variable:  
      Growth rate of Discretionary Tax Policy Index 
Instrumental variable Fixed Effects 
      Lagged growth rate of real GDP -0.0923319** 
 (0.046) 
      Lagged growth rate of real GDP × Lagged institutional quality (IQ) 0.1634522** 
 (0.082) 
      Lagged public debt 0.0008205* 
 (0.000) 
      Lagged external debt -0.0000278 
 (0.000) 
      Lagged population growth -5.805423*** 
 (1.676) 
      Lagged dependency ratio 0.0042201 
 (0.010) 
      Lagged trade openness 0.0019439** 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged inflation -0.0021186** 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged liquid liability   0.0019839** 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged log of oil price 0.0594543** 
 (0.026) 
      Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   0.0243259 
 (0.030) 
      Lagged global interest -0.0001328 
 (0.004) 
      Lagged discretionary tax policy index -0.0185307*** 
 (0.003) 
      Number of Observations 461 
      R-squared 0.0176 
      Over-identification test: Hansen test 3.48 
  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals. (i.e. 
the instruments are exogenous).  
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Table 2.7. Estimation Results Ⅱ-2: The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Public Debt (Threshold level of PD) 
    Dependent Variable: 
    Growth rate of Discretionary Tax Policy Index 
Instrumental variable 
Fixed Effects 
 
(Recession) 
 
(Boom) 
    Lagged growth rate of real GDP 0.0639006* 0.0537226*** -0.0503571 
 (0.035) (0.018) (0.038) 
    Lagged growth rate of real GDP × Lagged public debt (PD) -0.0007119** -0.0006022*** 0.0004209 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Lagged institutional quality (IQ)  -1.212857*** -1.096749*** -0.3834113 
 (0.326) (0.366) (0.502) 
    Lagged population growth -3.960974 -4.159035* 4.699498** 
 (2.651) (2.387) (1.949) 
    Lagged dependency ratio -0.001107 -0.0183519 -0.0045302 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) 
    Lagged trade openness -0.0042897*** -0.0032445*** -0.0010035 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    Lagged inflation  -0.0015254 -0.003286*** -0.0069029* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
    Lagged liquid liability   0.0000553 0.0013055 -0.001482* 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
    Lagged log of oil price 0.0136153 -0.2554179 0.036265 
 (0.036) (0.235) (0.026) 
    Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   0.0381395 0.0398114 -0.0209852 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.121) 
    Lagged global interest -0.019497* -0.0223813** 0.0086849 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
    Lagged discretionary tax policy index 0.0157813*** 0.0136684*** 0.0311633*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
    Number of Observations 561 306 255 
    R-squared 0.0137 0.0184 0.1947 
    Over-identification test: Hansen test 2.46 1.27 30.59*** 
    
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals. (i.e. 
the instruments are exogenous).  
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Table 2.8. Estimation Results Ⅱ-3: The Cyclical Stance of Tax Policy by Institutions and Public Debt (Threshold of IQ×PD) 
      Dependent Variable:  
      Growth rate of Discretionary Tax Policy Index 
Instrumental variable Fixed Effects 
      Lagged growth rate of real GDP 0.0995523** 
 (0.039) 
      Lagged growth rate of real GDP × Lagged institutional quality (IQ) × Lagged public debt (PD) -0.00214*** 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged external debt 0.0028237*** 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged population growth -7.326688* 
 (3.866) 
      Lagged dependency ratio -0.0176225 
 (0.015) 
      Lagged trade openness -0.0048638*** 
 (0.002) 
      Lagged inflation  0.0010726 
 (0.002) 
      Lagged liquid liability   -0.002156* 
 (0.001) 
      Lagged log of oil price 0.012023 
 (0.046) 
      Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   0.0114578 
 (0.051) 
      Lagged global interest -0.0249626** 
 (0.010) 
      Lagged discretionary tax policy index 0.0103068* 
 (0.006) 
      Number of Observations 461 
      R-squared 0.042 
      Over-identification test: Hansen test 12.62 
  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals. (i.e. 
the instruments are exogenous).  
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Table 2.9. Robustness Check Ⅰ: Specification with Different Identification Strategies 
     Dependent Variable: 
     Growth rate of Tax Policy Index 
  Advanced Countries  Developing Countries 
(1) Fixed Effects 
(2) Arellano-Bond  
     System GMM 
 
(1) Fixed Effects 
(2) Arellano-Bond  
     System GMM 
     Lagged growth rate of real GDP 0.0011408 0.0018082  -0.002521** -0.0036555 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.003) 
     Lagged external debt -0.0000429 -0.000808**  0.0001398 0.0002453 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
     Lagged discretionary tax policy index -0.0094989*** -0.0104142***  -0.013538*** -0.013236*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) 
     Lagged population growth -0.1420149 0.8147617  -0.857656 -0.3975935 
 (1.373) (1.731)  (0.670) (0.906) 
     Lagged dependency ratio -0.0023137 -0.0035745  -0.0100916** -0.0060435 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.009) 
     Lagged trade openness -0.0002556 0.0003306  0.0000599 0.0001398 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
     Lagged inflation  -0.0012985** -0.0004528  0.001637* -0.000324 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
     Lagged liquid liability   -0.0000132 0.0001175  0.0009963*** 0.0014564** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
     Lagged log of oil price -0.0024237 -0.004637  0.0331639 0.014712 
 (0.009) (0.006)  (0.023) (0.033) 
     Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   -0.0111333* -0.0127066**  -0.0155261*** -0.0079123 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.025) 
     Lagged global interest 0.0009484 0.0000154  -0.000979 -0.024204 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.028) 
     Lagged growth rate of tax policy index - 0.0109109  - -0.1647892*** 
  (0.057)   (0.060) 
     Number of Observations 410 382  1,642 1,387 
     R-squared 0.1601 -  0.1343 - 
     Over-identification test: Hansen test - 0.00  - 12,375 
     AR (2) test - 0.61  - -3.75 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals. (i.e. 
the instruments are exogenous).  
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Table 2.10. Robustness Check Ⅱ: Specification with Different Control Variables under IV Fixed Effects 
     Dependent Variable: 
     Growth rate of Tax Policy Index 
  Advanced Countries  Developing Countries 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)  Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 Lagged growth rate of real GDP 0.007868* 0.0206923*** 0.0232789***  -0.0168108*** -0.018388*** -0.017596*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
 Lagged external debt -0.000046 0.0005175*** 0.0005914***  -0.0002178 -0.0001008 -0.0001295 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Lagged discretionary tax policy index -0.0143834*** -0.017799*** -0.0178107***  -0.0109415*** -0.009871*** -0.011101*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Lagged population growth 0.3308109 -4.049136** -4.099622**  0.1948409 0.4523306 0.5873213 
 (1.051) (1.952) (1.991)  (1.012) (0.984) (1.053) 
 Lagged dependency ratio -0.0009752 - 0.0008376  -0.0018507 - 0.0001623 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
 Lagged trade openness -0.0004463 - -0.000432  0.000462 - 0.0006152 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Lagged inflation  -0.0032082** -0.0022292 -0.0018699  -0.0003355 -0.000498 -0.000467 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Lagged liquid liability   - -0.0005274 -0.0005728  - 0.0003487 0.0000849 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001) 
 Lagged log of oil price - -0.036912 -0.0348879  - 0.0391828 0.0358468 
  (0.044) (0.045)   (0.029) (0.028) 
 Lagged log of non-fuel commodity price   - 0.0047175 0.0038962  - -0.026511*** -0.027204*** 
  (0.017) (0.017)   (0.008) (0.008) 
 Lagged global interest - -0.0053421 -0.0062436*  - -0.0003582 -0.0004603 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
 Number of Observations 344 245 245  999 1,030 993 
 R-squared 0.1518 0.1887 0.0948  0.0559 0.1112 0.1007 
 Over-identification test: Hansen test 15.85 2.33 2.09  7.88 7.73** 7.94 
        
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of external shock, real GDP growth, and tax policy index. 
† For over-identification test, Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that the instrumentals are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. 
the instruments are exogenous).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Structural Impact of Demographic Shift on Fiscal Variables:  
“Granular” Projection for Public Spending using Micro-level Data 
 
3.1. Introduction 
          The world is in the midst of an unprecedented demographic shift, which has brought about 
– and will bring about – significant changes in the size and composition of population. In the 
context of public finance, this ongoing demographic shift will be one of the gravest fiscal 
challenges in the coming decades. Especially, aging population will accompany an increment in 
age-related fiscal spending, which might put considerable pressure on public finance going 
forward. Recently, amid global financial crisis in 2008-09, many researchers have focused on the 
role of fiscal policy to mitigate the short-run economic fluctuations. However, the structural shift 
in population-structure – despite its potential significance – has not yet taken center-stage in the 
discussion, except for advanced (or highly-aged) countries.  
 
          The aim of this paper is to examine empirically the fiscal impact of demographic shift, and 
to project its future impact on public finance in an internationally-comparable way. That is, it is to 
answer the following two questions: (ⅰ) “What is the structural impact of demographic change on 
fiscal variables in the empirical perspective?” More specifically, “What are the main channels 
through which demographic shift could affect public finance?” (ⅱ) “What would the future impact 
of demographic shift on public finance likely be?” Especially, the main focus is to compare 
internationally the future fiscal-burdens – augmented by three key age-related spending (i.e. 
pension, health and education) – that countries would face only by demographic shift. 
 
          Regarding the first research question, this paper identifies empirically the impact of 
demographic shift on various fiscal variables: government expenditure (pension, health and 
education expenditure), government revenue (tax and social contribution), fiscal balance and 
public debt. For this, it employs dynamic panel Arellano-Bond’s system GMM as a main 
identification methodology, using 161 countries’ panel-data from 1970 to 2016. Both fixed-effects 
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and pooled OLS are also utilized as supplementary methods for robustness check. Regarding the 
second question, this paper basically uses “granular” approach to project the future fiscal-burdens 
by three key age-related spending, following Miller, et. al. (2011; 2013). This method estimates 
the future dynamics of public spending, based on the micro-level (age-specific) data from the 
National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)16. In addition, for the countries without NTAs data, this paper 
newly invents an “alternative” approach – which is logically consistent with the granular one – 
even though the aggregated expenditure data is used instead. 
  
          Using these methods, this paper finds the following evidences. Firstly, empirical results for 
161 countries show that demographic shift negatively affects fiscal balance, leading to increment 
in public debt. This is due to the result that its negative effect on government spending is greater 
than its positive effect on revenue. Especially, its impacts on three age-related spending – pension, 
health and education spending– are likely to be the most important channels. Secondly, simulation 
results compare among countries the future fiscal-burdens by demographic shift, classifying 117 
countries into three categories by the degree of fiscal-burden: “highly-pressured”, “pressured” and 
“relatively safe” countries. Without structural reform, “highly-pressured” countries would likely 
face heavy fiscal-burden by aging population in the coming decades. Also, it finds that the fiscal 
impact in advanced countries would be still greater than that in developing countries. Moreover, 
advanced countries would likely exhibit a common – increasing – trend in public spending, 
whereas developing countries would show greater variations in public spending among countries. 
 
          This paper contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, regarding empirical analysis, it 
attempts to identify the fiscal impact of demographic shift more accurately, by using an enhanced 
dynamic estimation method and sizeable panel-data. Unlike the previous studies that have mainly 
used static model, this paper considers the long-run dynamic interactions between population-
structure and fiscal variables. Also, it uses more extended panel-data – 161 countries for periods 
of 1970-2016 – which is the first panel study of this size. Secondly, in the process of simulation, 
                                                          
16 The National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) constitute a coherent accounting of economic flows – consumption, saving, public 
transfer and etc. – from an age-cohort or generation to another in a given year. The NTAs database (https://www.ntaccounts.org) 
has 24 countries’ micro-level spending data for each age-profiles. Especially, the database has public transfer inflows in three key 
age-related spending – pension, health and education spending – for each age-cohort.  
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this paper decomposes public spending into two components – policy and demography – by using 
the micro-level (age-specific) data, as in Miller, et. al. (2011; 2013). However, unlike their studies 
for Brazil or 10 Latin American countries, this paper projects it more extensively for 117 advanced 
and developing countries, by using an “alternative” method based on the same logic as granular 
one for the countries without the NTAs data. More extensive (117 countries) projections based on 
a common method enable us to conduct “cross-country comparisons” for the future fiscal-burdens.  
 
3.2. Demographic Trends and Projections 
          The world has witnessed a rapid change in the size and composition of population, and it is 
expected to experience more drastic shift over the next few decades. The underlying forces driving 
these changes are associated with fertility-rate and life-expectancy. As in Figure 3.1-(A), since the 
1960s, total fertility-rates have been decreasing, while life-expectancies have been continuously 
increasing in major economies. Consequently, a falling fertility, combined with an increasing life-
expectancy, has brought about a change in total population size. The increase in fertility-rates 
between the 1950s and 60s, with the increase in life-expectancies, has caused population to grow, 
and then the growth rate reached its peak around the 1960s. However, after reaching its peak, 
population has been decreasing in total size, as shown in Figure 3.1-(B). 
 
          The changes in two key driving-forces – falling fertilities and increasing life-expectancies – 
have caused crucial shifts in the composition of population as well as the size of population. Figure 
3.1-(C) shows the trends and projections for old dependency ratio, meaning the share of the elderly 
(aged 65+) to working-age (15-64) population.  Falling fertilities cause the working-age 
populations to decrease with time-lag, while increasing life-expectancies raise the elderly 
populations. As a result, old dependency ratio is projected to continuously augment over time, 
which may be one of the gravest future-risks on public finance, especially on public pension and 
healthcare. Figure 3.1-(D) also shows young dependency ratio, which implies the share of young 
(0-14) population to working-age population. Since the young dependency ratio mirrors fertility-
rate with time-lag, it has exhibited a decreasing trend since the 1970s or 80s, and it is projected to 
fall continuously in the future. These compositional changes in population could have important 
implications on public finance, in the structural perspective.       
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3.3. Literature Review 
          There has been extensive literature about the impact of demographic shift on the 
macroeconomy. Aside from the fiscal impact, on which this paper focuses, the impact of 
population-structure on economic growth has been most widely addressed. Empirical evidences 
for the growth impact have been mixed, depending on the sample-coverage and the behavioral 
responses considered. Batini, et. al. (2006) find that aging population negatively affects growth in 
industrial countries, while it could positively affect growth in developing countries for the next 
20-30 years. Cruz and Ahmed (2018) claim that an increase in working-age population share is 
positively correlated with an increase in per-capita GDP growth. However, Bloom, et. al. (2011) 
claim that aging population retards growth by lowering labor-force participation and saving rates, 
but behavioral responses – for example, higher female labor-force participation – can weaken this 
adverse effect. Börsch-Supan, et. al. (2014) also confirm the unclear growth effect of demographic 
shift in Europe, based on overlapping generation (OLG) model with behavioral reaction.  
 
The changes in population-structure affect fiscal performances as well. However, regarding 
the degree of fiscal impact, empirical evidences have also been mixed, depending on the countries 
sampled and methodologies applied. Firstly, there has been a strand of literature supporting 
significant impact of demographic shift on public finance. Callen, et. al. (2004) find that fiscal 
balance is negatively affected by demographic change, using the fixed-effects estimation for 115 
countries from 1960 to 2000. Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2000) also confirm the same results, 
using vector error-correction model for Greece over the periods of 1960-1995. Yoon, et. al. (2014) 
find that the elderly share has a negative influence on budget balance, because its negative effect 
on spending is greater than its positive effect on revenue, using the data of 30 OECD countries 
from 1960 to 2013. Žokalj (2016) also confirms the negative impact of aging population on budget 
balance, using panel-data on 25 EU countries for periods of 1995-2014. On the contrary, there has 
been literature arguing that the evidences for negative effect are weak and insignificant. Chen 
(2004) claims the commonly accepted notion that aging population may deteriorate budget balance 
is supported empirically only in developing countries – but not in developed countries –, by using 
fixed-effects regression for 55 countries from 1975 to 1992. King and Jackson (2000) also confirm 
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in the study for Canada that even though demographic shift raises old-age spending, it plays a role 
in decreasing education spending, and its offsetting effect may be significant. They conclude that 
if debt-reduction as a policy response is considered, aging population alone would not cause major 
problems for public finance.  
 
          Regarding the second research question – projection for the future fiscal-impact –, most 
papers have focused on simulating the calibrated overlapping generations (OLG) models, firstly 
proposed by Samuelson (1958). These models have originated from a simplified closed-economy 
OLG models (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1985; Weil, 1989; Faruqee, 2002) – and have recently been 
developed into multi-country extensions (Attanasio and Violante, 2000; McKibbin and Nguyen, 
2004; Batini, et. al., 2006). The results from these models vary, depending on the assumptions for 
model parameters and policy arrangements. Unlike this strand of calibrated-model approach, a few 
studies recently introduced “granular” approach for projecting future fiscal-burdens, based on the 
micro-level (age-specific) data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTAs). Miller, et. al. (2011; 
2013) project three age-related spending (2015-2060) for Brazil or 10 Latin American countries, 
using the “granular” approach by age-specific NTAs data. With the same logic, Narayama (2014) 
projects the sustainability of India’s current fiscal policies, employing the generation accounting 
framework based on the NTAs data. Pavlov (2015) also projects the future impact of aging 
population on public finance in Sweden, utilizing the same approach as Miller, et. al. (2011; 2013).  
 
          To fill in the caveats left in the previous literature, a further research is in demand for this 
field. Firstly, regarding empirical analysis, the literature has only used static estimation model, but 
the long-run dynamic interactions between demography and fiscal variables need to be considered, 
by utilizing dynamic system GMM method based on more extended panel-data. Secondly, 
regarding simulation, the literature has conducted the “granular” projection only for an individual 
country or 10 Latin American countries, due to insufficient NTAs data (i.e. only 24 countries). 
However, more extensive study based on this common methodology needs to be done to conduct 
“cross-country comparisons” for the future fiscal-burdens by demographic shift. For this extension, 
an “alternative” approach needs to be newly devised – which is logically consistent with the 
granular method – at the same time being applicable to the countries without NTAs data. 
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3.4. Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis  
3.4.1. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
          The samples used in this paper are 161 countries’ panel-data over the periods of 1970-
2016. Table 3.4 shows data descriptions and variable sources. As dependent variables, various 
fiscal variables are used, which are all expressed as a share of GDP. Firstly, government 
expenditure is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database. 
Health expenditure are acquired from the OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX) for OECD 
countries, the World Bank’s WDI for developing countries. Pension expenditure are collected 
from various sources17: OECD SOCX, Eurostat, UN ECLAC “Social Pensions”, ADB Social 
Protection Index (SPI) and World Bank “Pension Spending” (4Q 2016/4Q 2013) database. 
Education expenditure also comes from the World Bank’s WDI. Secondly, government revenue 
is obtained from the World Bank’s WDI. As sub-categories, both tax-revenue and social 
contribution are also obtained from the World Bank’s WDI. Thirdly, fiscal balance is calculated 
by subtracting government expenditure from government revenue. Lastly, public debt is mainly 
central government debt as a share of GDP in this paper, but for countries without data, general 
government gross debt as a share of GDP is used instead. The former comes from the World 
Bank’s WDI, and the latter is from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
 
          As a main explanatory variable, demographic variables are used. In fact, it is challenging 
to choose one demographic variable that accurately reflects compositional changes of population. 
The old (or young) dependency ratio and the share of the elderly (or young) to population are 
most widely used as proxies of demography in the literature. This paper also employs old 
dependency ratio, – the ratio of the elderly (65+) to working-age (15-64) population –, young 
dependency ratio, – the ratio of 0-14 to working-age population – and population growth as 
                                                          
17 (ⅰ) For 33 OECD countries, the data are obtained from OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). (ⅱ) For Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Serbia, the data are from EUROSTAT database. (ⅲ) For Argentina, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago and Uruguay, the data are from UN ECLAC (CEPAL) “Social 
Pensions” database (https://dds.cepal.org/bdps/). (ⅳ) For Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, 
China, Fiji, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Vietnam, the data are from ADB Social Protection Index (SPI) database. (ⅴ) For 
other developing countries, the data come from World Bank “Pension Spending” (4Q 2016/4Q 2013) database. 
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demographic variables. For robustness check, the elderly share and the working-age population 
share are also used. All demographic variables are from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
          To control the other effects on fiscal variables, the following control variables are included. 
Unemployment rate is the unemployed as a share of total labor-force, which controls the effect of 
business-cycle on fiscal variables. It is obtained from the World Bank’s WDI. The synthetic index 
of institutional quality is calculated, based on the weighted average of five principal components.18 
They are obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI). Trade openness 
is the sum of both exports and imports divided by GDP, which controls the effect of external shock. 
Its source is the World Bank’s WDI. Inflation is the average growth rate of consumer price index, 
which is based on the World Bank’s WDI. Oil price is controlled, because for oil-exporting 
countries, the revenue from oil-exports largely contributes to total revenue. Oil price is calculated 
as log of inflation-adjusted oil price, which is only applied to oil-exporters19. To capture interest 
payments for public debt, global interest rate is included. The real return on U.S. Treasury bills is 
used as a proxy of it, which comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
 
          For simulation, the following data are used. The micro-level data categorized by each age-
profiles (0~90+) for three age-related spending – pension, health and education spending – are 
used. These age-specific data for each public transfer inflows are obtained from the “National 
Transfer Accounts (NTAs)” database20. Public transfer inflows refer to flows received by the 
beneficiaries of all public programs, which include cash transfers and all in-kind transfers. Also, 
the estimates (1950-2015) and prospects (2015-2100; medium-fertility variant) of population for 
each age-group are acquired from the UN’s “World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision”. Using 
these age-specific data, beneficiary dependency ratio is calculated, which implies the ratio of the 
main beneficiaries of each program to working-age (20-64) population. For pension, health and 
education, the main beneficiaries are assumed to be aged 60+, 0-9 & 60+ and 0-19, respectively.  
                                                          
18 The synthetic index of institutional quality is calculated as follows: 𝐼𝑄 = (𝑅𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐺𝐸 + 𝑅𝑄 + 𝑃𝑆)/5, where 𝑅𝐿 is rule of 
law, 𝐶𝐶 is control of corruption, 𝐺𝐸 is government effectiveness, 𝑅𝑄 is regulatory quality, and 𝑃𝑆 is political stability. All index-
ranges are from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), which are normalized as 0 (weak) ~ 1 (strong). 
19 Oil exporters (9): Angola, Algeria, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Norway, Russia (US Energy Information). 
20 “National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)” database (https://www.ntaccounts.org) have the following 24 countries’ spending data by 
each age-profiles: Australia, Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Moldova, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay and United States. 
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          Lastly, Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report summary statistics and stationarity-test results for key 
variables, respectively. For stationarity test, Fisher-type panel unit-root test based on ADF (Choi, 
2001) is used, which has the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit-roots. The green-
colored cells represent that the variables are stationary. Table 3.2 reports that all fiscal variables 
are stationary, as well as other key variables. Since the share of 65+ is the only variable not 
stationary, this paper employs old dependency ratio as the main demographic variable, instead of 
the share of 65+. Table 3.3 shows the sample list of 161 advanced and developing countries. 
 
3.4.2. Descriptive Analysis: Relationship between Demographic Shift and Fiscal Variables 
          To get an overview of fiscal-population dynamics, I briefly check the scatter plots with 
fitted lines. Figure 3.2 graphically shows the relationship between demographic change and 
fiscal variables. Old dependency ratio is used as a proxy of demographic variable – and 
exceptionally, the share of 0-15 to population is used for education. On the spending side, Figure 
3.2-(A) illustrates that government expenditure tends to increase as aging population accelerates. 
Similar patterns are observed in the sub-categories of spending such as pension and health 
expenditure, with pension spending having stronger correlation with aging population (i.e. 
steeper slope), as shown in Figure 3.2-(B) and (C). If the share of young population decreases by 
falling fertility-rate, education expenditure is likely to decrease, according to Figure 3.2-(D). On 
the revenue side, Figure 3.2-(E) shows that aging population may have a positive influence on 
government revenue, but its relationship is weak (i.e. flat slope). This slightly positive 
relationship is also seen in tax-revenue, as in Figure 3.2-(F). Overall, Figure 3.2-(G) reports that 
as population becomes older, fiscal balance – which captures both spending and revenue – tends 
to deteriorate. This can be explained from the observation that the negative effect of aging 
population on government expenditure is greater than the positive effect on revenue. Lastly, 
Figure 3.2-(H) shows public debt is accumulated as aging population proceeds.   
 
          These scatter plots do not guarantee any specific direction of causality. Rather, there is a 
possibility of reverse causality – endogeneity problem – in the long-run. Thus, it needs to be 
examined by a more accurate estimation method. I will discuss this in the next section. 
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3.5. Empirical Analysis: The Fiscal Impact of Demographic Shift  
          This section examines empirically the first research question: “What is the structural impact 
of demographic shift on fiscal variables?” In the process of investigating this, the following 
question is also answered: “What are the main channels through which demographic shift could 
have an influence on public finance?”  
 
3.5.1. Estimation Methodology: Dynamic Panel Arellano-Bond’s System GMM 
          This paper employs dynamic panel Arellano-Bond’s system GMM as a main identification 
methodology. Also, both fixed-effects and pooled OLS are used as supplementary methods for 
robustness check. This system GMM has the following advantages over the simple fixed-effects 
model. Most of all, potential endogeneity problem –  reverse causation – can be dealt with, as well 
as capturing the persistence of fiscal variables. Unlike the static model, this dynamic model enables 
us to consider the long-run interactions between demography and fiscal variables. Also, country 
fixed-effect is controlled by the first difference in this model. Moreover, it is known to be 
appropriate for relatively short-period and large-country panel-data, like the samples of this paper.   
 
          To analyze the fiscal impact of demographic shift, I employ the following fiscal reaction 
function with demographic factor as the estimation model, as in the literature (Callen, et. al., 2004; 
Yoon, et. al., 2014; Žokalj, 2016): 
 
               𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 ∙ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (1) 
 
                                   𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = one of the fiscal variables in country 𝑖 and year 𝑡  
                                   𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 = lagged demographic variables (old dependency ratio,  
                                                         young dependency ratio and population growth rate) 
                                   𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 = vector of K lagged control variables (unemployment rate,  
                                                    institutional quality, trade openness, inflation, global interest rate) 
                                   𝜂𝑖 = country fixed-effect of country 𝑖 
                                   𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = error-term. 
 
91 
 
To capture the persistence of fiscal variable, the lagged variable (𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1) is included in the model, 
which enables us to tackle possible omitted variable bias (Claeys, 2006). The coefficients’ vector 
𝛾𝑘 represent the effects of K variables on fiscal performance, which need to be controlled. Lastly, 
𝜂𝑖 is unobserved country-specific effect, which represents heterogeneity across countries. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
the disturbance term. 
 
          Moreover, including the lagged dependent variable in dynamic model provides us with 
another analytical usefulness. This enables us to identify separately the long-term effect from the 
medium-term effect (Žokalj, 2016). If the long-term convergence of fiscal variable to its steady-
state level is supported or assumed,21 this identification would be helpful for the long-term effect 
analysis. Equation (1) can be rewritten as the following first-difference: 
 
                  ∆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛼 − 1) ∙ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (2) 
 
If 𝛼 is lower than one, then fiscal variable will converge to its steady-state level in the long-run. 
In this case, the coefficient 𝛽 captures the medium-term fiscal impact of demographic shift, 
while the coefficient 𝛽/(1 − 𝛼) may represent the long-term fiscal impact. Since autoregressive 
coefficient 𝛼 is usually lower than one, the long-term fiscal impact of demographic shift would 
be higher than the medium-term impact, as expected intuitively.  
 
          To deal with endogeneity problem, the two-period lagged variable of fiscal balance is used 
as an instrument. It can be a valid instrument, because it is a good predictor of the lagged fiscal 
variable 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1, as well as being uncorrelated with the error-term – excluded correctly from the 
equation model. Also, the two-period lagged values of real GDP and old dependency ratio are used 
as instruments as well. As a test for validity of instrumental variables, Sargan-Hansen’s over-
identification test is conducted. The null hypothesis of the test is that the instruments are exogenous. 
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the IV’s requirements such as the relevance and the 
exclusion restriction can be considered as being satisfied. Also, Arellano-Bond AR (2) test is 
conducted with the null that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second order autocorrelation.  
                                                          
21 This assumption does not seem to be unreasonable, because it is observed in some advanced countries that the growth rates of 
fiscal variables – tax-revenue or government expenditure – as a share of GDP gradually decrease and approach to zero.  
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3.5.2. Estimation Results: The Fiscal Impact of Demographic Shift 
          From the results of descriptive analysis, I establish the following hypotheses about the 
impact of demographic shift on fiscal variables: government expenditure (hypothesis 1), 
government revenue (hypothesis 2), fiscal balance and public debt (hypothesis 3). In this section, 
these three hypotheses will be verified empirically by using the above estimation methods. In the 
process, I also investigate what the main channels are, through which demographic shift could 
affect public finance significantly. 
 
   
        Hypothesis 1 (The Impact of Demographic Shift on Government Expenditure) Aging 
population affects government expenditure positively, and its long-term effect may be more 
severe. Especially, the impacts of aging population on both pension and health spending are 
likely to be the most important channels, while the impact of falling-fertility on education 
spending may slightly mitigate the effect of aging population.   
 
          Table 3.5 shows the estimation results for the impact of demographic shift on government 
expenditure, by using system GMM regression. The estimated coefficient (𝛽) of lagged old 
dependency ratio is 0.0570744*, showing its sign is positive and it is significant at 10% 
confidence level. This implies that aging population affects government spending positively. 
Also, since the estimated coefficient of lagged government expenditure (𝛼) is 0.9044896*** and 
significant, the 𝛽/(1 − 𝛼) – implying the long-term (steady-state) effect – is 0.5976, which is 
greater than the medium-term effect 𝛽. This implies that the long-term effect of aging population 
may be more severe than the medium-term effect.  
 
          Now, let’s examine what the main channels – sub-categories of spending – are, through 
which demographic shift could affect government spending. For this, I need to identify 
separately the demographic impact on each category of age-related spending: public pension, 
health and education. Table 3.5 reports significant results for all three cases. The estimated 
coefficients of lagged old dependency ratio are 0.0285713*** and 0.0202477*** in pension and 
health spending, respectively. The estimated coefficient of lagged young dependency ratio in 
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education spending is also positive and significant (0.0039763**). This implies that aging 
population affects positively both pension and health spending, while a decrease in student-age 
population – due to falling-fertility – affects negatively education spending. Thus, I can conclude 
that aging population affects government expenditure positively, and especially, the impacts of 
aging population on pension and health spending are likely to be the most important channels, 
while the impacts of falling-fertility on education spending may slightly mitigate the effect of 
aging population.   
 
   
        Hypothesis 2 (The Impact of Demographic Shift on Government Revenue) Aging 
population affects government revenue positively, but this effect may be small or insignificant.  
 
          Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for the government-revenue impact. The estimated 
coefficient of lagged old dependency ratio has positive sign (0.0087498), but it is not statistically 
significant. This implies that aging population affects government revenue positively, but this 
effect may be small or insignificant. In the second and third column of Table 3.6, its impact on 
each category of government revenue – tax and social contribution – is provided. The estimated 
coefficient of old dependency ratio in tax-revenue has a negative sign, while that in social 
contribution has a positive sign. However, their effects are all insignificant. This implies that 
aging population may play a role in decreasing tax-revenue slightly, but this effect may be offset 
by the countervailing effect that increases social contribution. Thus, overall revenue-effect is 
likely to be small or insignificant.  
 
   
        Hypothesis 3 (The Impact of Demographic Shift on Fiscal Balance and Public Debt) 
Demographic shift affects fiscal balance negatively, which leads to the increment in public debt. 
This may be attributed to the result that the negative effect of aging population on government 
expenditure is greater than the slightly positive effect on government revenue. Also, their long-
term negative effects may be more severe.  
 
          Table 3.7 reports the results for the demographic impact on both fiscal balance and public 
debt. In the first column – fiscal-balance impact –, the estimated coefficient of lagged old 
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dependency ratio has negative sign (-0.0998264***), being statistically significant at 1% level. 
This implies that aging population may deteriorate fiscal balance. Especially, this may be mainly 
due to the result that its negative effect on government spending is stronger than its slightly-
positive effect on revenue, as in the second and third column.  
 
          Also, in the last column – public-debt impact –, the estimated coefficient of lagged old 
dependency ratio has positive sign (0.2853746***), showing it is significant at 1% level. This 
implies that aging population plays a role in accumulating public debt. Moreover, in both case, 
the long-term effect 𝛽/(1 − 𝛼) is greater than the medium-term effect 𝛽, which implies that the 
long-term impact on both fiscal balance and public debt may be more severe.  
 
3.5.3. Robustness Check: Specifications with Different Identifications and Variables 
          Table 3.8 compares the results from various identification strategies with those from the 
baseline model (Arellano-Bond system GMM). Two additional identification methods are used for 
robustness check: (ⅰ) simple fixed-effects and (ⅱ) pooled OLS regression. Regarding the fiscal-
balance impact, the estimated coefficients of lagged old dependency ratio are -0.208082*** and -
0.334784***, respectively for the two estimation methods – which have all negative signs with all 
significant at 1% level. Also, when it comes to the public-debt impact, the estimated coefficients 
of lagged old dependency ratio are also significant and positive, showing 4.533284*** and 
2.799977***, respectively. These results are basically the same as the results of the baseline model. 
Thus, robustness for various specifications with different identification strategies is satisfied. 
 
          Table 3.9. shows the results of various specifications with different sets of control 
variables. Column (3) reports the result of the baseline model. Column (1) is the result of model 
with different demographic variables. It replaces old (young) dependency ratio with the share of 
65+ (15-64). Column (2) is the result with different control variables. In this case, unemployment 
rate is replaced with labor-participation rate, and oil price variable is added. Regarding both 
impacts on fiscal balance and public debt, the signs and significances of both column (1) and (2) 
are basically the same as those of the baseline model. Hence, robustness is also satisfied to 
specifications with different control variables. 
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3.6. Simulation: “Granular” Projection for Public Spending using Micro-level Data 
          In the previous section, it is verified empirically that demographic impact on government 
spending dominates its impact on revenue, and especially, three key age-related spending – 
pension, health and education spending – are the most important channels, through which it could 
affect public finance. Thus, this section will project (simulate) the future impact of demographic 
shift on these three age-related spending for 117 countries. Especially, the main focus is to compare 
internationally the future fiscal-burdens – augmented by three key spending – that counties would 
face only by demographic shift. 
 
3.6.1. Simulation Method: “Granular” Approach from Micro-level Data 
          To project the future changes in three key age-related spending – pension, health and 
education spending –, this paper basically uses “granular” approach suggested by Miller, et. al. 
(2011; 2013), which estimates the aggregated spending based on the detailed micro-level (age-
specific) data. However, unlike the previous literature – which has focused on the study for an 
individual country or 10 Latin American countries due to the lack of the NTAs data –, this paper 
will project it more extensively for 117 both advanced and developing countries. For this extension, 
this paper will invent a new “alternative” approach with the same logic as “granular” one for the 
countries without the NTAs data. Consequently, comprehensive (117 countries) projections based 
on one common methodology enable us to do “cross-country comparisons” for the future fiscal-
burden by demographic shift. This is innovative feature of this paper.  
 
          Public spending is mainly determined by both “policy decisions” and “demographic factor”. 
Thus, this paper will project three key age-related spending by the following two-step procedure: 
(ⅰ) “decomposition of the current public spending into policy part and demographic part”, (ⅱ) 
“granular projections for public spending by demographic shift, taking the current policy fixed”. 
The assumption for the unchanged policy seems to be so restrictive and even unrealistic. However, 
this paper will not address the forecasts for country-specific policies, not only because it is difficult 
for us to consider the detailed policy-environment of each country, but also because the focus of 
this paper is to compare internationally the future fiscal-burdens – not to forecast the most plausible 
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scenario. Thus, this paper’s results should not be regarded as real forecasts, but as “cross-country 
comparisons” for the future fiscal-burdens only by demographic shift – not by policy change.  
   
          The first step is to decompose public spending into policy/economy and demographic parts. 
As shown in (3), public spending as a share of GDP can be decomposed into three components: 
replacement rate (𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡), coverage ratio (𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡), and cohort dependency ratio (𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡).  
 
 
𝐸𝑡
𝑌𝑡
  =   ∑    ( 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 / 𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑡 / 𝑊𝑡
 )
⏟       
=𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 ×  ( 
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
 )
⏟    
=𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 ×  ( 
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑊𝑡
 )
⏟  
=𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡
  
90+
𝑖=0
                                           (3) 
 
                                    𝐸𝑡 = aggregate expenditure on each pension, health and education 
                                    𝑌𝑡 = real GDP   
                                    𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = expenditure on each program for each age-cohort 𝑖   
                                    𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = the number of beneficiaries from each program for each age-cohort 𝑖  
                                    𝑊𝑡 = working-age (20-64) population    
                                    𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = population of each age-cohort 𝑖   
 
In equation (3), replacement rate (𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡) implies the ratio of the average benefit (expenditure) per 
beneficiary of each cohort 𝑖 relative to output per worker (i.e. productivity). Coverage ratio (𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
is the ratio of beneficiary to population of each cohort 𝑖22. Cohort dependency ratio (𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is 
defined as the share of each cohort’s population to working-age population. The first two are 
policy/economic factors, while the last is demographic one. Now, let’s combine the first two into 
a single policy variable. Then, public spending can be decomposed into the following two parts: 
benefit generosity ratio (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡) and cohort dependency ratio (𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡). 
 
 
𝐸𝑡
𝑌𝑡
  =   ∑  ( 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑡 / 𝑊𝑡
 )
⏟       
=𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡
(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦/𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦)
 × (  
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑊𝑡
  )
⏟    
=𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡
(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑦)
  
90+
𝑖=0
                                             (4) 
                                                          
22 For public pension, replacement rate (𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡) can be interpreted as “income replacement rate”, which implies the ratio of benefit 
paid out by pension program relative to a worker’s pre-retirement income (productivity or wage). For education, it can be 
regarded as the education cost per student relative to wage. Also, coverage ratio (𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡) can be interpreted as “pension coverage 
ratio” for public pension and “school enrollment rate” for education, respectively.  
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In the above equation, benefit generosity ratio (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡) implies the ratio of the average benefit per 
each cohort’s population relative to average productivity. That is, it represents the degree of a 
policy’s benefit-generosity relative to productivity. Table 3.10 illustrates this decomposition for 
each age-profile in case of Austria (2010). 
 
          As an “alternative” method for the countries without the NTAs’ micro-level data, this paper 
newly invents the aggregated approach, which is logically consistent with the granular one. Since 
there exists no age-specific spending data (𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ) except 24 NTAs countries, the aggregated 
expenditures (𝐸𝑡) are instead used for the rest of countries. Also, the age-cohorts that are mainly 
benefited from each program are assumed as follows: age 60+ for public pension, aged 0-19 for 
education, and both aged 0-5 and 60+ for health spending. The population of this beneficial age-
cohort is denoted by 𝐵𝑡
𝑒. This assumption does not seem to be unreasonable, considering the life-
cycle (age-specific) patterns of per-capita spending, as in Austria case of Figure 3.3-(A) and 24 
countries of Figure 3.4. Based on this assumption, public spending can be decomposed into two 
parts: benefit generosity ratio (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡) and beneficiary dependency ratio (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡). 
 
 
𝐸𝑡
𝑌𝑡
   =  ( 
𝐸𝑡  / 𝐵𝑡
𝑒
𝑌𝑡 / 𝑊𝑡
 )
⏟     
=𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡
(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦/𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦)
  × (  
𝐵𝑡
𝑒
𝑊𝑡
  )
⏟    
=𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡
(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑦)
                                                       (5) 
 
                                         𝐸𝑡 = aggregate expenditure on each pension, health and education 
                                         𝑌𝑡 = real GDP   
                                         𝐵𝑡
𝑒 = population of cohorts that are mainly benefited from each program 
                                         𝑊𝑡 = working-age (20-64) population    
 
Of course, beneficiary dependency ratio (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) varies among public programs, because the main 
beneficiaries (𝐵𝑡
𝑒) are different for each program. In the equation (5), since I know both aggregated 
expenditure and beneficiary dependency ratio in the current year, I can calculate benefit generosity 
ratio (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡) as the residual. Table 3.12 shows the benefit generosity ratios for 93 non-NTAs 
countries, which are derived by this “alternative” method. Thus, by using this “alternative” method 
as a supplementary one as well as “granular” method as a main one, I can decompose the current 
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public spending into policy part (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡) and demographic part (𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑡 or 𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡), for 117 advanced 
and developing countries.   
 
         The second step is to project the future public spending (2015-2060) that would be 
augmented only by demographic shift, taking the current policy – benefit generosity ratio – 
fixed. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.3 show this procedure in case of Austria (2015-2060). After fixing 
the benefit generosity ratio for each age-cohort that is already derived in Table 3.10 and Figure 
3.3-(B), I project the age-specific expenditure from 2015 to 2060, according to UN population 
prospects for each age-cohort, as shown in Table 3.11 (the column of cohort dependency ratio) 
and Figure 3.3-(C). Then, as shown in Table 3.11 (the last three column) and Figure 3.3-(D), I 
can get the projection for the aggregated spending, by summing up spending of all age-cohorts. 
This procedure is also applied to non-NTAs countries. After fixing the benefit generosity ratio 
that I already derived in Table 3.12, I project the aggregate expenditure (2015-2060), based on 
the forecasts for future beneficiary dependency ratio (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) by the UN population prospects.  
 
          In this process, the projection for pension spending needs to be done carefully, being 
cognizant that the fiscal obligations vary according to pension systems – Funded, Unfunded or 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) and Partially funded (Mixed) 23. The detailed pension schemes of 117 
countries are provided in Table 3.14. However, this paper does not consider this issue, because 
the benefit generosity ratio (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) is already derived, based on the current fiscal spending – 
which reflects only fiscal obligation – for public pension. 
 
3.6.2. Simulation Results: Projections for Public Spending in 2015-2060 
          Figure 3.5 shows the simulation results of projection (2015-2060) for public spending – 
pension, health and education spending– in 117 countries. To overview these results at a glance, 
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.13 provide “cross-country comparisons” for the future fiscal-burdens by 
                                                          
23 Pension system is usually classified into three types: (ⅰ) “Funded” system is to use contributions from the current workers to 
accumulate assets that will paid to the respective contributors in the future. Thus, there exist limited fiscal obligations under this 
system – but, fiscal obligations are not always zero, since some countries allow public sponsors to purchase insurance to cover 
pension obligations. (ⅱ) “Unfunded” or “pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)” system is to use contributions from the current workers to 
pay benefits to the current retirees. Thus, it is financed directly out of the government’s budget (or tax), and accordingly, the 
fiscal obligations are heavily influenced by aging population. (ⅲ) “Partially funded” system is the mix of both funded and 
unfunded (pay-as-you-go) schemes. (Ponds, et. al., 2011; Schwarz, 2016).  
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demographic shift. In Figure 3.6, the bars show the projected changes (gaps) in public spending 
as a share of GDP between 2015 and 2060. Especially, this paper classifies 117 countries as the 
following three categories by the degree of the future fiscal-burdens: (ⅰ) the red bars show 
“highly-pressured countries”, which imply the countries that would face high fiscal-burden in the 
coming decades only by demographic shift – the countries in which the gaps in public spending 
(% of GDP) between 2015 and 2060 exceed 15% points. (ⅱ) the yellow bars show “pressured 
countries”, which imply the countries that are likely exposed to moderate fiscal risks by 
demographic shift – the gaps between 2015 and 2060 are in the range of 5~15% points. (ⅲ) the 
blue bars show “relatively safe countries”, which means the countries that are little exposed to 
fiscal-risk by demographic shift – the gaps are below 5% points or negative. This classification 
by three colors is also applied to the last column of Table 3.13. As results for simulation, the 
“highly-pressured countries” for future fiscal-burden are as follows: Albania, Austria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Iran, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Turkey. 
Without structural reform in pension or healthcare, these countries would be expected to face 
high fiscal-pressure only by demographic shift in the coming decades.  
 
          Moreover, Figure 3.6 reports that on average, the future fiscal-impact in advanced 
countries is expected to be still greater than that in developing countries. Especially, advanced 
countries tend to show a common – increasing – trend in future public spending, while 
developing countries would likely show greater variations among countries. For example, in 
Table 3.13, some developing countries would show higher increase in public spending than 
advanced countries (i.e. Iran, Turkey, Albania, Maldives and Moldova), while the other 
developing countries – mostly Sub-Sahara African countries – would rather show a fall in future 
public spending (i.e. Belize, Central Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and etc.).  
 
          However, the above forecasts need to be interpreted carefully by policy makers, being 
recognizant that there also exist considerable uncertainties in population projections of the UN. 
Figure 3.7 illustrates how the forecasts for future public spending vary, depending on various 
population scenarios – based on various assumptions such as high-fertility, medium-fertility, 
low-fertility, constant-fertility and no change (constant fertility and constant mortality) – of the 
UN population prospects.               
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3.7. Conclusion  
          This paper investigates empirically the fiscal impact of demographic shift, and projects its 
future impact on public spending in an internationally-comparable way. For empirical analysis, it 
employs dynamic panel Arellano-Bond’s system GMM, using 161 countries’ panel-data for 
periods of 1970-2016. For simulation, it uses “granular” approach to project the future fiscal-
burdens by demographic shift, based on the micro-level (age-specific) data from the National 
Transfer Accounts (NTAs). This paper finds empirically that demographic shift affects fiscal 
balance negatively, which results in increasing public debt. It is due to the evidence that its negative 
effect on spending is greater than its positive effect on revenue. Especially, its impacts on three 
age-related spending – pension, health and education spending – are likely to be the most important 
channels. Also, as the results of simulation, this paper classifies 117 countries as three categories 
by the degree of the future fiscal-burdens by demographic shift – “highly-pressured”, “pressured” 
and “relatively safe” countries. Without an appropriate policy-change, the “highly-pressured” 
countries would likely face heavy fiscal-burdens only by demographic shift in the coming decades, 
which requires structural reforms be done without delay for some countries.  
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3.8. Figures and Tables 
 Figure 3.1. Demographic Trends and Projections  
   (A) Total Fertility (children per woman) and Life-Expectancy (years at birth)                                
 
            Notes. The prospects (2015-2100) are based on the baseline (medium-fertility variant) projection of the UN.  
            Source. UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision 
 
   (B) Population Growth Rate                                          
 
            Notes. The prospects (2015-2100) are based on the baseline (medium-fertility variant) projection of the UN.  
            Source. UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision 
102 
 
 Figure 3.1. (cont.)  
  (C) Old Dependency Ratio (65+/15-64 population)                                
 
            Notes. The prospects (2015-2100) are based on the baseline (medium-fertility variant) projection of the UN.  
            Source. UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision 
 
   (D) Young Dependency Ratio (0-14/15-64 population)                                           
 
            Notes. The prospects (2015-2100) are based on the baseline (medium-fertility variant) projection of the UN.  
            Source. UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision 
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Figure 3.2. Descriptive Analysis: The Relationship Between Demographic Shift and  
                                                       Fiscal Variables (161 countries, 1970-2016)  
 
   (A) Government Expenditure                              (B) Public Pension Expenditure     
 
 
   (C) Health Expenditure                                       (D) Education Expenditure     
 
     Source. Author’s own work, based on the sample. 
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Figure 3.2. (cont.)  
   (E) Government Revenue                                    (F) Tax-Revenue     
 
 
   (G) Fiscal Balance                                               (H) Public Debt     
 
     Source. Author’s own work, based on the sample. 
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Figure 3.3. “Granular” Projection for Public Spending from NTA Data: Austria (2015-2060)  
    (A) Per-capita Public Spending by Age: Austria (2010)     
 
         Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
                      database, and total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 
  
    (B) Per-capita Benefit Generosity Ratio in each Spending by Age: Austria (2010) 
 
         Notes. The benefit generosity ratio (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡) for each spending implies the ratio of the average benefit per   
                    population of each age-cohort 𝑖 relative to output per worker. That is, it represents the degree of a  
                    policy’s benefit-generosity relative to the average productivity. 
         Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
                     database, the population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and  
                     the real GDP from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Figure 3.3. (cont.)  
   (C) Projection for Demographic Shift by Age: Austria (2015-2060) 
 
         Notes. The prospects (2015-2060) for the population of each age-cohort is based on the baseline projection  
                     (medium-fertility variant) of the UN. 
         Source. Author’s own work, based on the data from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 
  
   (D) Projection for Public Spending in Pension, Health and Education: Austria (1980-2060) 
 
         Notes. The projection is conducted by two-step procedure: (ⅰ) decomposition of the current public spending  
                    into policy (benefit generosity ratio; BGR) and demographic parts (cohort dependency ratio; CDR),  
                    (ⅱ) granular projection for spending by only demographic shift, taking the current policy (BGR) fixed.  
        Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts      
                    (NTAs) database, total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, 
                    and other data from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Figure 3.4. Per-capita Public Spending by Age: NTA countries  
 
   (1) Austria                        (2) Argentina                      (3) Australia                     (4) Brazil                               
 
   (5) China                          (6) Costa Rica                    (7) Chile                             (8) El Salvador                               
 
   (9) Finland                       (10) Germany                     (11) Hungary                    (12) India                               
 
   (13) Italy                           (14) Japan                          (15) Korea                         (16) Mexico                               
 
   (17) Moldova                    (18) Slovenia                      (19) South Africa              (20) Spain                               
 
   (21) Sweden                      (22) Thailand                     (23) United States              (24) Uruguay                               
 
     Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
                  database, and total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 
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Figure 3.5. Projections for Public Spending in 2015-2060: 117 countries  
 
 (A) Advanced Countries: 36 countries  
                   
   (1) Australia                      (2) Austria                          (3) Belgium                       (4) Bulgaria                               
 
   (5) Canada                         (6) Croatia                         (7) Cyprus                         (8) Czech Republic                               
 
   (9) Denmark                      (10) Estonia                       (11) Finland                     (12) France                               
 
   (13) Germany                   (14) Greece                         (15) Hungary                    (16) Iceland                               
 
   (17) Ireland                       (18) Italy                            (19) Japan                        (20) Latvia                               
 
   (21) Lithuania                   (22) Luxembourg              (23) Malta                         (24) Netherlands                               
 
   (25) New Zealand              (26) Norway                      (27) Poland                       (28) Portugal                              
 
109 
 
Figure 3.5. (cont.) 
 
   (29) Romania                   (30) Slovak Republic          (31) Slovenia                    (32) Spain                                           
 
   (33) Sweden                      (34) Switzerland                (35) United Kingdom       (36) United States                                                        
    
 
 (B) Developing Countries: 81 countries  
                  
   (37) Afghanistan               (38) Albania                  (39) Antigua & Barbuda      (40) Argentina                               
 
   (41) Armenia                     (42) Azerbaijan                (43) Bahrain                      (44) Bangladesh                               
 
   (45) Barbados                    (46) Belarus                     (47) Belize                         (48) Benin                               
 
   (49) Bhutan                       (50) Bolivia                      (51) Botswana                  (52) Brazil                               
 
   (53) Burkina Faso            (54) Burundi                    (55) Cabo Verde               (56) Cambodia                               
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Figure 3.5. (cont.) 
 
   (57) Central Africa            (58) Chile                         (59) China                        (60) Colombia                               
 
   (61) Costa Rica                 (62) Cote d’lvoire              (63) El Salvador              (64) Ethiopia                               
 
   (65) Fiji                             (66) Gambia                      (67) Georgia                     (68) Ghana                               
 
   (69) Guatemala                 (70) India                          (71) Indonesia                  (72) Iran                               
 
   (73) Israel                          (74) Jamaica                    (75) Kazakhstan               (76) Kenya                               
 
   (77) Korea                         (78) Kyrgyz Republic        (79) Lao PDR                  (80) Lebanon                               
 
   (81) Malawi                      (82) Malaysia                    (83) Maldives                   (84) Mali                               
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Figure 3.5. (cont.) 
 
   (85) Mauritius                 (86) Mexico                       (87) Moldova                    (88) Mongolia                     
 
   (89) Nepal                        (90) Pakistan                    (91) Paraguay                   (92) Peru                                 
 
   (93) Philippines               (94) Qatar                          (95) Samoa                       (96) Senegal                               
 
   (97) Serbia                       (98) Seychelles                  (99) Sierra Leone            (100) Singapore                               
 
   (101) Solomon Islands    (102) South Africa           (103) Sri Lanka               (104) St. Lucia                               
 
   (105) St. Vincent             (106) Syria                        (107) Thailand                (108) Timor-Leste                               
 
   (109) Togo                     (110) Trinidad & Tobago    (111) Tunisia                 (112) Turkey                                
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Figure 3.5. (cont.) 
 
   (113) Uganda                   (114) Uruguay                 (115) Vanuatu                   (116) Vietnam                               
 
   (117) Zambia                     
 
 
Notes. 1. The projection is conducted by two-step procedure: (ⅰ) decomposition of the current public spending  
               into policy (benefit generosity ratio; BGR) and demographic parts (cohort dependency ratio; CDR),  
               (ⅱ) projection for spending by only demographic shift, taking the current policy (BGR) fixed.  
           2. For 24 countries with the NTAs age-specific data, “granular” projection method (i.e. equation (4)) is, 
               applied, while for the rest of countries without the NTAs data, “alternative” method (i.e. equation (5))  
               with the same logic as granular one is applied.  
           3. The shaded area represents the projection for public spending in 2015-2060.  
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
               database, total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and  
               other data from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Figure 3.6. Cross-country Comparisons for Future Fiscal-Burden by Demographic Shift: 
                   The Changes in Public Spending Between 2015 and 2060 for 117 countries 
 
   Notes. 1. The bars show the changes (gaps) in the sum of three age-related spending (public pension, health, and  
                  education) as a share of GDP between 2015 and 2060.  
              2. The red colored bars show “highly-pressured countries”, which imply the countries that would face high  
                  fiscal-burden only by demographic shift (i.e. the gaps between 2015 and 2060 exceed 15% points).  
                 The yellow colored bars show “pressured countries”, which imply the countries that would face moderate  
                  fiscal-burden by demographic shift (i.e. the gaps between 2015 and 2060 are in the range of 5~15%).  
                 The blue colored bars show “relatively safe countries”, which imply the countries that would face little  
                  fiscal-burden by demographic shift (i.e. the gaps between 2015 and 2060 are below 5% or negative). 
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
               database, total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and  
               other data from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Figure 3.7. Uncertainties in Population Projections: Austria (2015-2040) 
 
 
                   Notes. 1. This graph shows how the forecasts for public spending vary, depending on the assumptions  
                                  (i.e. five scenarios for fertility-variant) of the UN population prospects.  
                              2. “No change” means the assumption of both constant fertility and constant mortality.  
                  Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National  
                              Transfer Accounts (NTAs) database, population prospects by age from UN World 
                              Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of 161 Countries, 1970-2016 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
  Fiscal balance 3,548 0.39 11.26 -201.83 271.54 
  Public debt 3,178 56.53 49.66 0.47 789.83 
  Government expenditure 3,576 26.15 12.58 1.88 210.21 
  Health expenditure 3,022 5.55 2.38 0.00 27.42 
Dependent  Pension expenditure 1,600 5.61 3.81 0.00 14.80 
variables  Education expenditure 3,118 4.47 1.90 0.00 44.33 
  Government revenue 3,732 25.92 15.15 2.47 341.41 
  Tax-revenue 3,776 17.22 8.31 0.04 144.12 
  Social contribution 2,412 5.67 5.02 0.00 19.90 
  Old dependency ratio 7,309 10.97 6.60 0.87 43.91 
  Young dependency ratio 7,309 58.67 25.00 15.24 113.70 
  Share of 65 and over 7,312 6.83 4.65 0.75 26.56 
Explanatory  Share of 15-64 7,312 59.82 7.20 45.30 85.87 
variables  Population growth rate 7,541 1.67 1.58 -6.18 17.70 
  Unemployment rate 3,926 8.63 6.45 0.15 44.16 
  Institutional quality 2,785 0.52 0.18 0.07 0.96 
  Trade openness 6,191 80.92 50.42 0.02 531.74 
  Inflation 5,895 39.89 537.60 -35.84 24,411 
  Real GDP 6,630 4.3e+13 4.6e+14 0.01 1.2e+16 
  Global interest rate 7,406 0.65 2.35 -5.21 6.36 
      Source. Author’s own work based on the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Table 3.2. Stationarity Test for Key Variables: Panel Unit-Root Test 
Variables 
 
Stationarity Test: Panel Unit-Root Test  
(Fisher-Type based on ADF) 
Inverse  
Chi-squared 
Inverse 
Normal 
Inverse  
Logit 
Modified Inv. 
Chi-squared 
Dependent 
variables 
 
 
 Fiscal balance 613.99*** -8.17*** -9.15*** 12.57*** 
 Public debt 603.57*** -2.82*** -5.43*** 11.44*** 
 Government expenditure 580.65*** -5.10*** -7.59*** 11.46*** 
 Government revenue 539.11*** -3.83*** -5.57*** 9.31*** 
Explanatory 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Old dependency ratio 343.97 9.01 9.35 1.28* 
 Young dependency ratio 678.58*** -4.52*** -7.37*** 14.67*** 
 Share of 65 and over 237.55 12.68 13.54 -2.98 
 Share of 15-64 810.18*** -7.70*** -10.80*** 19.94*** 
 Population growth rate 2,422.96*** -31.17*** -50.43*** 82.79*** 
 Unemployment rate 476.34*** -5.63*** -5.97*** 7.09*** 
 Institutional quality 401.79*** 0.11 -0.62 3.69*** 
 Trade openness 497.29*** -4.98*** -5.76*** 7.21*** 
 Inflation 1,486.36*** -23.84*** -31.26*** 47.01*** 
 Global interest rate 1,848.46*** -34.58*** -40.16*** 60.15*** 
     Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
† Fisher-type panel unit-root tests (with one lag) based on ADF (Choi, 2001) have the null hypothesis that all 
the panels contain unit roots.  
† Green-colored shaded cells represent that the variables are stationary. 
     Source. Author’s own work, based on Fisher-type Panel Unit Root test suggested by Choi (2001). 
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Table 3.3. Classification of Countries in the Sample (161 countries) 
Category Countries in the subsample 
Number of 
Countries 
  Subsample 1 
    : Advanced      
      economies 
 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States  
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
  Subsample 2  
    : Developing     
      economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, China Macao, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’lvoire, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,  
Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe     
 
 
125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source. The United Nation, World Economic Situation and Prospect 2017 p151. 
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Table 3.4. Data Descriptions and Variable Sources 
 Variables Description Source 
  Dependent variables: Fiscal variables  
 ① Government expenditure Government expense as a share of GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ② Health expenditure Government health expenditure as a share of GDP 
  * (ⅰ) For 33 OECD countries, the data are obtained from OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).  
     (ⅱ) For developing countries, the data are obtained from World Bank’s WDI database. 
 ③ Pension expenditure Public pension expenditure as a share of GDP    
  * (ⅰ) For 33 OECD countries, the data are obtained from OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
     (ⅱ) For Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Serbia, the data are from EUROSTAT database. 
     (ⅲ) For Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,  
           El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago 
           and Uruguay, the data are from UN ECLAC (CEPAL) “Social Pensions” database (https://dds.cepal.org/bdps/). 
     (ⅳ) For Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Georgia, India, Indonesia,  
           Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal,     
           Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand,  
           Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Vietnam, the data are from ADB Social Protection Index (SPI) database. 
     (ⅴ) For other developing countries, the data come from World Bank “Pension Spending” (4Q 2016 / 4Q 2013). 
 ④ Education expenditure Government education expenditure as a share of GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑤ Government revenue Government revenue (excluding grants) as a share of GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑥ Tax-revenue Tax-revenue as a share of GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑦ Social contribution Social contribution as a share of GDP, which is calculated by 
multiplying social contribution (% of revenue) by revenue (% of GDP)  
World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑧ Fiscal balance  (Government revenue – government expenditure) / GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑨ Public debt Central government debt as a share of GDP.  For countries without 
data, general government gross debt as a share of GDP is used. 
World Bank’s WDI database / IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) 
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Table 3.4. (cont.) 
  Variables Description Source 
  Explanatory variables  
 ① Demographic variables   
 ②  Old dependency ratio The ratio of old population (aged 65+) to working-age population (aged 15-64)   World Bank’s WDI database 
 ③  Young dependency ratio The ratio of young population (aged 0-14) to working-age population (aged 15-64)   World Bank’s WDI database 
 ④  Share of 65 and over The ratio of old population (aged 65+) to total population   World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑤  Share of 15-64 The ratio of working-age population (aged 15-64) to total population   World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑥  Population growth rate The growth rate of total population World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑦  Unemployment rate The ratio of the unemployed as a share of total labor force (ILO estimates) World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑧  Institutional quality The synthetic index of institutional quality is calculated, based on the weighted 
average of five principal components, which is normalized as range 0~1. 
𝐼𝑄 = (𝑅𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐺𝐸 + 𝑅𝑄 + 𝑃𝑆)/5 
where 𝑅𝐿  is rule of law, 𝐶𝐶  is control of corruption, 𝐺𝐸 is government 
effectiveness, 𝑅𝑄 is regulatory quality, 𝑃𝑆 is political stability (-2.5~2.5). 
Author’s own calculation based 
on World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) 
database 
 ⑨  Trade openness The sum of both exports and imports (of both goods and services) as a share of GDP World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑩  Inflation The average growth rate of consumer price (CPI) index World Bank’s WDI database 
 ⑪   Oil price The oil price is calculated as the log of inflation-adjusted oil price. This data is only 
applied to oil-exporter countries. 
        * Oil-exporters (9): Angola, Algeria, Canada, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria,  
           Norway, Russia (source: US Energy Information Administration) 
Author’s own calculation, using 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) / inflationData.com 
database / Econstats database 
 ⑫  Global interest rate The global interest rate is calculated by subtracting the inflation (CPI) rate of the 
previous year from the yield-rate of U.S. Treasury bills. 
IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database 
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Table 3.4. (cont.) 
 Variables Description Source 
   Simulation variables    
 ①  Public spending by ages Age-specific public transfer inflows for all public services  
 * Public transfer inflows refer to flows received by the beneficiaries of all public        
    programs, measured to include cash transfers and all in-kind transfers. 
National Transfer Accounts 
(NTAs) database 
(https://www.ntaccounts.org) 
 ②  Health spending by ages Age-specific public transfer inflows (aggregate or individual) for health services are obtained from “National Transfer 
Accounts (NTAs)” database (https://www.ntaccounts.org). 
* NTAs countries (24): Australia (2010), Austria (2010), Argentina (1997), Brazil (1996), Chile (1997),   
   China (2002), Costa Rica (2013), El Salvador (2010), Finland (2006), Germany (2003), Hungary (2005), 
   India (2004), Italy (2008), Japan (2004), Mexico (2004), Moldova (2014), Slovenia (2010), South Africa (2005), 
   South Korea (2012), Spain (2000), Sweden (2003), Thailand (2004), Uruguay (2006) and United States (2011) 
 ③  Pension spending by ages Age-specific public transfer inflows (aggregate or individual) for public pension services are obtained from “National 
Transfer Accounts (NTAs)” database (https://www.ntaccounts.org). 
 ④  Education spending by ages Age-specific public transfer inflows (aggregate or individual) for education services are obtained from “National 
Transfer Accounts (NTAs)” database (https://www.ntaccounts.org). 
 ⑤  Population Prospects by ages The estimates (1950-2015) and prospects (2015-2100, medium-fertility variant) 
for total population (both sexes combined) by five-age group.  
UN’s World Population 
Prospects: The 2017 Revision 
 ⑥  Beneficiary dependency ratio The ratio of the main beneficiaries of each public program to working-age 
population (aged 20-64), which is calculated by the data of ⑤.   
Author’s own calculation from 
UN’s World Population Prospects 
 ⑦  Health dependency ratio The ratio of the main beneficiaries (aged 0-9 and 60+) of health spending to 
working-age population (20-64), which is calculated by the data of ⑤.   
Author’s own calculation from 
UN’s World Population Prospects 
 ⑧  Pension dependency ratio The ratio of the main beneficiaries (aged 60+) of public pension spending to 
working-age population (20-64), which is calculated by the data of ⑤.   
Author’s own calculation from 
UN’s World Population Prospects 
 ⑨  Education dependency ratio The ratio of the main beneficiaries (aged 0-19) of education spending to working-
age population (20-64), which is calculated by the data of ⑤.   
Author’s own calculation from 
UN’s World Population Prospects 
 ⑩  Real GDP The real gross domestic product based on constant local currency. World Bank’s WDI database 
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Table 3.5. Estimation Results Ⅰ: The Impact of Demographic Shift on Government Expenditure 
     Dependent Variables: 
     (Arellano-Bond System GMM) 
Government 
 Expenditure 
 
 
   
(Public Pension)  (Health)  (Education) 
     Lagged old dependency ratio 0.0570744* 0.0285713***  0.0202477***  -0.001776 
 (0.029) (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
     Lagged young dependency ratio -0.0084694 -0.0101049***  0.0046519***  0.0039763** 
  (0.009) (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
     Lagged population growth 0.1301622 0.1138622**  -0.0075324  -0.0192713 
 (0.128) (0.051)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
     Lagged dependent variable 0.9044896*** 0.9606588***  0.8739627***  0.7727102*** 
 (0.013) (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
     Lagged unemployment rate 0.0298863 0.003704  0.0002929  -0.0084907 
 (0.026) (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
     Lagged institutional quality -0.6246779 -0.6216564**  -0.2040332  1.341085*** 
 (1.116) (0.270)  (0.181)  (0.218) 
     Lagged trade openness  0.000696 0.0003436  0.0004951  0.0014319** 
 (0.004) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
     Lagged inflation -0.0129074 -0.0075168  0.0040957  0.0059097* 
 (0.014) (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
     Lagged global interest rate -0.6718132 0.1348725  0.0040623  0.0132507 
 (0.149) (0.107)  (0.191)  (0.016) 
     Number of Observations 1,705 826  1,912  1,227 
     Sargan-Hansen test  1,240 720**  1,351  914 
     AR (2) test 0.11 -4.17  -5.69  -0.84 
       
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of fiscal balance, old dependency ratio and real GDP. 
† For over-identification test, Sargan-Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. the instruments 
are exogenous). For autocorrelation test, AR (2) test is used. The null hypothesis is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order autocorrelation.  
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Table 3.6. Estimation Results Ⅱ: The Impact of Demographic Shift on Government Revenue 
     Dependent Variables: 
     (Arellano-Bond System GMM) 
Government 
 Revenue 
 
 
 
(Tax)  (Social Contribution) 
     Lagged old dependency ratio 0.0087498 -0.0173931  0.0060111 
 (0.029) (0.021)  (0.006) 
     Lagged young dependency ratio -0.0242233*** -0.0004791  -0.0013558 
  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.003) 
     Lagged population growth 0.2324428* -0.0342379  0.0064202 
 (0.130) (0.092)  (0.039) 
     Lagged dependent variable 0.8879659*** 0.8772415***  0.9696508*** 
 (0.011) (0.014)  (0.007) 
     Lagged unemployment rate 0.100046*** 0.0458651***  0.0048755 
 (0.025) (0.016)  (0.005) 
     Lagged institutional quality -0.1427282 1.748417**  -0.0999864 
 (1.033) (0.787)  (0.204) 
     Lagged trade openness  0.0092979** 0.0061178**  0.000728 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.001) 
     Lagged inflation -0.0020264 0.0045338  -0.0039049 
 (0.014) (0.009)  (0.003) 
     Lagged global interest rate -1.479215 -0.024847  -0.8209312* 
 (46.000) (0.065)  (0.454) 
     Number of Observations 1,734 1,758  1,128 
     Sargan-Hansen test 1,252 1,279  965*** 
     AR (2) test  0.29 -0.34  0.10 
     
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of fiscal balance, old dependency ratio and real GDP. 
† For over-identification test, Sargan-Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. the instruments 
are exogenous). For autocorrelation test, AR (2) test is used. The null hypothesis is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order autocorrelation.  
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Table 3.7. Estimation Results Ⅲ: The Impact of Demographic Shift on Fiscal Balance and Public Debt 
     Dependent Variables: 
     (Arellano-Bond System GMM) 
 
Fiscal Balance 
 
 
  
Public debt (Government 
Expenditure) 
 (Government 
Revenue) 
     Lagged old dependency ratio -0.0998264*** 0.0570744*  0.0087498 0.2853746*** 
 (0.033) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.082) 
     Lagged young dependency ratio -0.0435816*** -0.0084694  -0.0242233*** 0.0129478 
  (0.010) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.024) 
     Lagged population growth 0.1968289 0.1301622  0.2324428* 0.2217323 
 (0.146) (0.128)  (0.130) (0.298) 
     Lagged dependent variable 0.7867967*** 0.9044896***  0.8879659*** 0.9071045*** 
 (0.019) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.008) 
     Lagged unemployment rate 0.0767273*** 0.0298863  0.100046*** -0.251204*** 
 (0.025) (0.026)  (0.025) (0.065) 
     Lagged institutional quality -1.839531 -0.6246779  -0.1427282 5.383471* 
 (1.165) (1.116)  (1.033) (2.836) 
     Lagged trade openness  0.0110243** 0.000696  0.0092979** -0.0252596*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.009) 
     Lagged inflation 0.0167355 -0.0129074  -0.0020264 0.0005058 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.001) 
     Lagged global interest rate -0.1251249 -0.6718132  -1.479215 -0.4001833 
 (0.109) (0.149)  (46.000) (471.4) 
     Number of Observations 1,664 1,705  1,734 1,867 
     Sargan-Hansen test 1,214 1,240  1,252 2,107 
     AR (2) test  2.23** 0.11  0.29 -1.18 
      
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of fiscal balance, old dependency ratio and real GDP. 
† For over-identification test, Sargan-Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. the instruments 
are exogenous). For autocorrelation test, AR (2) test is used. The null hypothesis is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order autocorrelation.  
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Table 3.8. Robustness Check Ⅰ: Specifications with Different Identification Strategies 
     Dependent Variables: 
     Fiscal Balance / Public Debt 
Fiscal Balance  Public Debt 
(1) Fixed     
       Effects 
(2) Pooled 
  OLS 
(3) AB System 
GMM 
 (1) Fixed  
       Effects 
(2) Pooled 
  OLS 
(3) AB System 
GMM 
  Lagged old dependency ratio -0.208082*** -0.334784*** -0.099826***  4.533284*** 2.799977*** 0.285375*** 
 (0.072) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.567) (0.239) (0.082) 
  Lagged young dependency ratio -0.136612*** -0.098341*** -0.043582***  0.377170** 0.544039*** 0.012948 
  (0.023) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.169) (0.069) (0.024) 
  Lagged population growth 0.277257* 0.798952*** 0.196829  -2.344997** 3.733551*** 0.221732 
 (0.163) (0.136) (0.146)  (0.950) (0.896) (0.298) 
  Lagged dependent variable - - 0.786797***  - - 0.907105*** 
   (0.019)    (0.008) 
  Lagged unemployment rate -0.095963** 0.066506*** 0.076727***  2.568919*** 0.180045 -0.251204*** 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.025)  (0.299) (0.168) (0.065) 
  Lagged institutional quality 10.90026*** 1.359753 -1.839531  -188.400*** -38.39503*** 5.383471* 
 (3.176) (1.190) (1.165)  (22.88) (8.378) (2.836) 
  Lagged trade openness  0.027267*** 0.006634** 0.011024**  0.122149*** 0.117956*** -0.025260*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.044) (0.020) (0.009) 
  Lagged inflation -0.001605 0.007105 0.016736  0.000304 0.000339 0.000506 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.015)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
  Lagged global interest rate 0.403187*** 0.345706*** -0.125125  0.778868* 0.457642 -0.400183 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.109)  (0.437) (0.526) (471.4) 
  Number of Observations 1,742 1,742 1,664  1,919 1,919 1,867 
  R-squared 0.084 0.155 -  0.141 0.080 - 
  F-test 18.12*** 39.73*** -  36.37*** 20.89*** - 
  Sargan-Hansen test  - - 1,214  - - 2,107 
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of fiscal balance, old dependency ratio and real GDP. 
† For over-identification test, Sargan-Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (i.e. the instruments 
are exogenous). To check whether the model is appropriate or not, the joint F-test is used for both fixed-effects and pooled OLS. The null hypothesis of 
F-test is that all the coefficients are zero.  
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Table 3.9. Robustness Check Ⅱ: Specifications with Different Variables under Arellano-Bond System GMM  
     Dependent Variables: 
     Fiscal Balance / Public Debt 
 Fiscal Balance  Public Debt 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)  Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
  Lagged old dependency ratio - -0.090011*** -0.099826***  - 0.301303*** 0.285375*** 
  (0.033) (0.033)   (0.087) (0.082) 
  Lagged young dependency ratio - -0.034998*** -0.043582***  - 0.003981 0.012948 
   (0.010) (0.010)   (0.025) (0.024) 
  Lagged share of 65 and over -0.078285* - -  0.377026*** - - 
 (0.047)    (0.116)   
  Lagged share of 15-64 0.111301*** - -  0.009351 - - 
 (0.026)    (0.065)   
  Lagged population growth 0.220846 0.002781 0.196829  0.205839 0.373555 0.221732 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.146)  (0.297) (0.299) (0.298) 
  Lagged dependent variable 0.787630*** 0.772562*** 0.786797***  0.914154*** 0.903338*** 0.907105*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
  Lagged unemployment rate 0.067427*** - 0.076727***  -0.227434*** - -0.251204*** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.066)  (0.065) 
  Lagged labor-participation rate - 0.048732*** -  - 0.100638** - 
  (0.019)    (0.048)  
  Lagged oil price - 0.499349*** -  - -0.076034 - 
  (0.153)    (0.365)  
  Lagged institutional quality -1.640668 -0.629682 -1.839531  5.193732* 6.296988** 5.383471* 
 (1.140) (1.163) (1.165)  (2.839) (2.863) (2.836) 
  Lagged trade openness  0.009431** 0.013404*** 0.011024**  -0.026858*** -0.031975*** -0.025260*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Lagged inflation 0.017295 0.011766 0.016736  0.001394** 0.000504 0.000506 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Lagged global interest rate -2.274242 -0.091464 -0.125125  -0.325041 -0.349357 -0.400183 
 (27.78) (0.109) (0.109)  (534.2) (470.6) (471.4) 
  Number of Observations 1,664 1,664 1,664  1,867 1,867 1,867 
  Sargan-Hansen test  1,195 1,219 1,214  2,122 2,125 2,107 
  AR (2) test 2.19** 2.12** 2.23**  -1.23 -1.20 -1.18 
        
       Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
† The excluded instruments are the two-period lagged variables of fiscal balance, old dependency ratio (or share of 65 and over) and real GDP. 
† For over-identification test, Sargan-Hansen test is used. The null hypothesis of the test is that instruments are exogenous. For autocorrelation test, AR (2) 
test is used. The null is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order autocorrelation.  
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Table 3.10. Decomposition of Public Spending into Policy and Demography: Austria (2010)    
   (A) Pension Spending Decomposition: Benefit Generosity Ratio & Cohort Dependency Ratio     
Age 
 
(i) 
 
 
Benefit 
Generosity 
Ratio (%) 
 (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/
𝑁𝑖𝑡)/(𝑌𝑡/𝑊𝑡)) 
 
Cohort 
Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑖𝑡/𝑊𝑡) 
 
Pension 
Spending / 
GDP (%) 
(𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡 =
𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Pension 
Spending1 
(1,000 €, 
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) 
Population2 
 
(1,000, 𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
GDP 
(million €, 
𝑌𝑡) 
 
Working-
Age (20-64) 
Population 
(1,000, 𝑊𝑡) 
0-4 5,078 391   0.023 7.559 0.002 
5-9 16,512 407   0.071 7.870 0.006 
10-14 29,206 440   0.116 8.503 0.010 
15-19 46,304 504   0.161 9.744 0.016 
20-24 43,556 520   0.147 10.046 0.015 
25-29 44,185 555   0.139 10.732 0.015 
30-34 53,006 528   0.175 10.217 0.018 
35-39 99,456 594 295,897 5,172 0.293 11.485 0.034 
40-44 198,837 709   0.490 13.706 0.067 
45-49 359,941 708   0.888 13.694 0.122 
50-54 767,168 610   2.197 11.801 0.259 
55-59 2,347,450 487   8.417 9.425 0.793 
60-64 7,143,094 460   27.143 8.894 2.414 
65-69 9,185,531 461   34.803 8.920 3.104 
70-74 7,188,972 358   35.138 6.914 2.430 
75-79 5,048,195 266   33.222 5.135 1.706 
80-84 4,508,843 223   35.371 4.308 1.524 
85-89 3,037,604 142   37.354 2.748 1.027 
90+ 1,097,144 47   40.383 0.918 0.371 
Total Public Pension Expenditure/GDP:  𝑃𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖 /𝑌𝑡   13.931 
 
   (B) Health Spending Decomposition: Benefit Generosity Ratio & Cohort Dependency Ratio 
Age 
 
(i) 
 
 
Benefit 
Generosity 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡/  
 𝑁𝑖𝑡)/(𝑌𝑡/𝑊𝑡)) 
 
Cohort 
Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑖𝑡/𝑊𝑡) 
Health 
Spending / 
GDP (%) 
(𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡 =
𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Health 
Spending1 
(1,000 €, 
𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡) 
Population2 
 
(1,000, 𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
GDP 
(million €, 
𝑌𝑡) 
 
Working-
Age (20-64) 
Population 
(1,000, 𝑊𝑡) 
0-4 478,456 391   2.139 7.559 0.162 
5-9 290,584 407   1.248 7.870 0.098 
10-14 330,887 440   1.315 8.503 0.112 
15-19 424,425 504   1.472 9.744 0.143 
20-24 505,275 520   1.700 10.046 0.171 
25-29 622,713 555   1.961 10.732 0.210 
30-34 641,350 528   2.121 10.217 0.217 
35-39 744,214 594 295,897 5,172 2.190 11.485 0.252 
40-44 976,482 709   2.408 13.706 0.330 
45-49 1,158,987 708   2.860 13.694 0.392 
50-54 1,207,269 610   3.457 11.801 0.408 
55-59 1,178,889 487   4.227 9.425 0.398 
60-64 1,286,580 460   4.889 8.894 0.435 
65-69 1,498,839 461   5.679 8.920 0.507 
70-74 1,428,554 358   6.982 6.914 0.483 
75-79 1,241,143 266   8.168 5.135 0.419 
80-84 1,101,796 223   8.643 4.308 0.372 
85-89 744,826 142   9.159 2.748 0.252 
90+ 247,803 47   9.121 0.918 0.084 
Total Health Expenditure/GDP:  𝐻𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖 /𝑌𝑡   5.444 
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Table 3.10. (cont.) 
(C) Education Spending Decomposition: Benefit Generosity Ratio & Cohort Dependency ratio    
Age 
 
(i) 
 
 
Benefit 
Generosity 
Ratio (%) 
 (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡/
𝑁𝑖𝑡)/(𝑌𝑡/𝑊𝑡)) 
 
Cohort 
Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑖𝑡/𝑊𝑡) 
Education 
Spending / 
GDP (%) 
(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡 =
𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Education 
Spending1 
(1,000 €, 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡) 
Population2 
 
(1,000, 𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
GDP 
(million €, 
𝑌𝑡) 
 
Working-
Age (20-64) 
Population 
(1,000, 𝑊𝑡) 
0-4 785,355 391   3.511 7.559 0.265 
5-9 2,906,431 407   12.481 7.870 0.982 
10-14 4,324,174 440   17.187 8.503 1.461 
15-19 3,349,935 504   11.619 9.744 1.132 
20-24 1,047,251 520   3.523 10.046 0.354 
25-29 625,560 555   1.970 10.732 0.211 
30-34 329,588 528   1.090 10.217 0.111 
35-39 228,167 594 295,897 5,172 0.671 11.485 0.077 
40-44 155,164 709   0.383 13.706 0.052 
45-49 151,299 708   0.373 13.694 0.051 
50-54 114,339 610   0.327 11.801 0.039 
55-59 98,485 487   0.353 9.425 0.033 
60-64 92,952 460   0.353 8.894 0.031 
65-69 90,108 461   0.341 8.920 0.030 
70-74 54,730 358   0.268 6.914 0.018 
75-79 40,391 266   0.266 5.135 0.014 
80-84 32,867 223   0.258 4.308 0.011 
85-89 20,966 142   0.258 2.748 0.007 
90+ 7,284 47   0.268 0.918 0.002 
Total Education Expenditure/GDP:  𝐸𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖 /𝑌𝑡   4.885 
Notes. 1. The data for three age-related spending – pension, health and education – by each age-cohort are obtained  
                 from public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) database 
                 (https://www.ntaccounts.org). 
           2. The age-specific population data are obtained from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.  
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs)                       
               database, total population by age from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and  
               GDP data from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Table 3.11. “Granular” Projections for Public Spending: Austria (2015-2060)    
   (A) Public Spending Estimates (2015)     
Age 
 
(i) 
 
Benefit Generosity Ratio Cohort 
Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
 
Public Spending (% of GDP) Estimates 
Pension 
BGR (%) 
(𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Health 
BGR (%) 
(𝐻𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Education 
BGR (%) 
(𝐸𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Pension (%) 
(𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Health (%) 
(𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Education 
(%) (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
0-4 0.023 2.139 3.511 7.592 0.002 0.162 0.267 
5-9 0.071 1.248 12.481 7.499 0.005 0.094 0.936 
10-14 0.116 1.315 17.187 7.766 0.009 0.102 1.335 
15-19 0.161 1.472 11.619 8.521 0.014 0.125 0.990 
20-24 0.147 1.700 3.523 10.289 0.015 0.175 0.362 
25-29 0.139 1.961 1.970 10.752 0.015 0.211 0.212 
30-34 0.175 2.121 1.090 11.073 0.019 0.235 0.121 
35-39 0.293 2.190 0.671 10.206 0.030 0.223 0.069 
40-44 0.490 2.408 0.383 11.241 0.055 0.271 0.043 
45-49 0.888 2.860 0.373 13.289 0.118 0.380 0.050 
50-54 2.197 3.457 0.327 13.101 0.288 0.453 0.043 
55-59 8.417 4.227 0.353 11.187 0.942 0.473 0.040 
60-64 27.143 4.889 0.353 8.862 2.405 0.433 0.031 
65-69 34.803 5.679 0.341 8.243 2.869 0.468 0.028 
70-74 35.138 6.982 0.268 8.078 2.838 0.564 0.022 
75-79 33.222 8.168 0.266 6.007 1.996 0.491 0.016 
80-84 35.371 8.643 0.258 4.019 1.421 0.347 0.010 
85-89 37.354 9.159 0.258 2.734 1.021 0.250 0.007 
90+ 40.383 9.121 0.268 1.418 0.573 0.129 0.004 
Total Public Expenditure/GDP:  𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖 /𝑌𝑡  14.635 5.587 4.584 
   (B) Public Spending Projection (2060)     
Age 
 
(i) 
 
Benefit Generosity Ratio Cohort 
Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
 
Public Spending (% of GDP) Projections 
Pension 
BGR (%) 
(𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Health 
BGR (%) 
(𝐻𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Education 
BGR (%) 
(𝐸𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Pension (%) 
(𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Health (%) 
(𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Education 
(%) (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑌𝑡= 
𝑃𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
0-4 0.023 2.139 3.511 9.403 0.002 0.201 0.330 
5-9 0.071 1.248 12.481 9.522 0.007 0.119 1.188 
10-14 0.116 1.315 17.187 9.398 0.011 0.124 1.615 
15-19 0.161 1.472 11.619 9.318 0.015 0.137 1.083 
20-24 0.147 1.700 3.523 9.586 0.014 0.163 0.338 
25-29 0.139 1.961 1.970 10.243 0.014 0.201 0.202 
30-34 0.175 2.121 1.090 11.053 0.019 0.234 0.120 
35-39 0.293 2.190 0.671 11.632 0.034 0.255 0.078 
40-44 0.490 2.408 0.383 11.730 0.058 0.282 0.045 
45-49 0.888 2.860 0.373 11.340 0.101 0.324 0.042 
50-54 2.197 3.457 0.327 11.135 0.245 0.385 0.036 
55-59 8.417 4.227 0.353 11.340 0.954 0.479 0.040 
60-64 27.143 4.889 0.353 11.942 3.241 0.584 0.042 
65-69 34.803 5.679 0.341 13.403 4.665 0.761 0.046 
70-74 35.138 6.982 0.268 13.063 4.590 0.912 0.035 
75-79 33.222 8.168 0.266 12.323 4.094 1.007 0.033 
80-84 35.371 8.643 0.258 9.906 3.504 0.856 0.026 
85-89 37.354 9.159 0.258 8.248 3.081 0.756 0.021 
90+ 40.383 9.121 0.268 7.632 3.082 0.696 0.020 
Total Public Expenditure/GDP:  𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖 /𝑌𝑡 27.731 8.476 5.341 
   Notes. This step is to project the future public spending that would be increased only by demographic shift,  
              taking the current policy (benefit generosity ratio) fixed, which were derived in Table 3.10. 
   Source. Author’s own work, based on the baseline projections of UN World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision. 
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Table 3.12. Decomposition of Public Spending into Policy and Demography: non-NTA country    
 
Country Year 
 
Public Spending  
(% of GDP) (𝐸𝑡) 
 
Beneficiary Dependency 
Ratio (% of working-age 
population) (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) 
Benefit Generosity Ratio 
(% of GDP per working-age 
pop.) (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡= 𝐸𝑡/𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) 
Pension 
 
Health 
 
Edu. 
 
Pension Health Edu. Pension  Health  Edu.  
Afghanistan 2010 0.26 8.57 3.46 9.81 96.72 148.00 2.61 8.86 2.34 
Albania 2012 6.10 5.86 3.54 27.12 47.65 50.09 22.49 12.30 7.07 
Antigua and Barbuda 2009 0.02 4.75 2.52 15.49 46.42 62.08 0.14 10.23 4.06 
Armenia 2013 3.69 8.27 2.65 24.32 46.13 42.43 15.18 17.93 6.25 
Azerbaijan 2013 3.99 5.36 2.44 13.68 38.49 49.16 29.18 13.92 4.97 
Bahrain 2004 0.90 3.17 2.87 5.53 34.71 53.90 16.28 9.12 5.33 
Bangladesh 2013 0.46 2.65 1.97 12.79 49.53 74.56 3.61 5.36 2.64 
Barbados 2014 0.15 7.68 6.23 31.96 53.05 43.05 0.47 14.48 14.47 
Belarus 2015 8.00 6.11 4.79 31.55 49.29 32.47 25.35 12.40 14.74 
Belgium 2013 11.66 8.02 6.64 39.81 59.06 38.18 29.29 13.57 17.39 
Belize 2015 0.08 6.21 6.71 11.18 51.72 81.23 0.71 12.01 8.26 
Benin 2015 1.60 3.99 4.36 11.52 82.87 124.98 13.89 4.82 3.49 
Bhutan 2013 0.10 3.34 5.59 11.53 44.92 68.34 0.84 7.44 8.18 
Bolivia 2014 1.20 5.78 7.29 17.84 61.68 84.95 6.72 9.37 8.58 
Botswana 2009 1.31 6.75 9.63 10.03 52.92 84.34 13.06 12.75 11.42 
Bulgaria 2013 8.60 7.85 4.06 42.38 57.57 29.21 20.29 13.63 13.91 
Burkina Faso 2009 0.66 5.72 3.94 9.75 92.92 141.72 6.77 6.15 2.78 
Burundi 2006 0.70 10.33 3.63 10.45 90.56 144.67 6.70 11.41 2.51 
Cabo Verde 2013 2.82 4.40 5.00 12.76 53.81 83.68 22.10 8.19 5.98 
Cambodia 2013 0.31 6.91 2.02 12.08 53.74 81.12 2.58 12.85 2.49 
Canada 2011 4.65 7.18 5.27 32.57 49.83 36.46 14.26 14.41 14.46 
Central African Rep. 2004 0.80 3.87 1.62 13.30 83.17 123.06 6.01 4.65 1.32 
Colombia 2015 0.15 5.32 4.50 17.99 44.30 54.33 0.81 12.00 8.28 
Cote d’lvoire 2013 1.50 5.07 4.73 10.97 81.96 125.68 13.68 6.18 3.76 
Croatia 2013 10.80 7.30 4.59 41.02 57.39 34.11 26.33 12.72 13.45 
Cyprus 2014 10.50 6.80 6.12 27.44 45.32 38.07 38.27 15.01 16.09 
Czech Republic 2013 9.24 5.93 4.09 37.77 54.21 30.70 24.46 10.93 13.32 
Denmark 2013 10.21 6.68 8.49 41.77 61.22 40.86 24.44 10.90 20.79 
Estonia 2013 5.93 4.50 4.84 39.74 57.98 33.47 14.92 7.76 14.46 
Ethiopia 2014 0.32 4.03 4.50 12.20 80.33 126.67 2.62 5.02 3.55 
Fiji 2013 0.30 3.47 3.88 15.24 50.25 66.30 1.99 6.90 5.86 
France 2013 14.70 8.61 5.51 42.03 63.35 41.94 34.97 13.59 13.13 
Gambia 2006 0.36 5.47 1.21 9.69 93.41 140.11 3.72 5.85 0.86 
Georgia 2012 3.46 8.37 1.98 31.82 52.68 41.54 10.86 15.89 4.77 
Ghana 2014 0.60 5.53 6.16 11.16 69.63 104.97 5.38 7.94 5.87 
Greece 2012 14.56 6.27 3.96 40.18 56.49 32.57 36.23 11.11 12.17 
Guatemala 2015 0.10 5.72 2.96 13.86 64.19 98.86 0.73 8.91 2.99 
Iceland 2013 3.96 5.28 7.76 30.49 54.08 46.37 12.98 9.77 16.73 
Indonesia 2012 0.92 3.38 3.41 13.19 46.56 65.00 7.01 7.25 5.24 
Iran 2013 5.87 6.26 3.07 12.04 37.99 48.83 48.76 16.48 6.28 
Ireland 2013 5.93 5.47 5.32 28.88 53.83 44.74 20.54 10.15 11.88 
Israel 2014 3.81 5.21 5.74 29.33 65.76 66.43 12.98 7.92 8.64 
Jamaica 2013 0.05 5.83 6.25 21.81 49.51 61.25 0.23 11.77 10.21 
Kazakhstan 2015 3.00 3.88 2.79 17.81 51.68 55.14 16.85 7.51 5.06 
Kenya 2015 1.60 5.22 5.27 9.11 73.03 115.81 17.56 7.15 4.55 
Kyrgyz Republic 2013 7.61 8.19 6.78 12.17 51.56 71.79 62.52 15.88 9.44 
Lao PDR 2013 0.58 2.66 3.23 11.69 58.36 91.25 4.95 4.56 3.54 
Latvia 2013 7.97 2.76 6.97 39.98 56.76 31.78 19.95 4.86 21.94 
Lebanon 2013 2.70 7.50 2.48 19.84 45.58 58.24 13.61 16.45 4.26 
Lithuania 2014 7.00 6.18 4.49 39.38 55.35 33.70 17.78 11.16 13.31 
Luxembourg 2012 7.42 5.50 4.09 30.17 48.00 37.00 24.58 11.46 11.06 
Malawi 2015 1.20 9.33 5.61 10.49 87.61 136.16 11.44 10.65 4.12 
Malaysia 2012 3.23 3.63 5.74 14.39 43.87 62.98 22.46 8.27 9.11 
Maldives 2013 0.53 10.98 3.80 9.34 36.05 52.19 5.72 30.47 7.28 
Mali 2010 1.59 4.43 3.34 10.65 99.55 147.36 14.93 4.45 2.27 
Malta 2014 8.30 9.46 7.25 39.82 55.40 32.88 20.84 17.07 22.05 
Mauritius 2015 4.50 5.54 4.89 24.43 43.24 42.60 18.42 12.80 11.47 
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Table 3.12. (cont.) 
 
Country Year 
 
Public Spending  
(% of GDP) (𝐸𝑡) 
 
Beneficiary Dependency 
Ratio (% of working-age 
population) (𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) 
Benefit Generosity Ratio 
(% of GDP per working-age 
pop.) (𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑡= 𝐸𝑡/𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑡) 
Pension 
 
Health 
 
Edu. 
 
Pension Health Edu. Pension  Health  Edu.  
Mongolia 2013 3.10 4.00 4.94 9.93 44.03 61.00 31.21 9.09 8.10 
Nepal 2013 1.08 5.68 3.47 16.34 61.28 92.37 6.61 9.27 3.76 
Netherlands 2013 7.26 7.86 5.59 38.83 57.29 38.51 18.69 13.71 14.52 
New Zealand 2014 5.92 7.45 6.36 33.56 56.77 46.24 17.65 13.12 13.74 
Norway 2013 7.60 5.55 7.47 36.14 56.60 41.63 21.02 9.80 17.95 
Pakistan 2013 0.96 2.60 2.49 13.21 63.20 92.82 7.30 4.12 2.69 
Paraguay 2012 0.17 7.62 4.96 15.92 56.20 81.01 1.08 13.56 6.13 
Peru 2015 0.13 5.26 3.98 17.66 51.12 65.12 0.74 10.30 6.11 
Philippines 2009 4.38 4.35 2.65 12.25 58.26 88.31 35.73 7.47 3.00 
Poland 2012 9.50 4.34 4.81 31.75 47.43 32.61 29.94 9.16 14.76 
Portugal 2013 14.80 6.05 5.28 43.11 58.45 32.66 34.33 10.36 16.16 
Qatar 2012 0.31 1.75 3.51 2.48 14.44 23.00 12.52 12.11 15.25 
Romania 2014 8.20 5.03 3.13 37.48 53.86 33.62 21.88 9.35 9.31 
Samoa 2008 0.76 4.77 5.14 15.43 73.58 106.44 4.92 6.48 4.83 
Senegal 2010 1.78 4.01 6.50 10.96 83.45 126.90 16.24 4.80 5.12 
Serbia 2015 12.20 9.41 4.04 38.99 56.63 37.35 31.29 16.61 10.82 
Seychelles 2006 2.90 3.69 4.77 15.49 43.21 55.22 18.72 8.54 8.64 
Sierra Leone 2014 0.30 19.73 2.66 9.52 79.31 123.60 3.15 24.87 2.15 
Singapore 2013 1.54 3.72 2.91 24.33 39.68 34.33 6.34 9.38 8.49 
Slovak Republic 2013 7.87 5.61 4.09 29.73 45.39 32.04 26.47 12.36 12.76 
Solomon Islands 2010 1.26 7.36 10.00 11.16 73.98 112.08 11.33 9.95 8.92 
Sri Lanka 2012 1.28 2.61 1.50 21.41 50.43 55.94 5.97 5.17 2.67 
St. Lucia 2006 1.70 5.41 5.25 18.26 47.80 66.47 9.31 11.31 7.90 
St. Vincent and the G. 2003 0.17 4.01 8.64 17.90 54.29 74.61 0.95 7.39 11.58 
Switzerland 2013 7.19 6.63 5.04 37.45 53.34 32.82 19.21 12.43 15.36 
Syria 2004 1.30 4.48 5.37 10.76 70.87 112.59 12.08 6.32 4.77 
Timor-Leste 2013 4.93 1.65 5.61 13.15 91.28 141.29 37.48 1.81 3.97 
Togo 2014 1.90 6.47 4.88 10.02 77.12 116.95 18.97 8.39 4.17 
Trinidad and Tobago 2003 1.04 4.69 3.14 17.30 41.17 56.54 6.02 11.39 5.55 
Tunisia 2015 5.20 6.74 6.60 19.03 46.21 50.57 27.33 14.59 13.05 
Turkey 2013 8.22 3.98 4.36 18.99 49.07 60.05 43.30 8.12 7.27 
Uganda 2014 0.60 7.25 2.25 8.81 100.45 156.30 6.81 7.22 1.44 
United Kingdom 2013 6.23 7.15 5.62 39.34 59.77 39.98 15.84 11.96 14.05 
Vanuatu 2009 1.86 2.04 5.01 11.75 67.60 100.45 15.80 3.02 4.99 
Vietnam 2013 2.54 6.37 5.65 15.50 41.25 51.06 16.37 15.45 11.07 
Zambia 2008 1.40 5.46 1.10 9.84 95.71 146.85 14.23 5.70 0.75 
   Notes. Beneficiary dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the main beneficiaries for each program relative to  
              working-age (20-64) population. For example, pension (or education / health) dependency ratio is defined  
              as the share of aged 60+ (or 0-19 / 0-5 and 60+) to working-age population. 
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the population data from UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision,   
               and the expenditure data from various sources including World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Table 3.13. Cross-Country Comparisons: Demographic Shift and Fiscal Impact Projections for 117 countries (2015-2060)  
Country 
Demographic Shift Fiscal Impact Projection 
Old Dependency 
Ratio (%, 60+/20-64) 
 Young Dependency 
Ratio (%, 0-19/20-64) 
Pension Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Health Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Education Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Total Age-related 
Spending (% of GDP) 
2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 
Advanced                   
Australia 34.0 55.3 +21.3 41.8 42.6 +0.8 2.8 4.9 +2.1 5.8 8.7 +2.9 3.3 3.4 +0.1 11.9 17.0 +5.1 
Austria 39.4 76.5 +37.2 31.4 37.6 +6.3 14.6 27.7 +13.1 5.6 8.5 +2.9 4.6 5.3 +0.8 24.8 41.5 +16.7 
Belgium 40.5 63.8 +23.3 38.1 42.0 +3.9 11.9 18.7 +6.8 8.1 11.5 +3.3 6.6 7.3 +0.7 26.6 37.5 +10.8 
Bulgaria 43.9 70.4 +26.5 29.6 39.7 +10.1 8.9 14.3 +5.4 8.1 12.2 +4.1 4.1 5.5 +1.4 21.1 32.0 +10.9 
Canada 36.1 63.0 +26.9 35.3 38.9 +3.6 5.1 9.0 +3.8 7.7 11.8 +4.1 5.1 5.6 +0.5 18.0 26.4 +8.5 
Croatia 42.7 75.8 +33.1 33.9 35.4 +1.5 11.2 19.9 +8.7 7.5 11.8 +4.3 4.6 4.8 +0.2 23.3 36.5 +13.2 
Cyprus 27.9 68.3 +40.5 37.2 33.6 -3.5 10.7 26.1 +15.5 6.9 12.7 +5.8 6.0 5.4 -0.6 23.5 44.2 +20.7 
Czech Republic 39.7 73.3 +33.6 31.0 40.8 +9.7 9.7 17.9 +8.2 6.2 10.2 +4.0 4.1 5.4 +1.3 20.1 33.6 +13.5 
Denmark 42.9 59.5 +16.6 40.1 40.2 +0.1 10.5 14.5 +4.1 6.8 8.7 +1.9 8.3 8.4 +0.0 25.6 31.6 +6.0 
Estonia 41.4 73.6 +32.2 33.9 41.5 +7.6 10.1 18.0 +7.9 6.5 10.2 +3.6 7.0 8.6 +1.6 23.7 36.8 +13.1 
Finland 46.8 62.8 +16.0 37.9 40.6 +2.7 13.2 17.3 +4.0 6.1 8.2 +2.0 4.3 4.4 +0.2 23.6 29.9 +6.2 
France 44.0 62.9 +18.9 42.5 42.4 +0.0 15.4 22.0 +6.6 8.9 11.4 +2.5 5.6 5.6 +0.0 29.8 39.0 +9.1 
Germany 45.0 75.4 +30.4 29.9 35.9 +6.1 13.7 22.4 +8.7 10.3 15.6 +5.3 2.6 3.0 +0.4 26.7 41.1 +14.4 
Greece 42.5 86.4 +43.9 32.3 33.8 +1.5 15.4 31.3 +15.9 6.5 11.4 +4.9 3.9 4.1 +0.2 25.8 46.8 +21.0 
Hungary 39.8 69.9 +30.1 31.3 35.9 +4.5 11.1 17.6 +6.5 5.4 7.6 +2.2 3.9 4.2 +0.3 20.4 29.3 +9.0 
Iceland 32.2 63.1 +30.8 45.4 39.5 -5.9 4.2 8.2 +4.0 5.4 8.0 +2.6 7.6 6.6 -1.0 17.2 22.8 +5.6 
Ireland 31.1 57.9 +26.8 46.4 42.7 -3.7 4.0 7.5 +3.5 4.5 6.2 +1.7 4.0 3.7 -0.3 12.5 17.4 +4.9 
Italy 48.3 80.6 +32.3 31.1 36.7 +5.6 13.7 21.1 +7.4 7.7 12.4 +4.7 3.8 4.4 +0.7 25.2 37.9 +12.7 
Japan 58.2 91.2 +33.0 31.4 37.0 +5.7 11.2 16.6 +5.4 8.5 15.8 +7.3 3.4 4.0 +0.6 23.1 36.4 +13.4 
Latvia 41.5 68.0 +26.5 31.9 41.4 +9.5 8.3 13.6 +5.3 2.8 4.3 +1.4 7.0 9.1 +2.1 18.1 26.9 +8.8 
Lithuania 40.3 66.4 +26.2 33.4 41.9 +8.5 7.2 11.8 +4.6 6.3 9.7 +3.4 4.5 5.6 +1.1 17.9 27.1 +9.2 
Luxembourg 30.1 54.6 +24.5 35.1 39.8 +4.7 7.4 13.4 +6.0 5.4 8.5 +3.1 3.9 4.4 +0.5 16.7 26.4 +9.7 
Malta 40.7 80.2 +39.5 32.5 37.2 +4.6 8.5 16.7 +8.2 9.6 16.9 +7.2 7.2 8.2 +1.0 25.3 41.8 +16.5 
Netherlands 40.6 67.0 +26.3 38.3 38.9 +0.6 7.6 12.5 +4.9 8.1 11.8 +3.8 5.6 5.6 +0.1 21.2 30.0 +8.8 
New Zealand 34.4 59.4 +25.1 46.0 40.8 -5.2 6.0 10.5 +4.4 7.5 10.4 +2.9 6.3 5.6 -0.7 19.9 26.5 +6.6 
Norway 36.7 57.3 +20.6 40.8 40.0 -0.7 7.7 12.0 +4.3 5.6 7.6 +2.0 7.3 7.2 -0.1 20.6 26.8 +6.2 
Poland 35.1 87.0 +51.9 31.4 34.5 +3.1 10.5 26.0 +15.5 4.7 9.5 +4.8 4.6 5.1 +0.5 19.8 40.6 +20.8 
Portugal 45.1 87.0 +41.9 32.3 32.4 +0.1 15.5 29.9 +14.4 6.2 10.6 +4.4 5.2 5.2 +0.0 26.9 45.7 +18.8 
Romania 38.4 69.6 +31.2 33.6 37.4 +3.8 8.4 15.2 +6.8 5.1 8.2 +3.1 3.1 3.5 +0.3 16.7 26.9 +10.2 
Slovak Republic 31.7 74.9 +43.2 31.6 38.3 +6.7 8.4 19.8 +11.4 5.9 11.6 +5.7 4.0 4.9 +0.9 18.3 36.3 +18.0 
Slovenia 40.1 78.8 +38.7 30.8 40.9 +10.2 14.4 24.3 +9.8 7.3 10.0 +2.7 4.9 6.6 +1.7 26.7 40.9 +14.2 
Spain 39.6 85.3 +45.7 31.5 36.1 +4.7 12.2 23.2 +11.0 6.0 10.9 +4.9 3.6 4.1 +0.5 21.7 38.2 +16.5 
Sweden 43.5 61.1 +17.5 38.8 43.4 +4.6 8.4 11.8 +3.3 10.8 15.8 +5.0 7.3 7.8 +0.6 26.5 35.4 +8.9 
Switzerland 37.9 69.2 +31.3 32.3 37.4 +5.1 7.3 13.3 +6.0 6.7 10.9 +4.2 5.0 5.7 +0.8 19.0 30.0 +11.0 
United Kingdom 40.2 62.1 +21.9 39.9 41.5 +1.6 6.4 9.8 +3.5 7.3 9.9 +2.6 5.6 5.8 +0.2 19.3 25.6 +6.3 
United States 34.6 54.7 +20.2 43.5 42.4 -1.1 5.1 8.3 +3.3 7.5 11.4 +3.9 4.6 4.3 -0.2 17.1 24.0 +6.9 
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Table 3.13. (cont.)  
Country 
Demographic Shift Fiscal Impact Projection 
Old Dependency 
Ratio (%, 65+/20-64) 
 Young Dependency 
Ratio (%, 0-19/20-64) 
Pension Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Health Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Education Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Total Age-related 
Spending (% of GDP) 
2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 
Developing                   
Afghanistan 9.7 20.0 +10.2 136.2 49.1 -87.1 0.3 0.5 +0.3 7.5 3.9 -3.6 3.2 1.1 -2.0 10.9 5.5 -5.4 
Albania 29.3 78.1 +48.8 43.7 35.4 -8.2 6.6 17.6 +11.0 5.9 11.7 +5.8 3.1 2.5 -0.6 15.6 31.8 +16.2 
Antigua & Barbuda 16.8 49.5 +32.7 55.1 40.5 -14.6 0.2 0.7 +0.4 4.5 7.1 +2.6 2.2 1.6 -0.6 6.9 9.4 +2.5 
Argentina 27.0 47.3 +20.3 59.2 43.0 -16.2 8.0 13.7 +5.7 4.3 4.8 +0.5 3.0 2.3 -0.8 15.3 20.8 +5.4 
Armenia 25.1 67.5 +42.4 41.4 37.2 -4.2 3.8 10.3 +6.4 8.5 15.2 +6.7 2.6 2.3 -0.3 14.9 27.8 +12.9 
Azerbaijan 14.5 49.0 +34.5 47.6 39.5 -8.1 4.2 14.3 +10.1 5.6 9.4 +3.9 2.4 2.0 -0.4 12.2 25.7 +13.5 
Bahrain 5.8 34.5 +28.7 36.8 25.2 -11.5 0.9 5.6 +4.7 2.4 4.3 +1.9 2.0 1.3 -0.6 5.3 11.2 +5.9 
Bangladesh 12.7 47.7 +35.0 71.0 36.5 -34.5 0.5 1.7 +1.3 2.5 3.5 +1.0 1.9 1.0 -0.9 4.9 6.2 +1.3 
Barbados 33.0 60.9 +27.9 43.1 44.1 +1.1 0.2 0.3 +0.1 7.8 11.9 +4.1 6.2 6.4 +0.2 14.2 18.6 +4.4 
Belarus 31.6 59.9 +28.4 32.5 43.8 +11.4 8.0 15.2 +7.2 6.1 10.1 +3.9 4.8 6.5 +1.7 18.9 31.7 +12.8 
Belize 11.2 32.2 +21.0 81.2 43.0 -38.2 0.1 0.2 +0.1 6.2 6.4 +0.2 6.7 3.6 -3.2 13.0 10.2 -2.8 
Benin 11.5 16.6 +5.0 125.0 76.1 -48.9 1.6 2.3 +0.7 4.0 2.7 -1.3 4.4 2.7 -1.7 9.9 7.7 -2.3 
Bhutan 11.8 51.8 +40.0 63.7 36.8 -26.9 0.1 0.4 +0.3 3.2 5.2 +2.0 5.2 3.0 -2.2 8.5 8.6 +0.1 
Bolivia 18.1 35.8 +17.7 83.4 47.3 -36.1 1.2 2.4 +1.2 5.7 5.5 -0.2 7.2 4.1 -3.1 14.1 12.0 -2.1 
Botswana 11.1 34.4 +23.3 75.8 44.3 -31.5 1.4 4.5 +3.0 6.5 7.2 +0.6 8.7 5.1 -3.6 16.6 16.7 +0.1 
Brazil 19.4 63.3 +43.9 50.7 35.1 -15.6 1.6 4.6 +3.0 3.0 6.2 +3.2 2.2 1.6 -0.7 6.9 12.3 +5.4 
Burkina Faso 9.3 14.7 +5.4 137.2 76.8 -60.4 0.6 1.0 +0.4 5.5 3.4 -2.1 3.8 2.1 -1.7 9.9 6.5 -3.4 
Burundi 9.9 15.1 +5.2 129.3 83.9 -45.4 0.7 1.0 +0.3 10.0 6.8 -3.2 3.2 2.1 -1.1 13.9 9.9 -4.0 
Cabo Verde 12.6 40.4 +27.9 78.4 39.2 -39.2 2.8 8.9 +6.2 4.2 4.9 +0.7 4.7 2.3 -2.3 11.6 16.1 +4.5 
Cambodia 12.5 37.2 +24.8 77.0 45.8 -31.1 0.3 1.0 +0.6 6.8 7.6 +0.8 1.9 1.1 -0.8 9.1 9.7 +0.7 
Central Africa 13.3 16.5 +3.2 133.4 65.7 -67.7 0.8 1.0 +0.2 4.1 2.3 -1.7 1.8 0.9 -0.9 6.6 4.2 -2.4 
Chile 24.7 64.5 +39.7 46.3 37.2 -9.1 3.6 8.6 +5.0 2.2 3.3 +1.1 3.9 3.1 -0.8 9.7 15.1 +5.4 
China 23.0 71.6 +48.6 35.1 37.0 +1.9 2.8 6.5 +3.7 1.7 3.5 +1.7 1.6 1.7 +0.1 6.2 11.7 +5.6 
Colombia 18.0 57.2 +39.2 54.3 36.7 -17.7 0.1 0.5 +0.3 5.3 9.0 +3.7 4.5 3.0 -1.5 10.0 12.5 +2.5 
Costa Rica 21.1 66.4 +45.4 50.5 36.2 -14.3 0.5 1.5 +0.9 5.7 8.0 +2.3 6.4 4.7 -1.7 12.6 14.1 +1.5 
Cote d’lvore 10.9 14.5 +3.6 123.8 81.7 -42.0 1.5 2.0 +0.5 5.0 3.6 -1.4 4.7 3.1 -1.6 11.1 8.6 -2.5 
El Salvador 21.0 50.5 +29.6 73.4 38.4 -34.9 1.8 4.1 +2.4 2.8 3.5 +0.8 1.7 0.9 -0.8 6.2 8.6 +2.4 
Ethiopia 12.1 23.2 +11.1 123.9 52.3 -71.5 0.3 0.6 +0.3 3.9 2.5 -1.5 4.4 1.9 -2.5 8.7 4.9 -3.7 
Fiji 16.3 36.7 +20.4 65.7 45.6 -20.0 0.3 0.7 +0.4 3.5 4.0 +0.5 3.8 2.7 -1.2 7.7 7.4 -0.2 
Gambia 9.1 14.2 +5.0 137.1 69.1 -68.0 0.3 0.5 +0.2 5.2 2.9 -2.3 1.2 0.6 -0.6 6.7 4.0 -2.7 
Georgia 33.4 58.1 +24.7 40.7 43.2 +2.6 3.6 6.3 +2.7 8.8 12.5 +3.7 1.9 2.1 +0.1 14.4 20.8 +6.5 
Ghana 11.1 20.4 +9.4 103.9 63.7 -40.2 0.6 1.1 +0.5 5.5 4.2 -1.3 6.1 3.7 -2.4 12.2 9.0 -3.1 
Guatemala 13.9 34.6 +20.7 98.9 46.3 -52.6 0.1 0.3 +0.2 5.7 5.1 -0.6 3.0 1.4 -1.6 8.8 6.7 -2.0 
India 15.8 38.2 +22.3 67.7 39.6 -28.0 4.5 6.9 +2.4 2.3 2.9 +0.6 1.6 1.0 -0.7 8.5 10.8 +2.3 
Indonesia 13.9 36.2 +22.3 62.7 42.6 -20.2 1.0 2.5 +1.6 3.3 4.1 +0.8 3.3 2.2 -1.1 7.6 8.9 +1.3 
Iran 12.7 70.2 +57.5 47.4 37.0 -10.5 6.2 34.2 +28.0 6.4 14.4 +8.0 3.0 2.3 -0.7 15.6 50.9 +35.4 
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Table 3.13. (cont.)  
Country 
Demographic Shift Fiscal Impact Projection 
Old Dependency 
Ratio (%, 65+/20-64) 
 Young Dependency 
Ratio (%, 0-19/20-64) 
Pension Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Health Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Education Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Total Age-related 
Spending (% of GDP) 
2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 
Israel 29.8 42.9 +13.1 67.0 51.8 -15.1 3.9 5.6 +1.7 5.3 5.4 +0.2 5.8 4.5 -1.3 14.9 15.5 +0.6 
Jamaica 22.5 68.0 +45.5 57.5 38.2 -19.2 0.1 0.2 +0.1 5.7 10.2 +4.4 5.9 3.9 -2.0 11.6 14.2 +2.6 
Kazakhstan 17.8 35.6 +17.7 55.1 49.8 -5.4 3.0 6.0 +3.0 3.9 4.5 +0.6 2.8 2.5 -0.3 9.7 13.0 +3.3 
Kenya 9.1 23.3 +14.2 115.8 60.1 -55.7 1.6 4.1 +2.5 5.2 3.8 -1.4 5.3 2.7 -2.5 12.1 10.7 -1.4 
Korea 27.5 94.0 +66.4 30.2 34.8 +4.7 2.1 5.4 +3.4 3.6 7.9 +4.3 3.1 3.6 +0.5 8.8 16.9 +8.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 12.8 33.9 +21.1 71.3 52.7 -18.6 8.0 21.2 +13.2 8.6 9.4 +0.9 6.7 5.0 -1.8 23.3 35.6 +12.3 
Lao PDR 11.8 35.0 +23.2 86.0 40.2 -45.8 0.6 1.7 +1.1 2.6 2.5 -0.1 3.0 1.4 -1.6 6.2 5.6 -0.6 
Lebanon 19.6 74.2 +54.5 57.4 36.1 -21.3 2.7 10.1 +7.4 7.6 15.2 +7.7 2.4 1.5 -0.9 12.7 26.9 +14.2 
Malawi 10.5 18.9 +8.4 136.2 69.5 -66.7 1.2 2.2 +1.0 9.3 5.9 -3.5 5.6 2.9 -2.7 16.1 10.9 -5.3 
Malaysia 15.3 50.4 +35.1 57.6 38.9 -18.7 3.4 11.3 +7.9 3.5 5.8 +2.2 5.2 3.5 -1.7 12.2 20.6 +8.4 
Maldives 9.2 68.1 +58.9 47.5 35.2 -12.3 0.5 3.9 +3.4 10.7 25.9 +15.2 3.5 2.6 -0.9 14.7 32.3 +17.6 
Mali 10.3 12.7 +2.3 149.9 80.0 -70.0 1.5 1.9 +0.3 4.4 2.4 -2.0 3.4 1.8 -1.6 9.4 6.1 -3.3 
Mauritius 24.4 63.1 +38.6 42.6 34.0 -8.6 4.5 11.6 +7.1 5.5 10.2 +4.7 4.9 3.9 -1.0 14.9 25.7 +10.8 
Mexico 16.9 52.4 +35.5 64.9 37.6 -27.3 1.2 2.8 +1.6 1.9 2.6 +0.7 3.1 1.9 -1.2 6.2 7.3 +1.1 
Moldova 24.2 74.8 +50.6 31.7 33.6 +1.9 8.5 22.1 +13,6 5.6 9.7 +4.1 6.3 7.3 +1.0 20.4 39.1 +18.7 
Mongolia 10.4 35.5 +25.1 61.1 50.8 -10.3 3.2 11.1 +7.8 4.2 5.5 +1.3 5.0 4.1 -0.8 12.4 20.7 +8.3 
Nepal 16.9 40.6 +23.8 86.7 34.6 -52.1 1.1 2.7 +1.6 5.4 5.3 -0.1 3.3 1.3 -2.0 9.7 9.3 -0.5 
Pakistan 13.1 26.6 +13.4 90.0 51.0 -38.9 1.0 1.9 +1.0 2.6 2.1 -0.4 2.4 1.4 -1.0 5.9 5.4 -0.5 
Paraguay 16.8 39.5 +22.7 75.6 43.7 -31.8 0.2 0.4 +0.2 7.4 8.2 +0.8 4.6 2.7 -1.9 12.2 11.4 -0.9 
Peru 17.7 47.5 +29.9 65.1 40.9 -24.2 0.1 0.4 +0.2 5.3 6.9 +1.7 4.0 2.5 -1.5 9.4 9.8 0.4 
Philippines 13.7 29.1 +15.4 79.5 50.2 -29.3 4.9 10.4 +5.5 4.1 4.0 -0.1 2.4 1.5 -0.9 11.4 15.9 +4.5 
Qatar 2.9 36.1 +33.2 22.1 22.7 +0.5 0.4 4.5 +4.2 1.8 5.7 +3.9 3.4 3.5 +0.1 5.6 13.7 +8.2 
Samoa 17.1 30.7 +13.6 102.3 61.1 -41.2 0.8 1.5 +0.7 4.6 3.9 -0.7 4.9 3.0 -2.0 10.4 8.4 -2.0 
Senegal 10.7 18.7 +7.9 123.2 73.7 -49.5 1.7 3.0 +1.3 3.9 2.7 +1.2 6.3 3.8 -2.5 12.0 9.5 -2.4 
Serbia 39.0 64.6 +25.6 37.4 37.6 +0.3 12.2 20.2 +8.0 9.4 13.8 +4.4 4.0 4.1 +0.0 25.6 38.0 +12.4 
Seychelles 19.4 53.6 +34.1 43.8 43.9 +0.1 3.6 10.0 +6.4 3.7 6.3 +2.6 3.8 3.8 +0.0 11.2 20.2 +9.0 
Sierra Leone 9.4 16.2 +6.7 122.3 59.4 -62.9 0.3 0.5 +0.2 19.4 11.4 -8.0 2.6 1.3 -1.4 22.3 13.2 -9.1 
Singapore 26.9 86.4 +59.5 32.9 29.9 -3.1 1.7 5.5 +3.8 3.9 9.4 +5.5 2.8 2.5 -0.3 8.4 17.4 +9.0 
Solomon Islands 11.3 24.6 +13.3 108.7 59.6 -49.1 1.3 2.8 +1.5 7.0 5.4 -1.6 9.7 5.3 -4.4 18.0 13.5 -4.5 
South Africa 14.3 31.6 +17.3 68.6 44.7 -23.9 1.3 3.1 +1.8 2.3 2.6 +0.4 3.9 2.7 -1.2 7.5 8.5 +1.0 
Sri Lanka 23.8 58.2 +34.4 55.1 40.2 -14.9 1.4 3.5 +2.1 2.7 4.0 +1.3 1.5 1.1 -0.4 5.6 8.5 +3.0 
St. Lucia 21.2 73.7 +52.6 46.5 32.4 -14.1 2.0 6.9 +4.9 4.6 10.1 +5.5 3.7 2.6 -1.1 10.3 19.5 +9.2 
St. Vincent and G. 18.5 52.4 +33.9 56.5 36.7 -19.8 0.2 0.5 +0.3 3.4 5.2 +1.8 6.5 4.2 -2.3 10.1 9.9 -0.2 
Syria 13.7 33.2 +19.4 107.1 43.2 -63.8 1.7 4.0 +2.3 4.3 3.4 -0.9 5.1 2.1 -3.0 11.1 9.5 -1.6 
Thailand 24.3 72.4 +48.1 38.8 33.4 -5.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.8 +0.7 2.9 2.5 -0.4 4.4 4.6 +0.2 
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Table 3.13. (cont.)  
Country 
Demographic Shift Fiscal Impact Projection 
Old Dependency 
Ratio (%, 65+/20-64) 
 Young Dependency 
Ratio (%, 0-19/20-64) 
Pension Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Health Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Education Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Total Age-related 
Spending (% of GDP) 
2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 2015 2060 Gap 
Timor-Leste 13.4 16.4 +3.1 140.9 70.4 -70.5 5.0 6.2 +1.2 1.6 0.9 -0.7 5.6 2.8 -2.8 12.3 9.9 -2.3 
Togo 10.0 16.7 +6.7 116.3 70.5 -45.7 1.9 3.2 +1.3 6.4 4.5 -1.9 4.8 2.9 -1.9 13.2 10.6 -2.6 
Trinidad & Tobago 22.4 52.0 +29.5 42.8 38.2 -4.6 1.3 3.1 +1.8 5.1 8.0 +2.9 2.4 2.1 -0.3 8.8 13.2 +4.4 
Tunisia 19.0 53.3 +34.3 50.6 42.7 -7.8 5.2 14.6 +9.4 6.7 10.8 +4.1 6.6 5.6 -1.0 18.5 31.0 +12.4 
Turkey 19.8 55.5 +35.7 58.7 38.5 -20.2 8.6 24.0 +15.5 4.0 6.0 +2.0 4.3 2.8 -1.5 16.8 32.8 +16.0 
Uganda 8.7 14.3 +5.6 154.6 80.1 -74.5 0.6 1.0 +0.4 7.2 4.1 -3.1 2.2 1.2 -1.1 10.0 6.2 -3.8 
Uruguay 33.8 56.8 +23.0 51.1 39.5 -11.6 8.1 13.5 +5.4 3.3 3.6 +0.4 2.5 2.0 -0.5 13.9 19.1 +5.2 
Vanuatu 13.1 29.2 +16.1 93.6 57.0 -36.6 2.1 4.6 +2.5 2.0 1.8 -0.2 4.7 2.8 -1.8 8.7 9.2 +0.5 
Vietnam 16.4 61.0 +44.6 48.7 42.8 -5.9 2.7 10.0 +7.3 6.5 12.7 +6.2 5.4 4.7 -0.7 14.6 27.4 +12.9 
Zambia 9.1 16.2 +7.1 138.7 84.3 -54.3 1.3 2.3 +1.0 5.0 3.5 -1.5 1.0 0.6 -0.4 7.3 6.4 -0.9 
Notes. 1. The last column shows the changes (gaps) in the sum of three age-related spending as a share of GDP between 2015 and 2060.  
             2. The red colored cells ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖    show “highly-pressured countries”, which imply the countries that would face high fiscal-burden in the future only by    
                 demographic shift (i.e. countries in which the gaps in public spending (% of GDP) between 2015 and 2060 exceed 15% points).  
                 The yellow colored cells ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖    show “pressured countries”, which imply the countries that would face moderate fiscal-burden in the future only by  
                 demographic shift (i.e. countries in which the gaps in public spending (% of GDP) between 2015 and 2060 are in the range of 5~15% points).  
                 The rests (blue colored cells) show “relatively safe countries”, which imply the countries that would face little fiscal-burden in the future only by   
                 demographic shift (i.e. countries in which the gaps in public spending (% of GDP) between 2015 and 2060 are below 5% points or negative). 
  Source. Author’s own work, based on the public transfer inflow by age from National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) database, total population by age from     
               UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and other data from World Bank’s WDI database. 
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Table 3.14. Overview of Public Pension Schemes    
 
 
Country Intro  
Year 
 
Pension Scheme  
 
Pensionable 
 Age 
 
Contribution Rates (%) 
PAYG 
DB 
 
Provided 
Fund 
 
Funded 
DC 
 
 
Men 
 
Women 
Insured 
Person 
Employ
er 
Self-
Employ 
Financing from 
Government 
Albania 1947 √ - - 65 60 8.8 12.8 21.6 Contribution 
Antigua & Barbuda 1972 √ - - 60 60 4.0 6.0 10.0 No contribution 
Argentina 1904 √ - - 65 60 11.0 12.7 27.0 Contribution 
Armenia 1956 √ - √ 63 63 5.0 - 5.0 Contribution 
Australia 1908 √ - - 56 56 Voluntary 9.5 Voluntary Contribution 
Austria 1906 √ - - 65 60 10.3 12.6 - Contribution 
Azerbaijan 1956 √ - - 63 60 3.0 22.0 20.0 Contribution 
Bangladesh 1998 √ - - 65 62 - - - Contribution 
Barbados 1966 √ - - 66 66 5.9-6.8 5.9-6.8 13.5 Contribution 
Belarus 1956 √ - - 60 55 1.0 28.0 29.0 Contribution 
Belgium 1900 √ - - 65 65 7.5 8.9 - Contribution 
Belize 1979 √ - - 65 65 vary vary 7.0 Contribution 
Benin 1970 √ - - 60 60 3.6 6.4 - No contribution 
Bhutan 1976 - √ - 56 56 5.0 5.0 - No contribution 
Bolivia 1949 √ - √ 55 50 12.71 - 10-1.71 Contribution 
Botswana 1996 √ - - 65 65 - - - Contribution 
Brazil 1923 √ - - 65 60 8.0-11.0 20.0 20.0 Contribution 
Bulgaria 1924 √ - √ 63 60 7.9 9.9 12.8 Contribution 
Burkina Faso 1960 √ - - 56-63 56-63 5.5 5.5 11.0 No contribution 
Burundi 1956 √ - - 60 60 4.0 6.0 - No contribution 
Cabo Verde 1957 √ - - 60 60 3.0 7.0 10.0 Contribution 
Cambodia 1994 √ - - 55 55 - - - Contribution 
Canada 1952 √ - - 65 65 4.95 4.95 9.9 Contribution 
Central Africa 1963 √ - - 60 60 3.0 4.0 Voluntary No contribution 
Chile 1980 √ - √ 65 60 10.0 1.0 10.0 Contribution 
China 1951 √ - √ 60 60 - - 12.0 Contribution 
Colombia 1946 √ - - 62 57 4.0 12.0 15.9 Contribution 
Costa Rica 1941 √ - √ 65 65 1.0 3.3 - No contribution 
Cote d’lvore 1960 √ - - 60 60 6.3 7.7 - No contribution 
Croatia 1922 √ - √ 65 61.5 20.0 - 20.0 Contribution 
Cyprus 1957 √ - - 65 65 7.8 7.8 14.6 Contribution 
Czech Republic 1906 √ - - 63 62 6.5 21.5 28.0 Contribution 
Denmark 1891 √ - - 65 65 - - - Contribution 
Estonia 1924 √ - √ 63 63 2.0 4.0 4.0 No contribution 
Finland 1937 √ - - 63-68 63-68 5.7 18.0 - Contribution 
France 1928 √ - - 61 61 6.9 8.55 - Contribution 
Germany 1889 √ - - 65 65 9.3 9.3 18.7 Contribution 
Greece 1934 √ - - 67 67 6.67 13.33 20.0 Contribution 
Guatemala 1969 √ - - 60 60 1.8 3.7 5.5 Contribution 
Hungary 1928 √ - √ 63 63 10.0 27.0 10.0 Contribution 
Iceland 1909 √ - - 67 67 4.0 8.0 12.0 Contribution 
India 1952 √ √ - 58 58 12.0 3.67 - Contribution 
Indonesia 1977 - √ - 56 56 2.0 3.7 - Contribution 
Iran 1953 √ - - 60 55 5.0 14.0 18.0 Contribution 
Ireland 1908 √ - - 66 66 4.0 8.5-11 4.0 Contribution 
Israel 1953 √ - - 70 68 0.2-3.9 1.3-2.0 3.0-5.2 Contribution 
Italy 1919 √ - - 66 62 9.19 23.81 23.1 Contribution 
Jamaica 1965 √ - - 65 65 2.5 2.5 5.0 Contribution 
Japan 1941 √ - - 65 65 16,260¥ - 16,260¥ Contribution 
Kazakhstan 1991 √ - √ 63 58 10.0 - 10.0 No contribution 
Kenya 1965 - √ - 60 60 6.0 6.0 200 units Contribution 
Korea 1973 √ - - 61 61 4.5 4.5 9.0 Contribution 
Kyrgyz Republic 1922 √ - √ 63 58 8.0 15.25 9.3 Contribution 
Lao PDR 1996 √ - - 60 55 2.5 2.5 5.0 No contribution 
Latvia 1922 - - √ 63 63 10.5 23.6 30.6 Contribution 
Lebanon 1963 √ - - 60-64 60-64 - 8.5 - No contribution 
Lithuania 1922 √ - - 63 61 3.0 23.3 26.3 Contribution 
Luxembourg 1911 √ - - 65 65 8.0 8.0 16.0 Contribution 
Malawi 2011 - - √ - - - - - Not yet start 
Malaysia 1951 √ √ - 55 55 0.5 0.5 50- units Contribution 
Maldives 2009 √ - - 65 65 - - - Contribution 
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Table 3.14. (cont.)    
 
 
Country Intro  
Year 
 
Pension Scheme  
 
Pensionable 
 Age 
 
Contribution Rates (%) 
PAYG 
DB 
 
Provided 
Fund 
 
Funded 
DC 
 
 
Men 
 
Women 
Insured 
Person 
Employ
er 
Self-
Employ 
Government 
Financing 
Mali 1961 √ - - 58 58 3.6 5.4 9.0 No contribution 
Malta 1956 √ - - 62-65 62-65 10.0 10.0 vary Contribution 
Mauritius 1950 √ - - 63 63 3.0 6.0 150 units Contribution 
Moldova 1956 √ - - 62 57 6.0 23.0 - Contribution 
Mongolia 1994 √ - - 60 55 7.0 7.0 10.0 Contribution 
Nepal 1962 - √ - 58 58 10.0 10.0 - Contribution 
Netherlands 1901 √ - - 65 65 17.9 - 17.9 Contribution 
New Zealand 1898 √ - - 65 65 - - - Contribution 
Norway 1936 √ - - 62 62 8.2 14.1 11.4 Contribution 
Pakistan 1976 √ - - 60 55 1.0 5.0 - Contribution 
Paraguay 1943 √ - - 60 60 9.0 14.0 12.5 Contribution 
Peru 1992 √ - √ 65 65 10.0 - 10.0 Contribution 
Philippines 1954 √ - - 60 60 3.6 7.4 11.0 Contribution 
Portugal 1935 √ - - 66 66 11.0 23.8 29.6 Contribution 
Qatar 2002 √ - - 60 60 5.0 10.0 - Contribution 
Romania 1912 √ - √ 65 60 5.4 15.8-26 21.2 Contribution 
Samoa 1972 √ √ - 55 55 7.0 7.0 Voluntary Contribution 
Senegal 1975 √ - - 60 60 5.6 8.4 - No contribution 
Serbia 1922 √ - - 65 61 14.0 12.0 26.0 Contribution 
Seychelles 1971 √ - - 63 63 2.0 2.0 4.0 No contribution 
Sierra Leone 2001 √ - - 60 60 5.0 10.0 15.0 Contribution 
Singapore 1953 - √ - 55 55 20.0 17.0 4.0-10.5 Contribution 
Slovak Republic 1906 √ - √ 62 62 7.0 17.0 24.0 Contribution 
Slovenia 1922 √ - - 65 65 15.5 8.9 24.35 Contribution 
Solomon Islands 1973 - √ - 50 50 5.0 7.5 Voluntary No contribution 
South Africa 1928 √ - - 60 60 - - - Contribution 
Spain 1919 √ - - 65 65 4.7 23.6 - Contribution 
Sri Lanka 1958 - √ - 55 50 8.0 12.0 - No contribution 
St. Lucia 1970 √ - - 65 65 5.0 5.0 vary No contribution 
St. Vincent and G. 1970 √ - - 60 60 4.5 5.5 9.5 Contribution 
Sweden 1913 √ - √ 61 61 7.0 10.21 17.21 Contribution 
Switzerland 1946 √ - - 65 64 4.2 4.2 4.2-7.8 Contribution 
Syria 1959 √ - - 60 55 7.0 14.1 21.1 No contribution 
Thailand 1990 √ - - 55 55 3.0 3.0 5,184B Contribution 
Timor-Leste 2008 √ - - 60 60 - - - Contribution 
Togo 1968 √ - - 60 60 4.0 12.5 16.5 No contribution 
Trinidad & Tobago 1939 √ - - 60 60 4.0 8.0 - No contribution 
Tunisia 1960 √ - - 60 60 4.7 7.8 - Contribution 
Turkey 1949 √ - - 60 58 9.0 11.0 20.0 Contribution 
Uganda 1967 - √ - 55 55 5.0 10.0 - No contribution 
United Kingdom 1908 √ - - 65 63 12.0 13.8 vary Contribution 
United States 1935 √ - - 66 66 6.2 6.2 12.4 Contribution 
Uruguay 1995 √ - - 60 60 15.0 - 15.0 Contribution 
Vanuatu 1986 - √ - 55 55 4.0 4.0 vary No contribution 
Vietnam 1961 √ - - 60 55 8.0 14.0 22.0 Contribution 
Zambia 1966 √ - - 55 55 5.0 5.0 10.0 No contribution 
   Source. ILO “World Social Protection Report 2014-2015” (pp.237-260, Table B.6. Old-age pension: Key features 
               of main social security programs) / Dorfman (2015, World Bank) “Pension Patterns and Challenges in  
               Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
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